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140aM the Oedao4...0
The student-run law review is common to almost every
law school in the country. While the reviews, in their long
tradition of servicing the legal profession, have never been all
things to all lawyers, there has never been a time when most
lawyers have not wished the reviews were doing more, or at
least something different. The audience of law reviews is comprised of practicing lawyers, academicians, and, to an increasing
extent, non-lawyers with a concern for the role of the law in
various social problems. There is another and distinct class
of consumers, however, who benefit from law reviews-the
students who participate in the law review experience. The
law review typically provides students with various opportunities, including an opportunity to develop work habits and
clarity of thought that lead to self-sufficiency in the later
practice of law.
In determining what a particular law review will publish,
it is becoming increasingly necessary to be aware of the variety
of interests which a legal publication might serve. While the
various interests are not necessarily incompatible, the demands
of any particular group, based on its individually perceived
needs, have a tendency to exclude the interests of the other
groups. The consequence is that an attempt to balance the
separate desires of each audience with the various student
interests often results in a product which satisfies no single
group. The alternative of devoting a publication solely to the
needs of one group would be inconsistent with the requirement
of some minimal agreement among the diversity of students
whom the law review is designed to educate.
The question remains. What should the law review publish?
In a survey of its readership, the Journal received a nottoo-surprising response which indicated that Colorado lawyers
would appreciate greater attention to Colorado law. The specific information resulting from the survey, however, was more
revealing. A relatively significant percentage asked for brief
case abstracts with analysis, and there was almost as great a
request for analysis of legislative enactments. A desire was
also expressed for symposium issues, i.e., an entire issue devoted
to a specific topic. With respect to specific areas of law, the
three in which coverage was most requested were business
(commercial and tax), estate planning, and family law.
There is little doubt that traditional analysis of Colorado

law, with students doing the bulk of the writing, would serve
a traditional educational function, as well as service the Colorado practitioners who represent a significant portion of the
Journal audience. The assumption is that in-depth analysis of
the law of any jurisdiction teaches the research and logic skills
that prepare a student to practice in any other jurisdiction.
Even presuming that the survey speaks the interest of
Colorado lawyers, it cannot be said that coverage of Colorado
alone would serve the individual law student's interest in a
broad educational opportunity. Although there is no question
that traditional legal education, in its emphasis on doctrinal
analysis, is a valid and necessary experience, there is concern
that it provides a limited perspective of the character of law.
The University of Denver College of Law has, in fact, a growing
reputation which reflects on equal emphasis on a complementary perspective of law which directs that law be examined in
the context of practice. Examination of the law in practical
situations is motivated not only by a desire to determine
whether the impact of a particular law is or is not socially beneficial, but by a desire to determine whether a particular law
has any impact at all. The question asked is whether the law
which governs a particular social relationship is realistic, i.e.,
does the law in fact govern the situation to which it addresses
itself? Alternatively, are there situations presently not within
the governance of law, merely because they have not come to
the attention of the decisionmaking segment of the public? It is
increasingly apparent that this broader view of the law is relevant outside the minds of academicians: cases are being argued
contrary to the established law on the basis of facts of a sort not
generally considered - e.g.., Brown v. Board of Education.
The publication policy of the Denver Law Journal is in a
constant state of development, and that is as it should be. The
present direction of policy development reflects a desire to
balance the needs of practicing lawyers with the educational
demands of Journal members -we
do not view the demands as
incompatible. The present direction involves a plan that will
be implemented, of necessity, over a period of time, so that this
issue contaiis articles which reflect that policy development
only indirectly.
Articles in this issue include empirical views of the criminal justice system by Raymond T. Nimmer and Samuel J.
Brakel, both research attorneys with American Bar Foundation.
Both articles deal with the inevitability of discretionary behavior in the criminal justice system and the impact of the law

or the lack of impact - on that behavior. James E. Bond's
discussion of the applicability of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions represents a more traditional analysis in which he
nonetheless suggests applying international law in an untraditional sphere - internal conflicts. In view of the recent
Bangladesh conflict, Bond's analysis is extremely timely. In
his article on the UCCC, John L. C. Black has examined the
failure of those states which have enacted the UCCC to remain
faithful to the philosophy of the Uniform Commissioners and
suggests that state legislators should exercise greater care in
changing the provisions of the Uniform Code.
Professor Alan Merson's comment on Hawkins v. Shaw,
in its combination of case analysis with the review of a related
book, represents not only a unique approach but an interesting
and novel suggestion for the legal solution of racial problems
in the urban context. Other faculty contributions include book
reviews by Professor William M. Beaney and Professor Charles
A. Ehren, Jr.
-

Student contributions include Roger W. Arrington's anaylsis of
Briola v. Roy, a Colorado case which changes the choice of law
rule in torts occurring outside of Colorado, a change which the
court's opinion failed to mention. Continuing a feature initiated
in the previous issue, this issue contains brief discussions of a
number of recently-published books of interest to the legal profession. The Journal carries a new feature in this issue which
has the potential of developing into a significant research aid:
Legal and Empirical Abstracts includes selected and brief
descriptions of research papers with legal implications which
may be obtained from various government agencies and research institutes for a nominal price.
In line with the Journal's developing publication policy, the
next issue will contain a significant proportion of brief studentauthored materials pertaining to Colorado case and legislative
analysis in addition to articles which reflect our continuing
attempt to achieve a balanced approach to the law. While we
do not expect to be all things for all lawyers, we do intend to
be more useful for more people.
John P. Davidson
Editor-in-Chief
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SLIGHTLY MOVEABLE OBJECT:

CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE

PROCESS-

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

THE OMNIBUS HEARING
BY RAYMOND T. NIMMER*

The thesis of this article is that attempts to reform the
criminal justice system are likely to fail unless the reform
design recognizes and accounts for the tendency of pre-existing
administrative processes to dilute the reform or ignore it altogether. Illustrating his thesis with a discussion of the failure
of the omnibus hearing concept in the San Diego Federal District Court, Mr. Nimmer provides a detailed case study of a
reform which was imposed from within the system and which
failed despite the participant-perspective of the reformer, a
judge who might have been expected to foresee such difficulties in reforming a system of which he was a part. While
the explication of the failure of the omnibus hearing in San
Diego represents in itself a significant step in the development
of a concept of administrative nullification of reforms in general, it is likely that the thesis has greater implication for
reforms which are externally imposed, such as those required
by Supreme Court decisions. As such, the article provides the
legal profession with an insightful -model for self-examination.
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INTRODUCTION

T

HIS article discusses some of the underlying problems involved in achieving reform of the criminal justice process
at the judicial level. Although the focus is upon the results of
a recently completed American Bar Foundation study of a
single reform proposal-the omnibus hearing' - the purpose
is not to report on the results of that reform attempt. Rather,
this presentation develops a theme related to reform of the
criminal justice judicial machinery which was strongly suggested by the study of the omnibus hearing.
There is obviously a chronic shortage of manpower and
other resources in most criminal justice systems. Largely in
response to this shortage, but also because of a variety of other
factors, the criminal justice system today thrives not upon the
adjudicated determinations of guilt or innocence embodied in
the adversary model of criminal justice, but upon discretionary,
often informal, adjustments of prosecutions. Criminal prosecu1 R. NiMMER, OMNIBUS HEARING-AN EXPERIMENT IN RELIEVING JUDICIAL
DELAY, INEFFICIENCY AND UNFAIRNESS (1971).
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tions are initiated or deferred based upon discretionary decisions of the prosecutors and the police. Cases are terminated
via plea bargains,2 screening decisions (outright dismissal of
cases deemed to lack sufficient importance),2 and decisions to
divert the case into alternative procedures (dismissal conditioned upon the channeling of the defendant through alterna4
tive systems providing sanctions, treatment, or reparation).
Trials and legal issue hearings are often not, in the daily administrative practice, a frequently-used method of disposition.
The theme suggested by the ABF study is that reforms of
the criminal justice system produce actual change only as they
are filtered through the discretionary adjustment procedure
by which the criminal justice system functions. Changes inconsistent with the local discretionary system face difficult, if not
impossible, obstacles before they become the rule of practice
rather than the hypothetical model. Changes which are
irrelevant to current practice may simply be ignored, while
changes which are supportive of, or only slightly different from
current procedures may have comparatively easy paths toward
accomplishing their purpose. The interrelationship of this discretionary adjustment process and attempts at reform will be
illustrated by an analysis of the reaction of the San Diego court
system to the introduction of the omnibus hearing concept. It
is hoped that discussion of the impact of the discretionary adjustment process will stimulate an awareness of and sensitivity
to the problems confronting any attempt to change the criminal
justice process.
I.

THE DISCRETIONARY

ADJUSTMENT

PROCESS:

OBSTACLE TO REFORM

Since, under the proposed theme, the characteristics of the
adjustment process are the crucial variables, it follows that, in
addressing the issue of court reform, the first place to turn is
not towards the mechanics of the court process itself, although
2

See D.

NEWMAN, CONVICTION:

CENCE WITHOUT TRIAL

THE DETERMINATION

OF GUILT OR INNO-

(1966).

3See McIntyre & Lippman, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony
4

Cases, 56 A.B.A.J. 1154 (1970).
The American Bar Foundation is currently engaged in a national study,
sponsored by the Justice Department's LEAA, aimed at cataloging and
analyzing various methcds of diversion from the criminal justice system.
Virtually every jurisdiction encountered during this unsystematic
national inquiry has been found to have one or more essentially informal
programs to divert crimes such as bad checks, youthful offenders, first
offenders, minor narcotics, and nonsupport from the formal flow of the
system. For a general description of a variety of efforts which we label

diversion, see F.

MILLER, PROSECUTION:
PECT WITH A CRIME chs. 8-18 (1970).

THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUS-
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these must be understood, but to the mechanics and the rationale of the discretionary adjustment procedure which surrounds
and includes the court.
A. Traditional Approaches: Eliminating Discretion
One approach to reform of the criminal justice system
would be to characterize this adjustment process as improper,
and to strive towards maximizing the use of formal adjudication mechanisms. Since a principal bar to the achievement
of this goal is the current imbalance of resources and case load,
this approach must begin by a massive effort to replenish the
resources of the system, or an equally difficult effort to restrict
the input of caie6 ilito the process.5
Although resource or input manipulation is a currently
popular theme, most proposals fail to even approach the level
of redistribution necessary to permit broad use of the adversary
model of disposition. Efforts to completely remove certain
crime categories from the system seldom achieve the necessary
balance for a variety of reasons: they tend to be blocked by
political considerations and a tendency to adhere to traditional
definitions of crimes; they often deal with crimes which, despite
often impressive total arrest numbers, consume comparatively
little time in the system; and they often propose the creation
of massive and expensive non-criminal procedures to handle
the newly redefined non-crime.6 On the other hand, for any
resource-oriented effort to approach success, it must not only
add sufficient judicial and prosecutorial manpower to enable
trial of the current cases being put into the system and the
cases which are pending, but must also account for the everexpanding workload of the criminal system. It must deal with
the-probability that, as additional resources permit, the extent
of defense representation of the routine bulk of the caseload, a
representation which had been compressed by the caseload
pressure, will expand with a resultant consumption of larger
quantities of judge and other system resources. It must not
only create a sufficient supply of defense attorneys to enable
them to carry much smaller caseloads, but must also take steps
to either provide large public defense offices, or to make the
smaller caseloads financially feasible for the private practitioner. Finally, a resource-oriented effort must contend with
the fact that, as the size and investigative capacity of the police
5

For an example of this approach, see F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964); N. MoRImS & F. HAWKINS, AN HONEST POLrn-

CIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIMINAL LAW (1970).
6 See, e.g., R. NIMMER. Two MILLION UNNECESSARY ARRESTS (1971).
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department increase, the rate of input of criminal cases will
increase, regardless of any real increase in the number of crimes
committed.
Even if some semblance of a balance is attained, it is unlikely that the discretionary adjustment of cases would cease.
Although the current imbalance of resources makes it difficult
to separate actual reasons from created justifications, the
rhetoric from the agencies in the system explains much of the
adjustment process in terms of adjusting the law to fit the
facts of the cases, modifying harsh laws or ignoring antiquated
statutes. To the extent that these and similar non-resource
rationales actually explain the process, the discretionary adjustment of cases would continue even if a resource balance was
achieved. Recognizing the impossibility of shaping laws which
can routinely be applied to a limitless variety of factual circumstances to achieve just results, the elimination of discretionary justice seems neither possible nor desirable.'
An Alternative Proposal: Controlling Discretion
An alternative and more realistic approach to reform regards the adjustment process as a fixed characteristic of the
system, and directs attention to modifying, reshaping, safeguarding, or otherwise shaping it to fit desired reform objectives." Thus, procedural change to enhance judicial efficiency
or to increase fairness would work upon a system in which the
norm is and continues to be discretionary, not adjudicated,
disposition. Increases of resources or limitations on case input
would be intended not to eliminate the adjustment process, but
to ameliorate severe imbalances which tend to shape the system
into an undesirable mold, or to provide a tool for the achievement of other reform objectives, such as increasing the availability and the use of trial mechanisms within a system in
which the norm remains non-adjudicated disposition. Realistically construed, most, if not all, reform proposals fit into this
alternative mold. As such, they must work upon a system of
exercised discretion and, in so doing, encounter a number of
substantial and predictable difficulties, several of which are
outlined below.
B.

7

See generally Remington & Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the
Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481.
8 Although he focuses primarily upon administrative processes other than
the criminal justice system, recent efforts by Professor K. C. Davis reflect the understanding that since discretion is the lifeblood of administration, the way to reform administrative practice must be through
modifying ("safeguarding") the exercise of that discretion. K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1970).
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Formal adjudication of issues occurs in court under the
supervision of the judge and is readily susceptible to his control. On the other hand, the important decisions made within
the discretionary adjustment process, decisions which are reflected in the flow of the cases through the court system, occur
out of sight of the judge. Plea discussions control the method
of disposition and the type of sentence imposed, and have a substantial impact upon the time lapse from filing to disposition
and the number of court appearances per case. These are commonly conducted without overt participation of the judge whose
primary function often is to ratify, reject, or modify, post facto,
decisions which have already been made. In a few jurisdictions
the judge actively participates in screening decisions and dominates the charging practice, but these are the exceptions rather
than the rule and are largely explained by local tradition. 9
Theoretically, the judge's power to affect these decisions is
great, but practically, it is limited. Obviously, the court has no
opportunity to review or revise discretionary decisions to forego
prosecution entirely. However, even after a case is filed-a
situation in which theory would require that disposition decisions be made by the court -the ability to revise, reject or run
counter to the discretionary power exercised elsewhere is limited. For example, in a jurisdiction in which continuances are
routinely granted in order to permit full negotiation of cases, a
judge could seek to limit continuances by encouraging counsel
to agree sooner. However, if the judge fails to change the timing
of the negotiating process, he would be hard-pressed to deny a
continuance where the denial would cut off bargaining which
might benefit all sides and force an unprepared defense and
prosecution into premature trial or hearing. Similarly, although
the court is theoretically in full control of sentence decisions,
a judge faced with the real prospect that taking control might
disrupt the bargaining system and result in unmanageable numbers of trials, would not often revise agreed-upon sentences.
This is not to imply that the court is impotent; certainly it is
a principal determinant of the policies which are created. However, once created and functioning, the court may be unable
to unilaterally alter the existing practice.
Although an important theme of the discretionary process
is individualization of justice, recurrent fact situations, repetition of encounters with defense counsel, prosecutor, police offi9 See McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process,

59 J. CREM. L.C. & P.S. 463 (1968).
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cer, and judge, and the consistently heavy press of the caseload
force the discretionary process into a repetitive mold. Roles
develop; practices and priorities become firmly established. In
short, the system settles into an accommodation of the various
interests involved, and this accommodation becomes, over a
long period, a comfortable pattern often regarded by the participants as a correct balancing of the various interests involved. The court reform must alter this balance if it is to
achieve any change in the manner in which cases are handled.
Predictably, the task of dislodging any aspect of the balance
is not easy, and this explains, in large part, why many formal
reforms simply fail to produce any real change in practice.
As a consequence of the accommodation of system interests,
the theoretical models of criminal justice roles no longer apply,
and any reform must confront the real, not the theoretical
model. The judge is not simply the impartial arbiter interested
in "just" dispositions; he is also concerned that a flow of cases
be maintained. The prosecutor does not inevitably aim toward
full prosecution, but tempers the law with his own notions of
justice and expediency. The interaction between prosecution
and defense is often more characteristically cooperative - a
mode of survival- than adversary. 10
Even if a change is enacted and implemented, its results
will not correspond to the consequences which might be anticipated if the system were less fluid and reacted directly to
change. Discretion is controlled by a variety of factors, only
one of which is the formal law. A change in the law may leave
most of the other factors unaffected, and if, as is often true, the
formal rules are only a secondary factor shaping practice, the
discretionary process may go unchanged. On the other hand, a
formal change may alter one element of the balance of the various interests involved and the balancing process will shift to
counteract the change. In any event, if unchanged, the other
factors to which the process responds will ultimately shape the
new factor into a mold consistent with the old established
practice.
II.

THE OMNIBUS HEARING:

A

CASE STUDY

IN JUDICIAL REFORM

The following discussion seeks to place the relatively abstract comments made above into the illustrative context of a
single court reform. As indicated earlier, the object of the dis10 See Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT
RES. 52 (1967).
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cussion is not to attempt a thorough exposition of the results or
method of the ABF study of the omnibus hearing, nor to evaluate the desirability of that reform in general. Rather, it is
intended as an illustration, by concrete example, of the concept
that reforms of the criminal justice system at the judicial level
are interpreted into actual change by filtering through the discretionary adjustment procedure which we label the criminal
justice process.
A.

Identifying the Approach: Traditional

The omnibus hearing was promulgated in 1967 by the
American Bar Association Minimum Standards Report Relating
to Discovery and Proceedings Prior to Trial" as the focal point
of a three-step pre-trial process, the purpose of which is to
move the case speedily and efficiently toward disposition. The
hearing, in theory, provides the context in which the court is
to assert affirmative control over the identification and early
disposition of issues and the scheduling of future appearances
in court. This, in addition to a major increase in the extent of
discovery allowed to the defense, is the most important innovation of the omnibus proposal. The responsibility for raising
issues and moving a case along, previously the sole province
of counsel, is shared with the court. With respect to moving
12
a case toward disposition, the court's role is predominant.
Despite the shift of responsibility from counsel to the court,
the first step in the proposed process involves discussions between counsel without court supervision. During this period
there is an informal exchange of information (amounting to
broad discovery for the defense), plea discussions and a discussion of the probable progression of the case, including an
identification of the issues which are likely to be raised. As the
Report acknowledges, informal discussions as contemplated
under this procedure with respect to possible guilty pleas are
not unique, but already occur in most jurisdictions. However,
the process contemplated by the Report is allegedly unique in
the extent to which information is made available to the defense
and in the fact that an informal discussion period is encouraged
-if not required- by the structure of the process and by the
court.1 3 The intended products of this period are full knowl11

A.B.A.

12

The conglomerate nature of the omnibus hearing proposal has led to its

PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (1969).

implementation with a variety of emphases and results. See R. NnIMER,

supra note 1.

13 In state court systems disclosure of prosecution evidence often occurs

during the preliminary hearing. See McIntyre, supra note 9.
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edge of the facts of the case, the identification of primary issues,
and a determination that the possibility of a guilty plea has
been explored prior to any extensive involvement of the court.
The second stage, close court supervision of the progress of
the case, is initiated by the omnibus hearing, the date for which
is set according to local formula at the time of arraignment.
The term "omnibus" is an apt description since the purposes to
which the hearing is put are numerous and interrelated. First,
the hearing provides a regular, efficient forum to enforce the
wide discovery and early discussion aspects of the first stage.
Immediate rulings on discovery issues are obtained and the
court can apply explicit pressure-often by simply refusing
to proceed - upon counsel to meet and discuss the case. Second,
the hearing provides the court an opportunity to ensure that
all issues have been identified and raised. Counsel are required
to file a "checklist motion" indicating all action to be taken
in the case, and the judge explores the case in open court, via
the checklist, ensuring that all possible issues are noted. Motions and defenses which should have been raised at the hearing, but were not, are waived. Third, the hearing is a focal
point for the simplification of motion practice. Notation upon
the checklist motion form is sufficient to raise any issue, and
written briefs are avoided. Motions not requiring evidentiary
hearings are disposed of immediately at the hearing. Fourth,
the hearing provides the court the opportunity to schedule
future court appearances so as to promote speed, efficiency, and
over-all case flow. Further hearings in a given matter are set
for hearing as soon as conveniently possible, achieving a minimum lapse of time from complaint to disposition. Motions are
scheduled for a single or minimum number of court appearances, and the entire workload of the court is arranged for a
steady flow, avoiding periods of high or low activity.
The third stage is devoted to trial preparation and is labeled
a pretrial conference. The specifics of a projected trial are discussed and determined during a court appearance. Inasmuch
as most cases will not go to trial and many that do need no
additional preparation, this aspect of the process is of little
importance.
Shortly after it was promulgated, the omnibus hearing was
introduced on an experimental basis into the federal district
court having the larger criminal caseload in the system-the
Southern District of California (San Diego). This court continues to be the only criminal court in which the hearing is
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used on a regular basis. Shortly after it was introduced, there
appears to have been a good deal of enthusiasm for the success
which the hearing supposedly achieved. In fact, the A.B.A.
Report, in a draft published subsequent to the San Diego experiment, suggests the following:
Although the collection of conclusive data has not been possible, in the opinion of the judges and many of the lawyers
involved, the new procedures and the increased discovery appear
to be working well and fulfilling the objectives sought: increasing the efficiency of the judges and lawyers, speeding up the process, improving the performance cf defense counsel, eliminating a substantial amount of paperwork, making trials shorter
and more to the point, increasing the number of guilty pleas
-all
apparently without any sacrifice of the interests of the
government or the defendant.14

B.

Testing the Impact

The subsequent American Bar Foundation study focused
upon the San Diego court's use of the omnibus hearing. The
research involved observation and interview procedures with
respect to the omnibus process as it functioned in 1970, and
analysis of random samples of cases for the period before and
after the introduction of the hearing process in 1967. The
samples taken were of narcotics cases, a crime category which
accounts for over 50 percent of the district's caseload. The conclusions of this research were, simply stated, that the sole positive accomplishment of omnibus in 1967 as well as in 1970 was
to establish a broadened discovery procedure. All of the other
objectives of the process were either substantially unperformed,
or were performed poorly. In addition, the hearing proved to
be counter-productive in that it increased judge time per case
and lengthened the time required to dispose of most of the caseload. Finally, the hearing has, over the three years between
1967 and 1970 suffered an erosion of its format, and is apparently no longer expected to perform the extensive goals proposed in the A.B.A. Report.'14 A.B.A. MINEIMUM STANDARDS RELATING To DIScOVERY, supra note 11, at 9.
15 The cycle of excessive, immediate praise followed by destructive criti-

cism based upon reflection and research is common in the field of judicial administrative experiments.
Viewed as a whole, the campaign (to eliminate court delay)
has gone forward with much vigor but with no real breakthrough. There has been a definite pattern to the activity.
The sponsors of a new device trumpet it as a miracle remedy,
manage to get it introduced and almost instantly pronounce
it a lavish success. After a time, experience and careful research deflate the premature boasts and then something new
is invented.
Rosenberg, Ccurt Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies,
in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29 (H. Jones
ed. 1965).
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of Prosecution

Files

on

Case

The achievement of a broadened discovery procedure occurred in the midst of a continuing controversy concerning the
desirability of increasing disclosure of prosecution files to defense attorneys.'" Much of this controversy focuses upon the
effect that increased disclosure might have on the adversary
process represented by the traditional models of criminal justice.
Opponents of broad disclosure suggest that it will hinder the
prosecution of cases and produce a higher rate of acquittals
by encouraging fabrication of defenses and intimidation of witnesses. On the other hand, proponents emphasize the need to
achieve greater equality in the task of preparing for and actually conducting trials and other "essential" formal steps of the
process.
The evidence in San Diego suggests that the focus of this
controversy might be misplaced. Disclosure of prosecution files
appears to have occurred in San Diego with little initial strong
opposition from the U.S. Attorney's Office. Of the cases in our
1967 sample, 77 percent of the defense attorneys neither requested nor received court intervention requiring disclosure by
the prosecution. In these cases the prosecutor apparently complied "voluntarily" with the disclosure rules. In an undetermined portion of the remainder of the caseload, the court order
for further disclosure was a routine matter, requested and issued
regardless of whether or not there had been prior compliance
by the prosecutor.
Thus, although the theory would indicate that the prosecutor would oppose the increased disclosure, the U.S. Attorney's
Office complied substantially voluntarily. In large part, this
occurred as a result of a trade-off in which the U.S. Attorney
relinquished the supposed advantages of secrecy in return for
potential benefits to be received in other areas. Although the
expected benefits did not materialize, the increased disclosure
was not discontinued because the practice apparently had little
or no impact upon the disposition of the bulk of the caseload.
It would be an overstatement to indicate that the achievement of the broader disclosure resulted solely from the trade-off
indicated above. Certainly, an important factor in the success
of this objective was that, from the outset, the judges in the
16 See, e.g., Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19

HASTINGS

L.J. 865 (1968); Mar-

golin, Toward Effective Criminal Discovery in California, 56 CALIF. L.
REv. 1040 (1968); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964).
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district placed a strong emphasis upon the disclosure element of
the omnibus format. It occupied a central position in the literature distributed by the court when omnibus was first implemented. Disclosure issues were the most frequently discussed
matters at the omnibus hearings during its first year of implementation. 7 Likewise, the commonly-used, individualized
explanations for the performance of reform efforts -- personalities of judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys -played
an
important role. In 1967, San Diego could be described as enjoying a strong and interested judiciary, a cooperative prosecutor and willing defense attorneys.
The nature of the trade-off involved becomes apparent
when we examine the manner in which the discovery concept
was promoted and the substance of the prosecutor's cooperation. The literature distributed by the court sets the theme.'
Broad disclosure was promoted only partially as an objective
in its own right, and primarily as a tool to achieve other goals,
many of which might appear highly desirable to the U.S. Attorney, e.g., certainty of conviction, more frequent guilty pleas,
earlier guilty pleas, firmer schedules for court appearances, and
early and firm listings of defense issues to be raised. Even more
revealing than the judicial emphasis is an article authored by
the head U.S. Attorney at the time,1" which raises many specific
objections to the impact of the increased disclosure upon the
prosecution of the caseload. However, the entire article is
prefaced by the author's admission that the circumstances in
the district at the time that omnibus was proposed made the
innovation essential. The exact circumstances referred to and
the benefits expected irom omnibus were indicated by an assistant U.S. Attorney who commented that "the purpose of the
increased discovery was to increase guilty pleas and to facilitate firm scheduling of appearances in court." Faced with a
huge caseload and a small staff, the U.S. Attorney, prior to
omnibus, apparently wasted large portions of staff time preparing for scheduled appearances which were never held. The prosOf the cases in our 1967 sample, in cnly 36 percent were any issues decided at the omnibus hearing itself. The issues most frequently decided
at the hearing concerned disclosure of prosecution files, occurring in
23 percent of the sample.
18 Form OH distributed by the court during 1967 lists a number of purposes of the omnibus hearing: eliminate written motion practice, provide
a checklist to suggest issues and procedures to counsel, secure discovery
for defense and prosecution, expose and dispose cf latent constitutional
issues, provide a specific time for issue exploration and plea discussion,
and postpone until later the decision of issues requiring further hearing.
19 Miller, The Omnibus Hearing-An Experiment in Federal Criminal
Discovery, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 293 (1963).
17
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pect was that the omnibus hearing, aided by the broad discovery
which was a part of the concept, would help to alleviate the
lost time problem.
The trade-off was facilitated by the fact that the discovery
had no observable impact upon the rate of guilty plea disposition. Judge Carter, a member of the District Court during
the time when omnibus hearing was first introduced, later observed that the experience with the hearing indicated to him
that the increased disclosure might result in a few, but not
many, additional acquittals. This observation is supported by
the fact that, in comparing our 1966 and 1967 samples, virtually
20
identical rates of guilty pleas and trials were indicated.
At first it may appear somewhat unexpected that one side
of the bargaining system could relinquish substantial information to the opposing side and leave the dispositional pattern substantially unchanged. The explanation, however, lies in the role
played by the new disclosure in the context of bargained justice
as it existed in San Diego at the time the omnibus procedure
was introduced.
For many defense attorneys, the impact of the disclosure
to the defense was not to weaken the prosecution's case, but
was largely an internal matter for the defense. One attorney
remarked that he could not rely upon the prosecution's evidence contained in its files in preparing his case for trial. Even
if the files were complete, they were prepared from a wholly
dissimilar viewpoint and would not sufficiently explore issues
beneficial to the defense. However, the attorney did indicate
that the disclosure was a tool with which he could examine
the accuracy of his client's description of the crime, and which
might be used to persuade otherwise reluctant clients to accept
favorable deals. Other defense attorneys took a less pessimistic
view of the value of the prosecution files in their case preparation, but most emphasized the intra-defense impact of the disclosures. Rather than strengthening their case against the
prosecution, the major impact was to test their client's
credibility.
Several U.S. Attorneys noted this internal use of the disclosed evidence, but emphasized a second explanation for the
lack of a strong observable impact on the disposition of cases.
20Trials occurred in the following percentages of cases:
1966
1967
20%
11%
hard narcotics
8%
marijuana
11%
14%
9%
minor narcotics
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It was their suggestion that the discovery produced offsetting
effects. Cases which were borderline with respect to a defense
decision to plead guilty, but in which the state's evidence was
strong, would be pushed toward a guilty plea-the disclosure
tending to demonstrate that resistance could not prevent conviction. In other cases in which the prosecution's evidence was
weak, and there existed some tendency on the part of the defense toward a trial, the case might be pushed away from the
guilty plea route. For the bulk of the cases, however, disclosure
was largely irrelevant since the factual basis for prosecution
was simple and understood by all.
The current U.S. Attorney also distinguished among cases
within his caseload, but did not perceive a sizeable negative
effect as a consequence of disclosure with respect to more than
a few of the cases handled by his office. He indicated that,
although some assistants might feel that the disclosure hindered
their preparation, they would be hard-pressed to cite a single
specific illustration. For cases in which a protracted series of
negotiations or an eventual trial would occur, both sides would
tend to be fully prepared before the termination of the case
regardless of whether disclosure occurred. For the bulk of the
caseload, however, a guilty plea would be the eventual product
regardless of the presence of broad disclosure. In these cases,
he felt, the disclosure served merely to add an element of fairness to the process.
Plea negotiation is a process of give and take with a variety
of unstated premises and tools on both sides. Consequently, an
"intrusion" into this arrangement in the form of new rules
giving one side an advantage is likely to be met with concomitant adjustments on one or more fronts.
That disclosure of prosecution files would not substantially
affect guilty plea rates should, therefore, have been anticipated to some extent. The amount and kind of information
the prosecution has against the defendant are simply two elements among many that enter into the bargaining process. The
prosecutor could maintain the existing frequency of guilty pleas
by offsetting disclosure with lighter charges or sentences, for
instance. As one assistant remarked, disclosure was a fact of
life which he had learned to live with. He might have said
"which he had adjusted to."
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Efficiency-Related Impact
a. Failure to Increase Efficiency

The benefits expected from the increased disclosure and
the omnibus hearing itself did not materialize. The rate of
guilty pleas did not increase following the omnibus hearing's
introduction. Neither was the hearing able to increase the frequency of early guilty pleas, establish a more effective scheduling process for court appearances, speed the disposition of the
caseload in general or conserve judicial time spent on the case.
Instead, it proved to be counterproductive, delaying a substantial number of the cases and resulting in additional comsumption of judge time per case.
In large measure, the omnibus hearing failed in these areas
because the preexisting process was already highly effective
in conserving judge time and achieving speedy dispositions of
cases. Prior to the omnibus hearing, the criminal justice proccess in San Diego achieved a remarkable number of early dispositions. Fifty-nine percent of the cases in our sample for the
year prior to omnibus were disposed of by the court within
90 days of the filing of the indictment. Viewed in another
manner, 48 percent were disposed of on or before the second
appearance in court following the arraignment on indictment.
This performance is indicative of the preexisting emphasis
of the discretionary system upon the conservation of judicial
time in San Diego. One portion of our analysis of the random
samples of San Diego narcotics cases involved use of a scale
designed to estimate the comparative time spent in court for
various appearances. Computing these estimates for each case
and totaling the results, we found that 65 percent of the cases
in our sample during 1966-prior to the establishment of the
omnibus hearing-were handled with in-court time of less
than or equal to the time required for the indictment-arraignment-disposition hearing.
Neither the result with respect to the speed of disposition,
nor the comments concerning in-court time, were limited to
nonserious crimes. Our sample, although restricted to narcotics cases, spread through various levels of seriousness as
measured by potential sentence. Included were hard narcotics,
importation cases, marijuana cases, and a variety of miscellaneous minor charges. Minimum potential sentences ranged
from a minimum of 20 years in the hard narcotics cases to a
minimum of less than 1 year in the minor charge category.
Throughout all of these groups, the pattern was similar: most
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cases were disposed of within extremely short time intervals
21
and with little consumption of judicial in-court time.
This speedy and efficient disposition pattern reflects discretionary adjustment to an extremely heavy caseload pressure
in the district. San Diego has been, for quite s-me time, the
federal district with the heaviest load of criminal cases per
authorized judgeship. 22 Similarly, the district has traditionally
functioned with a limited, and largely overworked, U.S. Attorney's office.
Given this imbalance between caseload and resources, the
district adopted an early and effective plea negotiation procedure and extensive screening process at the U.S. Attorney's
office. In part, the ability to terminate cases early must be
attributed to the nature of the caseload; border offenses predominiate in the district and often present few, if any, issues
to be negotiated away. However, it is clear that the U.S. Attorney engaged in extensive negotiations, and that these negotiations began early. Also, the negotiating tools used by the U.S.
Attorney were highly effective. One tool involved the statutes
charged. With respect to narcotics cases, the statutes most frequently charged in San Diego involved extremely high minimum and maximum penalties,2 3 and the purpose in charging
them was often not to achieve the conviction under the higher
statute, but simply to achieve negotiating leverage. Seventythree percent of the guilty plea cases in the 1966 sample involv21 Time lapse--percent disposed of within 90 days:
64%
hard narcotics
60%
marijuana
82%
minor narcotics
Judge time-percent disposed of before indictment-arraignment:
disposition
77%
hard narcotics
60%
marijuana
66%
minor narcotics
That serious charges were handled with minimal judge time so frequently is, no doubt, due to the practice of over-charging discussed
above. A serious charge, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (generally referring to penalty for illegal importation and sale of narcotic drugs), was
readily, and quickly, reduced in most cazes.
22 In recent years, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has employed a weighted scale to estimate the workload per judge in each of
the federal district courts.
The weighted caselcad reflects the amount of court time used
for types of civil and criminal cases divided by the proportions
of total terminations. The weight of cases is based on, the 1964
revisions described on pp. 156-161 in the Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1964.
AD. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. TABLE XI, n. 1 (1969).
San Diego has always ranked high. In 1969 it had a weighting of
1077 for its criminal caseload while the Northern District of Illinois
(Chicago) had a weighting cf 375 for its total caseload. Id.
23 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) or 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
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minor charge
ing these charges produced charge reductions -a
being substituted for the high penalty statutes. A second negotiating tool employed was that of offering extremely light sentences as part of the bargain. San Diego has consistently recorded low sentence severity ratings in the annual reports dis24
tributed by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
Finally, the judges in the district not only recognized the prevalence of negotiations, but actually promoted them as a necessary
response to an imbalanced caseload-resource mixture.
Negotiations were, and continue to be, begun virtually from
the point at which a complaint is filed. The factor determining
the timing of the actual plea appears simply to have been the
length of time necessary to establish a firm agreement. The
effectiveness with which the process reached this point at early
steps in the progression of its cases is attested by the frequency
of pleas within 90 days of filing.
In addition to the extensive and early plea negotiation
process, the U.S. Attorney followed a highly selective prosecution policy. Criminal complaints are presented to his office
from a variety of sources, including the FBI and immigration
authorities, and the rate of complaints which the U.S. Attorney
refuses to file varies according to which agency presents the
matter. However, a rough estimate suggests that as many as
50 percent of all complaints presented to the office are not
prosecuted. We did not examine the bases upon which this
extensive screening process was conducted in pre-omnibus years
or in 1970. The net product of the screening was, however, that
the prosecutions in San Diego were concentrated upon cases
in which the government's case was relatively strong or, at
least, upon cases involving alleged, substantial criminal violations rather than technical violations or the products of harassing enforcement techniques.
On the surface, our conclusion that the San Diego system
was extremely efficient in disposing of the bulk of its caseload
may appear to contradict the impression of the U.S. Attorney's
Office that the process was wasteful. Upon analysis, however,
the apparent contradiction is fully explicable. Although most
cases were handled efficiently, a minority of our sample did
require substantial in-court involvement, required over 1 year
for disposition, and encountered over 10 continuances per case.
Given a large caseload, this small percentage of the caseload
24 UNITED

STATES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (1968).

STATES

COURTS,
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would still involve a large number of actual cases. It is likely
that the cases fitting into this longer mold consumed the bulk
of the U.S. Attorney's time and attention, and that they provided the benchmark with which the performance of the system was measured. The easy, more numerous cases tended to
be forgotten simply because they were handled so easily,
whereas the difficult cases tended to be more prominent because of their difficulty.
b.

Early Pleas Under Omnibus: No Increase

The omnibus procedure was intended to increase the frequency of early guilty pleas and early indications that a guilty
plea would be entered. If accomplished, this would produce a
direct benefit in terms of speedier dispositions and would tend
to avoid the scheduling uncertainties involved in scheduled appearances rendered unnecessary by late-developing pleas. This
result was to be achieved by establishing the omnibus hearing
as a cutoff point before which extensive negotiation would
occur, but after which negotiation would cease or, at least, be
markedly curtailed. The attorneys could then enter the hearing
with a clear notion of how the case would be disposed, and,
acting upon this notion, the court could establish firm schedules
for the case.
Given the preexisting, extensive early negotiation practice,
the omnibus process could not produce much of an increase.
In fact, it produced the opposite result, delaying the entry of
guilty pleas in many cases. The following table illustrates the
shift which occurred, indicating the timing of the entry of a
guilty plea in terms of the number of appearances after arraignment at which it was entered. For most of the cases in 1967,
the omnibus hearing represented the first post-arraignment
appearance.
TABLE I: Step at which guilty plea entered
(cumulative percentage, all cases)
(1)

(2)

(3)

arraignment:
hard narcotics
marijuana
minor narcotics
first post-arraignment appearance:
hard narcotics
marijuana
minor narcotics
second post-arraignment appearance:
hard narcotics
marijuana
minor narcotics

1966

1967

11%
9%
39%

4%
3%
7%

37%
24%
53%

10%
9%
29%

50%
35%
66%

20%
19%
37%
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This shift is attributable to an affirmative decision by defense counsel to defer the finalization of plea negotiation until
after the omnibus hearing. Two factors contributed to this
decision. Judge Carter suggested one explanation, observing
that many attorneys delayed until the omnibus hearing to enter
a guilty plea in order to benefit from the disclosure which occurred during the interim between arraignment and omnibus.
A second explanation relates more to the psychological effect
of the implicit statement by the court inherent in its adoption
of the omnibus process that the desirable method of disposition
of cases in the district was through the omnibus hearing. In
order to ensure use of the omnibus hearing during its early
period, the judges in the district placed a strong emphasis upon
the desirability of use of the hearing by the defense attorney.
This was regarded as a statement by the court that it was not
interested in dispositions of cases prior to omnibus, but would
prefer disposition to be delayed until after omnibus.
A further indication that the hearing was not effective at
compressing the plea negotiation process was that during the
early steps of the process, the frequency of in-court indications
that a plea would be entered did not increase. There was an artificial increase caused by the delay in plea entry noted above.
However, at the appearance following, when the effect of the
shift in plea entry had faded, the rate of plea indications was
roughly identical to a comparable stage during the prior year. 25
The failure of the omnibus hearing to compress the plea
negotiation process illustrates the tenacity, if not the desirability, of the discretionary adjustment process when it is at
peak efficiency. The preexisting procedure which the parties
25 Examining the combined rate of pleas and plea indications, it is clear

that by the second post-arraignment appearance, no significant difference appears:
1966
1967
arraignment:
hard narcotics
16%
12%
marijuana
19%
10%
minor narcotics
46%
25%
first post-arraignment:
hard narcotics
47%
43%
marijuana
69%
32%
minor narcotics
68%
59%
second post-arraignment:
hard narcotics
61%
55%
marijuana
76%
41%
minor narcotics
74%
76%
Here, as in some other comparative analyses, marijuana cases diverge
from the pattern in the other two groups. The divergence apparently
relates to a border "crackdcwn" on marijuana violations occurring during 1967. The existence of this crackdown makes analysis of marijuana
comparisons impossible, and the full report focuses, in comparisons, upon
the other categories.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

had "adjusted to" was not affected by the addition of the omnibus hearing and, consequently, the new procedure resulted only
in an additional time-consuming step.
c.

Scheduling Firm Appearances:
Continued Strategy Appearances

Even assuming that the rate of the negotiation process
was not speeded, omnibus could have made some inroads into
the scheduling problems of the district by encouraging or forcing attorneys to be more realistic in predicting the probable
mode of disposition of the case. That is, at the omnibus hearing,
attorneys in cases in which there was a clear likelihood of an
eventual plea disposition could have been made to schedule
their cases for plea hearings rather than for "trial," thereby
minimizing the extent to which resources and preparation
would be wasted on scheduled trial dates rendered unnecessary
by a guilty plea. This did not occur. As indicated above, the
frequency of early plea indications did not increase. Viewed
another way, the act of setting a case for trial did not become a
firm indication that a trial would occur. Of all the cases in our
sample which were set for trial following the omnibus hearing,
57 percent eventually plead guilty without trial. On the other
hand, of all the cases set for disposition hearings, only one case
failed to result in a guilty plea, resulting in a trial disposition.
Many cases had continuances of scheduled disposition hearings,
apparently reflecting prolonged haggling over specifics of the
plea bargain, but only one encountered a complete breakdown
in the bargaining process. This high degree of conformance
to "disposition" schedulings suggests that the in-court statement
or request for a disposition hearing was regarded by the defense
attorneys in the district as an essentially firm commitment
that a guilty plea would be entered. It was a firm commitment
which in neither 1966 nor 1967 was entered until the actual
plea bargain was clearly in sight.
Thus, the omnibus hearing failed to produce more frequent
and earlier firm plea indications because it could not further
compress an already speedy process and because it failed to accomplish an actual change in the meaning attributed to the
"trial" and "disposition" schedulings. Although it may tend to
be characteristic of any negotiated process, the importance attached to a disposition scheduling could be altered by established practice. Such scheduling could be regarded as merely
indicating an inclination to negotiation - an indication subject
to being revoked should negotiations falter. The experience
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of omnibus might suggest, however, that when prior practice
attaches a greater significance to the "disposition" schedule, this
practice cannot be readily altered, even where the alteration
might serve a stated interest in minimizing wasted effort.
d. Failure to Enforce New Procedure
One method which might have been used to obtain more
realistic indications of intention would have been to enforce
the appearances which were scheduled- refusing requests for
continuances unless extremely good cause were shown and barring or discouraging pleas after trial or after hearing schedules
had been made. There was no necessity to enforce scheduled
disposition hearings. On the other hand, the court found itself
to be largely impotent in enforcing trial or hearing dates. The
rate at which continuances were granted for the year following
omnibus was actually greater than the continuance rate for
the prior year. Additionally, many cases which had been set
for trial reverted to plea disposition. This lack of enforcement
occurred in the context of a judicial staff highly interested in
obtaining firmer schedulings, and the reasons why actual enforcement did not occur are instructive.
There was an unstated, but obvious, element of expediency
involved in the nonenforcement of trial or hearing schedules.
The court could not have afforded, in terms of available resources, to hold a trial in anything remotely approaching the
percentage of its caseload which had been set for trial after
omnibus. Such a massive use of trial or other adjudicatory
mechanisms could not have been used for even the short period
which might have been sufficient to accomplish a change in the
meanings attached to indicated schedules. Thus, in a sense, enforcement could follow, but could not precede a change in the
significance of schedules.
The explanation suggested in our interview is that denying
requests for continuances or refusing pleas was often viewed
by the judges as an unfair procedure. The judges in the district
were fully aware of the fact that the negotiated plea is the
primary method of disposition for their caseload. Given this
awareness, the continuance request was frequently regarded as
a vehicle for permitting negotiations to run their full course.
Since the negotiation process had not been compressed as a
result of the omnibus hearing, the judges felt that enforcing
schedules in the face of a discretionary process which continued
to rely upon the judicial willingness to grant extensions would
unfairly force unprepared parties into adjudication. Also, an
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element of unfairness was involved in the possibility of denying the defendant the fruits of a favorable bargain. This potential unfairness became apparent in individual situations in
which a strict enforcement could have been followed, and the
factors apparent in the individual case overcame the generalized
judicial interest in enforcing the schedules which had been
established.
e.

Identification of Issues:
Failure to Reach the Substance

A related problem is the inability of the omnibus hearing
to perform well in identifying or discussing issues. The theory
of the omnibus hearing was that the parties and the court would
be able to raise and consider any and all possible issues which
would be decided in the case. This would not only improve the
extent to which issues were raised, but would assist in scheduling cases. However, other than issues relating to disclosure and
relating to motions to sever multiple defendants, little or no
activity concerning substantive issues occurred at the omnibus
hearing. Of the few cases in which substantive issues were
raised either on the form filed at omnibus or during the hearing
itself, approximately 50 percent did not follow the issues through
to disposition.
In part, the weak performance concerning discussion and
firm indication of issues to be raised and decided relates to the
timing of the hearing. Several attorneys remarked that 2 weeks
after arraignment was simply too early for the attorney to be
fully conversant with the issues which should be raised and
litigated.
Of greater importance, however, is what might best be
labeled the "overbreadth" of the omnibus hearing as practiced
in San Diego. Although omnibus was designed as an alternative
method to be employed at the option of the defense attorney, in
practice the court affirmatively promoted the use of omnibus
and the attorneys tended to use the hearings as a tool to delay
disposition of cases. Of the cases in the 1967 sample, less than 13
percent waived the hearing and for most of the cases waiving,
the explanation seems to be that the defendant was a fugitive
during the early pendency of the case and, when apprehended,
there appeared to be little or no reason for holding the hearing.
This almost universal use of the omnibus hearing resulted not
only in a delay in the entry of guilty pleas, as indicated above, 26
Table I, p. 196 supra. See generally M.
FERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964).
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but also in large expenditures of court time.
With respect to issue identification and discussion, however,
the impact of the omnibus hearing was more ephemeral.
Almost 20 percent of the cases apparently entered omnibus with
the defendant intending to plead guilty regardless of the hearing's impact, and in an even larger percentage, no issues existed
needing explication in court..2 7 Nevertheless, hearings were held
and identification of substantive issues was, at least nominally,
a part of the exercise conducted. This affected the entire process in two ways. First, in having to devote time to so many
cases in which the process was not relevant, the court wasted
time which could have permitted lengthy consideration of other
cases. A tendency towards speedy rather than reflective hearings was established. Second, since the discussion of issues was
pro forma and unnecessary in many cases, the importance of
issue identification and specification generally suffered. The
50 percent drop-off of issues without decision reflects a tendency to regard lightly the raising of issues.
f. Summary of the 1966-67 Comparison:
No Increase in Efficiency
Since omnibus was intended to make the disposition of
criminal cases more efficient, it is ironic that its impact in each
of the areas discussed above was the reverse. The study examined efficiency largely in terms of judge-time spent in court
per case. The time spent was estimated based upon the types
of appearances recorded in court files. In comparing 1966 and
1967 we found that cases in the second year were handled almost identically to those in the first year, except that the second
year's cases had an additional appearance - the omnibus
28
hearing.
Although this result appears anomalous in comparison to the
objectives of the system, the fact that omnibus increased judge
time per case becomes understandable in light of the discussion
above concerning the objectives and performance of the pre-

27 Seventy-four percent of the case files in our 1967 sample in which an

omnibus hearing was held either contained no checklist form or con-

tained forms on which no issues were indicated. Twelve percent of the

samples listed only issues relating to discovery.

28 Judge Carter noted:

The U.S. Attorneys and defense counsel have been saved much
paperwork on motions, offset by the time used for the additional
appearance in court at the ominbus hearing.
Memorandum from Judge J. Carter. Discussion Material for Seminar of

New Federal Judges 4 (1968).
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existing discretionary process. 2 ' The frequency of early plea dispositions was a part of the generalized thrust of the omnibus
hearing to minimize judge time in court per case. As a result of
this thrust, 65 percent of the 1966 sample cases were handled
with in-court time consumption of ]ess than or equal to the
equivalent of a three-step disposition pattern. For these cases,
omnibus functioned simply as a fourth step - given the already
minimal time input, it could not have achieved any offsetting
time gains in these cases. In the other cases, including but not
limited to cases going to trial, omnibus also served merely as an
additional step. Reductions of continuances, trials, and hearings
were not achieved for reasons discussed above.
Regardless of the method of measurement, this increased
expenditure of court time was substantial. During 1967, the
omnibus hearings took approximately 15 to 25 minutes per case.
Averaging over 1700 cases per year, the additional judge time
element amounts to approximately 425 judge-hours for the cases
filed during that year. Viewed from another perspective, the
bulk of the cases in the district were handled with a three-step
or less process which could not have involved more than 40
minutes in court per case. The addition of omnibus to these
cases increased judge time by a factor of almost 40 percent.
For early disposition cases, the elapsed time to disposition
was increased by the 2 or 3 week interval between arraignment and omnibus hearing and, in many cases, by the additional interval between omnibus and the next scheduled appearance. For later disposition cases, the omnibus effect is not clear,
although there was certainly no compression of negotiation patterns or time lapse gains caused by other factors. Our compari29

For serious (hard) and minor charges, comparison of case weightings
for the two years revealed that, when weightings for the omnibus hearing were deleted, the cases reccrded roughly similar average weightings.
Comparison of marijuana cases was nct used in the main analysis because the crackdown noted earlier made interpretation of marijuana
results impossible.
1967
1966
Hard narcotics:
13.2 (38 cases)
12.1 (39 cases)
non-trial
11.3 (11 cases)
11.4 ( 5 cases)
trial (pre-trial time)
trial (including
105.8
105.0
trial days)
12.8
12.0
all cases
Minor narcotics:
10.6 (54 cases)
8.9 (52 cases)
non-trial
9.2 ( 5 cases)
9.1 ( 9 cases)
trial (pre-trial)
trial (including
102.8
103.1
trial days)
10.2
8.9
all cases
For specifics of the weighting scale employed in this analysis, see R.
NIMMER, supra note 1, at 23.

A CASE

STUDY

IN JUDICIAL REFORM

son of cases with late disposition patterns revealed large time
lapse increases, but we were unable to estimate what portion
of the increase occurred as a result of omnibus.
With respect to elapsed disposition time for cases involving
defendants held in custody, the discretionary process was ablk
to mold the hearing procedure so as to minimize the negative
effects that the hearing produced elsewhere. In comparing
cases for the two years, elapsed times for disposition in cases
involving defendants who were held in custody show merely
a statistically insignificant increase in the omnibus year.
The explanation for this differential performance is found
in a discretionary adjustment of omnibus in the face of a previously perceived need to process in-custody defendants speedily.
During both years in-custody defendants were handled speedily
(100 days average difference) regardless of whether their cases
were terminated by plea or trial. In the second year, although
in-custody cases experienced the early plea shift discussed
above, they went through a greater number of steps prior to
disposition in the second year with comparatively little additional time lapse.
The explanation lies in a reduction of the time lapse intervals for each early step. In-custody cases were arraigned with
more speed than non-custody cases, a phenomenon apparently
occurring both years. As Judge Carter said:
Our rule is that if the defendant is in jail, he comes up for arraignment on the Monday succeeding the Wednesday when the
indictment is returned. If the defendant is cn bail, he comes up
a week from the Monday succeeding the Wednesday on which
30
the indictment is returned.

More importantly, the interval between arraignment and the
omnibus hearing was shortened by the court. This was accomplished before the omnibus appearance and is reflected in the
scheduling made at arraignment. Measured in terms of mean
values, the interval for in-custody cases was 14 days while the
interval for non-custody cases was 24 days (in-custody: 14 days
for non-trials, 15 days for trials; non-custody: 24 days for no
trial, 25 days for trials).
3.

Omnibus 1970:

Complete System Absorption

The interval between appearances under the omnibus system was modified immediately to conform to a desire to handle
in-custody cases expeditiously. Over a longer period of time,
the omnibus hearing itself was modified by the pressures which
3 Letter from Judge J. Carter to several district court judges.
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had previously forced the system toward emphasis upon economical use of in-court time. The omnibus hearing process
observed by our staff in 1970 resembled neither the theoretical
omnibus hearing format, nor the actual format followed during
1967. This modification occurred without formal changes of
policy or purpose, and provides a demonstration of the ability
of the system to transform new procedures to fit more comfortably into the preexisting system rationale. The tendency
of the system to transform new additions is an often-overlooked,
but vital consideration in the drafting of judicial reform ideas.
In 1967 the omnibus hearing consumed between 10 and 25
minutes of judge time and called for individualized attention
to each case. By 1970 this format had been transformed into a
mass production model in which hearings lasted no more than 5
minutes, and most were completed within 1 minute, a transformation which reduced the inconsistency between the scheduling of a hearing and the emphasis of the system upon minimizing in-court time. A single prosecutor appeared for all omnibus hearings on a given day, and one or two members of the
staff of the Federal Defender handled the omnibus hearing caseload for their office. The judicial officer, no longer a judge, but
rather the magistrate, devotes one full day each week entirely
to the disposition of omnibus hearing matters. Between 60 and
31
80 omnibus hearings are handled in a single day.
Under this "mass production model" the omnibus hearing
was transformed from an appearance in which the judicial
officer discusses and suggests the proper progression of the case
into an appearance in which all of the substantive discussion
is disposed of by stipulation. At each "hearing," the defense
attorney files a stipulated motion form on which he has indicated issues to be raised during the case. The form is signed by
the prosecutor and the defense attorney. During the hearing,
the judicial officer inquires into the need for schedules for trial,
disposition, or hearing, and ascertains whether the informal discovery has been completed prior to the hearing. He makes no
effort to discuss the substance of the case in any respect.
Although the magistrate emphasizes establishing appropriate
case schedules and the attorneys pay lip service to the idea that
the stipulated form is regarded as binding, neither the scheduling nor the indication of issues is enforced following the omni31

This process minimizes time spent by the court, the U.S. Attorney, and
Federal Defender. However, the private defense bar is not so fortunate.
Although each hearing takes little time, the period spent waiting for the

one-minute hearing may amount to as much as 2 hours.
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bus hearing. The schedules made at omnibus are virtually
ignored. Of a sample of narcotics cases filed in 1970, only about
40 percent conformed to the schedule indicated at the omnibus hearing. This percentage decreases to around 15 percent if
we exclude those cases indicated for a disposition hearingas previously, indications for "disposition" continue to be a firm
statement of intention to plead guilty.
One innovation has occurred in scheduling technique which
modifies the extent to which schedules for trial dates are essentially meaningless. This is an intermediate scheduling device
iabeled "trial call" which calls for an appearance by counsel on
the specified date for the purpose of indicating whether a trial
date should be set. Essentially, the trial call is used in cases in
which, at the time of the omnibus hearing the eventual likelihood of a guilty plea is fairly clear to the parties, but neither
side is willing to be fully committed to the extent of requiring
a disposition hearing schedule.
Despite the use of this intermediate scheduling device, the
district experiences a major problem with respect to "trial dropouts," i.e., trial set cases which involved either a request, a continuance, or a plea of guilty on the day of trial. Substantial
resources are mounted in preparing for trials which are not
held, and the judicial personnel in the district regard failure
to comply with trial schedulings as an important problem. The
magistrate, recognizing this dropout pattern, schedules as many
as eight trials per judge on a given day, hoping to leave the
judge with at least one or two cases for trial after the dropouts
have occurred.
The omnibus hearing, quite obviously, was intended to meet
this kind of problem, but in discussing possible solutions, the
personnel in the district no longer refer to the hearing but, instead, consider additional scheduling tools. When we conducted
our research, a frequently mentioned alternative was to establish a date, one week prior to the trial day, at which the
attorneys would be required to indicate their readiness to proceed to trial. Once readiness has been indicated, the trial date
would be enforced by denying any continuance request and
taking steps to deny the fruits of the later plea bargaining to
32
the defendant who was delayed for so long.
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An earlier attempt to supplement omnibus is described in the following

court order:
General Order 82; April, 1969: By reason of the extreme crucial
condition of our trial calendar, it is ordered that from date hereof,
after all parties . . . have announced that they are ready for
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The general theme expressed was that omnibus occurred
too early to be effective in establishing firm trial dates. In explaining why late pleas are so frequent, several judicial officers emphasized the desire of the defendant to defer inevitable
conviction as long as possible, but they also mentioned that the
U.S. Attorney, in the interests of fairness, continue.s to negotiate
with most defendants until the last moment. The assistant U.S.
Attorneys that were interviewed emphasized the continued bargaining aspect of the above explanation. Several suggested that
continued bargaining violated an office policy that negotiation
cease after the omnibus hearing -- a policy which had never
been fully enforced.
The role of the omnibus hearing in establishing a firm
list of issues has become a passive one-the court merely
accepts a stipulated checklist motion form submitted by the
attorneys. Once this form is accepted, however, it is virtually
never enforced. One attorney indicated that his only purpose in
listing issues on the hearing form and requesting a hearing date
was to obtain a specific date for a hearing. The matter of which
issues might be raised or discussed at that hearing could be
deferred with relative impunity until the time at which notice
entries are filed for the hearing date. The indication is that,
for those cases in which issues might be raised and litigated,
omnibus occurs too early to enable the attorneys to make a firm
commitment, and in the other cases it is meaningless. In response to this, the checklist form has become essentially an unimportant ritual which has little bearing upon deciding which
issues will eventually be determined.
Omnibus plays a nominal role in enforcing disclosure. At
each hearing the magistrate inquires whether discovery has
been accomplished, and if it has not, he delays the hearing until
the files have been reviewed by the defense attorney. However,
an interesting shift in the attitude of the judicial officer towards
this enforcement role has occurred. In those cases in which disclosure has not occurred by the time of the omnibus hearing,
the initial leaning of the magistrate is to consider the failure to
achieve the disclosure as resulting primarily from the laxity
of the defense attorney. The practice of making files available

trial, and the case is sent out for trial, no plea of guilty to a
lesser charge or to less than all of the charges contained in the
the complaint shall be accepted.
This order was never enforced; it became, almost immediately
upon its issue, a dead letter.
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to the defense has become so routine that reluctance on the part
of the prosecutor has become virtually nonexistent.
Under the 1970 procedure, cases are handled by the complaint section of the U.S. Attorney's Office until they are set
for trial. Thus, the full period prior to the omnibus hearing is
handled by the small group of assistant U.S. Attorneys in this
section, and their attitudes toward discovery determine the extent to which omnibus hearing has to play an enforcement role.
The attorneys in the complaint section regard the disclosure
practice as a routine matter which causes no noticeable disruption in the processing and negotiation of cases. The comments of the magistrate support this and he notes that there is
seldom any difficulty in making files available to the defense.
Once the case is set for trial, however, it is transferred to
the trial section of the U.S. Attorney's Office. In this portion of
the office, the attitudes toward discovery are mixed and less
favorable. Whereas the bulk of the caseload at the complaint
office consists of many routine cases which will easily be turned
into bargain pleas, the cases which reach trial section are more
prone to pursue an adversary disposition of the prosecution.
This may influence the attitudes of the assistants at this level.
Also, the personnel in the trial section experience a substantial
turnover, with new attorneys entering frequently. These new
attorneys have not had the time to deal with the discovery practices for any lengthy period, and their attitudes reflect an initial unwillingness to permit extensive disclosure. In fact, although some of the attorneys at the trial section will freely disclose evidence obtained in their investigations, many simply
refuse to make disclosures. The court does not compel disclosure where the prosecutor refuses to comply--except
through the vehicle of the omnibus hearing. Therefore, with
respect to any late-developing evidence, the extent to which the
defense receives disclosures is controlled by the attitude of the
prosecutor in the trial section who happens to be handling
the case.
Interestingly, despite the comparatively broad disclosure,
the defense attorneys are not fully satisfied with the process.
Although they acknowledge that, at early stages, the files are
routinely made available, they have come to regard disclosure
as a minimal requirement, and are pushing to make access to
files more administratively convenient. They emphasize that
obtaining and recording the information in the prosecutor's files
is a burdensome task, since important items, such as FBI re-
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ports, cannot be photostated but must be read and dictated to
33
be retyped.
CONCLUSION

The experience of the omnibus hearing in San Diego illustrates a variety of manners in which discretionary administrative practices affect the course of actual change. Disclosure of
prosecution files occurred without substantial controversy, and
became a routine part of the practice in the system largely because of the ability of the discretionary process to balance benefits and detriments. Earlier pleas, better scheduling, and conservation of judicial time did not occur in San Diego despite
a general enthusiam for achieving these results, largely because
the preexisting process had already achieved a balance which
went far toward maximizing performance, especially with respect to early pleas and the saving of judge time. Guilty pleas
were actually delayed in a large number of cases as a result of
a shift in timing of the bargaining process so as to permit the
use of the omnibus hearing for early disposition matters.
The effects produced by omnibus might appear inexplicable
if one were to assume the traditional model of the adversary
process as describing the manner in which the system actually
performs. However, measured against an understanding of the
discretionary procedures in the jurisdiction, the results are
clearly predictable. The lesson is apparent in preparing to seek
reform of the process in any jurisdiction: it is essential to examine the results and the rationale of the preexisting system, and
to understand how the proposed procedure will fit into the discretionary enforcement patterns.
For the bulk of the caseload, the criminal justice system in
San Diego was neither slow in disposing of cases nor inefficient
33

Several months after the data for this report had been gathered and the
analysis completed, the author had the oppcrtunity to speak with the
new director of the defender program in San Diego. During this conversation, the current director asserted that the omnibus hearing had
been revitalized. According to this report, the hearing currently serves
an important function in ensuring disclosure of prosecution files and
in achieving the other objectives of the original concept.
We have had no opportunity to examine the extent to which omnibus has re-emerged as an active part of the San Diego federal criminal
process. However, assuming that the report is accurate, it supports
the conclusion that the presence of a forceful and interested individual
or individuals can temporarily force the hearing to go against the grain
of the system emphasis on efficiency. As we have seen, during 1967,
the omnibus process suffered not from lack of effort, but from lack
of accomplishment. The stripped-down, mass production version described in this section was the product of growing disinterest and caseload pressure during the intervening years. Unless, unlike the 1967 version, the 1971 cmnibus performs a needed, affirmative function in
processing the cases, a reversion to a mass production model is probable as the current level of interest and pressure subsides.
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in terms of in-court time. There are preliminary indications
that the speedy disposition for most cases is not a phenomenon
limited simply to the San Diego district court. Recent studies
by the Federal Judicial Center indicate that 75 percent of all
criminal cases in the federal system are terminated within 180
days of filing. This interval includes the time during which the
defendant may have been a fugitive from justice and the time
necessary to develop a probation report for the sentencing of
already convicted offenders. If these aspects of the time measurement were deleted, the percentage would increase substantially.3 4 Likewise, a study of the Chicago courts with respect
to the processing of felony cases found that 50 percent of these
cases were disposed of within 90 days of filing.3 5 Referring to
our data with the qualification that the exact profile of the timing of disposition may not be generally applicable, the following chart for serious narcotics cases depicts the extent to which
most cases are disposed of very early:
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Speedy disposition is fully consistent with the further observation that in-court time is minimized by the discretionary
adjustment process. Both results relate to the fact that the discretionary system has, in most jurisdictions, been forced to
adjust to a situation in which there has been a chronic im-4 Interview with William Eldridge, Research Director, Federal Judicial
Center, Chicago, Illinois, June 22, 1971.
3.5 Banfield & Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Criminal Courts,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 259 (1968).
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balance of resources and caseloads. It has long been generally
known that the negotiation process minimizes the frequency
with which trial dispositions are followed. However, the San
Diego data suggest that even within the non-trial category, the
system goes far toward minimizing the time spent in court per
case. Supportive data suggesting the general applicability of this
observation come from the Chicago studyA" This study indicated
that 50 percent of the felony cases were handled with five or
less court appearances.
If these observations are generally accurate, attempts at
reforming the judicial process must take into account a system
in which there has been a substantial pre-adjustment of speed
and court-time factors. The long-delayed, time consuming case
is the exception to an efficient adjustment procedure, and
should be treated as such. Delay in the criminal courts may be
a problem, but the problem must be defined as being applicable to only a minority of the caseload. Clearly, a selective
reform technique is essential to avoid offsetting time losses
or the dilution of effort involved in attempting to speed
and make more efficient the disposition of cases which are handled very quickly already. Additionally, since the systems may
have long adopted a technique of minimizing in-court time,
it is entirely inconsistent to seek substantial reform by creating
a time-consuming and generally mandatory in-court appearance.
It is predictable, and was observed in San Diego, that such timeconsuming appearances will, over a long period of time, be
modified and integrated into the existing rationale of the system, just as the adversary model generally has been adjusted
to meet the demands of efficiency.
It may be accurate to observe that, assuming once again
that the speedy and efficient disposition is generally widespread,
the problem in reforming the court processing system is not to
achieve general patterns of greater speed or efficiency. There
may be some need in the minority of the cases to speed the disposition patterns. But the primary goal may be the exact reverse - there may be a need to delay and to increase the formal
judicial involvement in the disposition of the bulk of the routine
caseload handled within the system. In a sense this was implicit
in a statement made by the chief U.S. Attorney in San Diego
who, as previously noted, remarked that a primary effect of
omnibus and especially of the increased discovery was to inject
an element of greater fairness into the bulk of the caseload.
36
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INTRODUCTION

T

HE concept and practice of diversion is neither novel nor
esoteric. Indeed, the exercise of some forms of discretion
by criminal justice officials- ranging from the initial decision
not to arrest, to the determination to refrain from prosecution,
and up through the acquittal of the "guilty"-has always been
an integral part of the criminal process. However, recognition
and articulation of this phenomenon as part of a conceptually
distinct and analytically helpful process called diversion is much
more recent. Only in the past few years has the term diversion
become common usage not only in academic circles, but even
among officials in the criminal justice system who, having
*Research

Attorney, American Bar Foundation; A.B. 1965, Davidson

College; J.D. 1968, University of Chicago Law School.
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transcended the usual cultural-linguistic lag, are beginning to
see it as part of their vocabulary.
The new familiarity of the term and concept of diversion
is hardly attributable to the abundance of literature on the subject, since the literature dealing specifically with this notion is
quite scarce.' The concept of diversion has been touched upon3
or police
in incidental fashion in treatments of prosecutorial'
discretion, or in the context of arguments in favor of decriminalization, 4 with diversion usually viewed as a means of cushioning the impact of harsh laws but generally submerged in the
viewer's preoccupation with more conspicuous or better-known
Consedispositional processes- trial and plea-bargaining.
characterquently, although diversion has been identified as a
little writing exisis on the topic of non-criminal processing argues
for the need for further exploration and a clearer focus. The literary
experience also indicates that the present commonness of the term
"diversion" stems not from the literature but more likely from the recent persistent habits of a growing number of academicians and reformers who circulate among criminal justice officials and periodically
confront and bewilder them with questions and proposals on the subject. One topical article which focused on diversion in rural areas of
Southern Illinois grew out of an American Bar Foundation study conducted two years ago. This modest piece, which exhibited a somewhat
misleading emphasis on mental hospital practices, concluded that diversion in the informal rural setting came close to being the rule rather
than the exception to "traditional" criminal processing. Brakel & South,
Diversion From the Criminal Process in the Rural Community, 7 AM.
CRIM. L.Q. 122 (1969).
2 See generally R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE,
LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE (1969); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION:
THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969); and D. NEW-

I What

MAN, CONVICTION:

THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT

TRIAL (1966) (American Bar Foundation's Administration of Criminal
Justice Series). See also Braun, Ethics in Criminal Cases: A Response,
55 GEO. L.J. 1048 (1967); Freedman. The Professional Responsibility of
the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030 (1967) and Kaplan, The
ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1965).
3 See generally W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY (1966) (American Bar Foundation's Administration of Criminal Justice Series). J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process, 69 YALE L.J.
543 (1969).
4 See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964); J.
BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION T0 THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

(Hafner Library of Classics No. 6); P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEH. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1964); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIVIINAL SANCTION (1968);
Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization,374 ANNALS 157 (1967); Remington, The Limits and Possibilitiesof the Criminal Law. 43 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 865 (1968). Abstract discussions of the problem of "overcriminalizaticn," however, have failed to recognize the practical realities of
existing diversionary practices. As a result, the arguments in favor of
decriminalization have overstressed the recognition of the substantive
impropriety (the harshne-s) of the criminal law. The problem with
these arguments is that their basic premise is only one element in a
series of philcsophies and circumstances which are at the root of proposed or practiced decriminalization by diversion. In short, framing the
argument in favor of diversion in terms of the harshness of the law is
less than compelling when criminal justice officials already divert for
a variety cf other compelling reasons; talk of substantive or procedural
due process is less than apposite when practitioners in the criminal justice system regularly avoid both substance and procedure.
(1948)

MENT OF MORALS (1959);

DIVERSION

istic of official practice in separate analyses of the various
decisionmaking junctures, there has been no significant attempt
to distinguish it from other kinds of discretionary behavior, or
to explore the essence and the range of diversionary practices
and the variety of motivations behind them. But the fact is
that the dispositional process for a substantial (though not precisely known) number of criminal cases covering a wide variety
of offenses bears little relation to traditional conceptualizations
and modes of analysis. The fact that the diversion process is
often informal and unrecorded has contributed to depriving it
of the focal attention it merits.
I.

THE DIVERSION CONCEPT

Though the concept of diversion (or non-criminal disposition) is to some extent self-explanatory, a precise definition
is difficult. The term diversion has been used loosely from
time to time in contexts which imply a lack of agreement as to
whether a certain process or disposition falls within the meaning of the concept. It is not the purpose of this article to participate in a debate over categorization. Rather, the definition
offered here is an operational one which may help clarify the
conceptual focus and hence the discussion of the issues in the
remainder of this article.
For these purposes, then, diversion is the practice by criminal justice officials - police, prosecutors, and judges - of channeling out of the criminal process classes of offenders who, as a
consequence of their probable and assumed guilt, could theoretically be handled by the criminal process. Diversion contemplates some sort of dispositional response, though it is often
minimalistic and ineffectual, and in some instances a mere "donothing" response. Diversion usually (though not necessarily
or always) means stopping short of conviction, sometimes short
of prosecution or even formal arrest.
Diversion is most commonly a discretionary exercise and it
has been used as synonymous with discretion. But not all
diversion is discretionary. Some diversionary practices are
highly structured, as, for example, diversion circumscribed by
the laws of criminal irresponsibility (insanity pleas). 5 Moreover, diversion is distinct from discretion to the extent that it
is an aspect of discretion, which is a broader notion. Diversion
operates only to channel offenders out of the criminal system,
5 American Bar Foundation studies already dealing with this type of
diversion are: A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW (1970); and R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENALLY ILL

(1968).
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whereas discretion generally can be used to achieve exactly
opposite ends. For example, criminal justice officials use discretion to invoke the criminal process for offenses and offenders popularly perceived as not warranting criminal handling,
e.g., "victimless" crimes, morals offenses between consenting
parties, drug or liquor "abuse," and so forth.
II. THE SPECIFIC Focus
The object of this article is to describe and analyze the
concept of diversion on the basis of field research conducted
in several urban centers in the Midwest.' The intention is not
to treat in narrow and quantified detail the findings of the Midwest study, since subsequent reports on the American Bar
Foundation project of which this study was a part will serve
that purpose. Rather, this article will present some preliminary
conclusions and impressions about the nature of diversionary
practices, their motivations, and official attempts to formalize
these practices. The data gathered during the course of the
field work suggests that there are serious problems connected
with (perhaps inherent in) the informality which characterizes many diversionary practices. But the experiences with
formalized diversion raise equally troublesome questions. One
certain conclusion is that the issues surrounding diversion are
highly complex and not subject to facile analysis, nor to unidimensional resolutions.
This article will focus on diversionary practices which obtain in the areas of white-collar crimes, shoplifting, family disputes, and first offenses. There are many other areas involving
common diversionary practices, or practices which may be
diversionary, which have been exciuded from the scope of
this article.
These four general areas of crime- white collar offenses,
a profitshoplifting, family disputes, and first offenses -offer
table setting for the problems and issues which must be ex6 The survey was conducted in the fall of 1970 as part of the American
Bar Foundation's project on Non-criminal Disposition of Criminal Cases,
directed by Donald M. McIntyre. The cities are Cleveland, Ohio; Des
Moines, Iowa; Indianapolis, Indiana; Kansas City, Missouri; Milwaukee.
Wisconsin; Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; and St. Louis, Missouri.
The purpose of tl~e Midwestern swing was to arrive at an inventory and
overview of the various diversicnary practices which prevail in the
criminal justice operations of the urban centers of this country. The
Midwestern survey served as a complement to similar work conducted
earlier in the life cf the study in such geographically diverse urban
centers as New York, Philadephia, Baltimore, Chicago, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and Seattle. Toward completion of the urban focus, the
study further contemplates a similar effcrt (and in addition a more
concentrated inquiry into the issues which have emerged) in the middlesized cities of Charlotte, North Carolina and Albuquerque, New Mexico.
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plored. The diversionary practices commonly applied in these
areas are typically informal and inconspicuous. They occur at
various stages in the criminal process, and the dispositions are
generally devoid of approbative aspects except very perfunctory
ones.7 Though not exhaustive of the range of practices encountered during the field work, the areas selected for focus
in this article do coincide with the dominant themes which
developed in the course of interviews with the practicing officials, and it appeared that these "middle-ground" diversionary
practices would sufficiently demonstrate the problems and complexities of diversion in general. This focus seemed to present
an advantage over concentration on the particularly frequent
(plea-bargaining accounts for anywhere from 75 percent to 95
percent of all criminal dispositions s and is rather difficult to fit
within the concept of diversion), the particularily structured
(commitment to mental institutions), or the particularly "undesirable" (police pay-offs, immunity for unreliable informers).
Moreover, formalization schemes have been attempted in each
of the four areas selected, providing a context which suggests
to the fullest the intractability of the problems raised by the
practice of diversion.
The organization and thrust of this article will be the following: First, the four categories of offenses will each be discussed in terms of the rationales for the practice of diversion
in each of those particular situations. The analysis will suggest
that informal diversion carries with it a substantial potential
for discriminatory application. Second, the attempts at formalization of the practices will be examined. The point of this
discussion is to indicate that these attempts have been mis7 In short, the practices dealt with in this article stand in sharp contrast

to such ccnspicuous non-criminal dispositions as may result, for instance,
from a plea of insanity, where the diversion option is formally documented in legal codes or cases, occurs cnly at the last stage of criminal
processing, and includes very real sanctions, the punitive character of
which is only guised by a twist in semantics which serves to make the
deprivation of freedom which does result, "morally" palatable.
Other practices which have at times been labeled diversionary in
conception and implementation but which are excluded from the scope
of this article are the commcn disposition of probation, non-criminal
handling of drug addicts and alcoholics, "morals" offenses, the sweeping
institutionalized (diversionary?) scheme of juvenile justice (except to
the extent that scme aspects of the handling of youthful offenders are
relevant to the diversion concept generally), and other particular practices listed in the text below. The reason for these exclusions is in part
that these practices have been treated extensively, albeit not usually
with the focus preferred in this article, in other writings. But the more
basic reason is that the practices selected for inclusion appear more
likely to raise the crucial issues and problems inherent in diversion than
those excluded.
8 These figures were obtained in the course of the field study. They are
confirmed in writings such as NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
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directed. The formalizers have oversimplified the problems of
diversion, and they appear to have been uncertain in identifying
the purpose behind their attempts. These failings are not surprising because the informality of diversion is both its strength
and its weakness, its necessary essence and its undesirable
aspect, its promise of rationality and its potential for abuse.
Does one structure, check, eliminate, control, legitimize, standardize, promote, or kill such a thing? The real failing of the
formalizers is that they acted, whereas they should have studied.
III.

SPECIFIC PRACTICES AND THEIR RATIONALES

The types of non-criminal dispositions with which we are
concerned occur primarily, if not exclusively, in the area of
misdemeanors. The very fact implies the rationale: the offense
is "not too serious," and to expend the full energies of the
criminal system in prosecuting such offense is simply "not
worth it." 9 This statement comes close to describing the essence
of the reasons behind the diversionary practices in question.
However, by the use of specific offenses or categories of offenses
as examples, it will become clear that the rationale is not as
simple and one-dimensional as it appears; that the characterization of an offense by criminal justice officials as "not too
serious" involves a variety of interrelated considerations; and
that the phrase "not worth it" similarly denotes a complex of
factors. Even at that, the statement risks incompleteness and
oversimplification. Some of the motivations behind diversionary
decisions fit only loosely within this generalization; involved are
such disparate rationales as the moralistic one that in some
instances the retribution required by the written law is dis9 See H. PACKER, supra note 4, at 290-91: "The worst abuses of discretion
in enforcement occur in connection with those offenses that are just
barely taken seriously . . . . And it is here that the greatest danger
exists of using enforcement discretion in an abusive way: to pay off a
score, to provide a basis for extortion, to stigmatize an otherwise deviant
or unpopular figure." See also, Jackscn. The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 3, 5 (1940):
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that
he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous
power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks
he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted. . . . [Liaw enforcement becomes personal, and the real
crime becomes that of being unpopular with predominent or
governing group being attached to the wrong political views,
or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor
himself. (italics added).
Discretion as personal whim or prejudice may be part of the probblem, but only a small part. Neither is it very helpful to suggest as a more
appropriate practice the prosecution of "cases that need to be prosecuted," even where the focus, as above, is on discrimination in the narrow, personal, and political sense; the more pertinent problem, with
which this article deals, is the more subtle social and racial form of
discrimination.
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proportionate to the harm done,' or at the other extreme, such
essentially practical considerations as the difficulty of proof,
the existence of tangible non-criminal disposition alternatives,
or the need to conserve already overburdened criminal justice
resources appear to be operative. Finally, the analysis suggests
that "not too serious" and "not worth it" are at times independent rather than interdependent elements comprising the rationale behind diversion. It is a fact that some behavior which is
decidedly not low-danger is nonetheless deemed to be beyond
the scope of full intervention by the criminal process.
Before discussing specific offenses or offense categories
and the motivation for diversion in those instances, it must be
pointed out that linking of certain offense types to specific
rationales is to some extent an artifical process. The fact of the
matter is that diversionary decisions are often based not upon a
single rationale, but upon interdependent or even cumulative
sets of motives. The exercise thus often becomes a question of
singling out what appear to be the outstanding and more conspicuous motivations behind the decision to divert a specific
group of cases. At times, one motive will appear so obvious,
one circumstance of the offenses so compelling in terms calling
for a non-criminal disposition, that other motivations and circumstances naturally fall into the background. This is not to say
that other factors and rationales play no part at all, consciously
or subconsciously. In other instances, however, it is clear that
the decision to divert is based on a combination of circumstances surrounding the offense or the offender and that several
motivations are at play simultaneously, none of which are
separable or can be said to predominate.
A.

White Colbar Crimes
White collar offenses are "low-danger" offenses not involving violence and are typically committed by persons belonging
to the more advantaged sectors of society. 1 Included are business frauds, bad checks and the like. That the offense has
10 The argument, however, that discretion-diversion occurs only because
of the substantive impropriety of the law is too limited. Law enforcement officials divert for many other reasons and will continue to do so
even if laws become substantively more reasonable.
11H. PACKER, supra note 4, at 354:
As introduced by the sociclogist E. H. Sutherland, the term
refers to crimes that persons of respectability and high social
status commit in the course of their occupations. It is a sociological concept that cuts across legal categories, and it is admittedly
imprecise as a definition of categories of crime. The proper
function of the term is probably connotative rather than denotative. Nonetheless, it has some usefulness as a boundary-setting
term.
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become labeled in the criminal justice jargon to reflect the
typical offender is illustrative of the general fact that the characterization of an offense as non-serious or low-danger is heavily
permeated with an evaluation of the offender, as distinguished
from an evaluation of the act.1 2 The point is not only that the
act of perpetrating a business fraud or writing a bad check is
deemed to be relatively harmless. but that certain "sociological"
assumptions are made about the perpetrators as well. Many
criminal justice officials apparently adhere to the notion - and
they may have some empirical basis for this - that these middle
class offenders will not readily recidivate nor regress into patterns of more serious crime, and that the mere fact of official
detection serves as a sufficient deterrent against future misbehavior. 13 Even more compelling, the white collar offender is
typically a businessman, white, head of a family-in short,
someone with "status" and "worth" in the community. It is in
part this status which is seen to make criminalization disproportionate and prosecution inappropriate. The very frequent
response of the criminal justice system to these cases is therefore not to prosecute, but to simply compel the offender to
make restitution to the victim, or to extract a "promise to cease
and desist."' 4
The merits of this response are difficult to gauge. The following observations, however, may be deserving of further exploration. Though a measure of individualized justice based on
sound experience may be viewed as salutary, it would seem
that the exercise of discretion in the area of white collar
offenses is peculiarly open to misapplication. It is of course a
fact that discretion always entails this risk and that discretionary decisions are commonly based on assumptions of varying
validity. The problem, however, is that behavior is adjudged
innocuous not just by the evenhanded assumptions or misassumptions about the nature of the offense, but rather by unequal predictions or mispredictions based on the offender's social
12 For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon, see Sudnow, Normal
Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender
Office, 12 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 255 (1964-65).
13 See F. MILLER, supra ncte 2, at 279:
Another factor present in many charging decisions is the economic and social standing of the suspect. In many such cases,
the administrative officials apparently believe they should be
more lenient because prosecution would be particularly harmful
to the suspect's reputation and the suspect's awareness cf and
concern for his own standing makes a recurrence of the offense
more unlikely. It is a regular practice in the Detroit's prosecutor's office not to charge well-to-do persons accused of offenses
such as exhibitionism and homosexual acts.
14 See id. at 272-73.
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status. There is a certain - perhaps perverse - sense of equality in predictions or assessments, be they reasonable or unreasonable, when these are derived from the nature of the offense.
In other words, there is an element of neutrality in the discretionary judgment that a particular type of offense is not worth
full prosecution, whether this judgment derives from the view
that the punishment prescribed by the law is too harsh, or that
the cases occur too frequently and would overload the system
at the expense of more "serious" matters. Examinations of the
specific circumstances surrounding the offense, including considerations bearing on the strength of the evidence, may also
play a legitimate part in the discretionary decision not to prosecute. These considerations are already more troublesome, however, in that they are "individual" and open to manipulation.
Consideration of the prior record of the offender, though perhaps a justifiable concern, is even more problematic. The problem is that consideration of "specific circumstances" readily
becomes a smokescreen for more arbitrary and subjective decisions, where a disproportionate focus is on the offender and on
his social status, where assessments cease to be neutral but
ter-.d to become expressions of favoritism towards a social group
(and prejudice to those outside of it) that is felt to have "something in common" with the decisionmakers, hence deemed to
be deserving of a "break," and for whom the confrontation
with the reality (brutality) of the criminal process would be
unsuitable.
Prior studies focusing on the handling of white collar
crimes1 5 have largely missed the systematic diversion which
occurs in this area of offenses. Such omission may in part be
attributable to the jurisdictional selection: the frequency and
regularity of diversion of white collar offenders may vary in
substance and, more particularly, in observability from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.1" Differentials may even be apparent within
15 See, e.g., H.

EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE

(published in May 1970 by the National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice). But cf. J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND
SocIETY, ch. 7 "Embezzlement," at 289 (1952); E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME (1961); and Robin, The Corporate and Judicial Disposition of Employee Thieves, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 685.
COLLAR CRIME

In one city, for example, the stated prosecutorial policy was "hard-nosed

is not our business, we're not a collection
prosecution -restitution
agency." By contrast, cfficials in two other cities made much of the fact
that they systematically diverted white collar offenses; restitution demand sheets (instruments of implementation) and statutory authority
were liberally shown and cited. Interestingly, the same rationale which
was used to support the stated policy of prosecution ("we're not a collection agency") was avowed to be the motivation for systematic diversion. More importantly, further discussion with the prcsecutor and with

other criminal justice officials in the non-diverting metropolitan area
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a single jurisdiction since practice and stated policy shift with
changes in prosecutorial administrations." Our field investigation, however, indicates that observability may be the primary
factor accounting for apparent differentials in processing of
white collar crimes. Prosecutors who claim that they are "hardnosed" or "exercise little discretion" in this area in effect
operate quite similarly to those officials who are quite comfortable with-who in fact propagandize- their policy of diversion. Further studies in the area of white collar offenses should
take this fact into account."
Shoplifting
An analysis of the offense of shoplifting yields a series of
observations quite similar to those relating to white collar
offenses. There is no need to reiterate these. Separate mention
of the shoplifting situation is made here because it constitutes
a significant chunk of the types of non-serious cases where the
dispositional pattern is almost universally diversionary, and
because it provides a particularly notable illustration of the
notion that the offense can be adjudged non-serious when the
offender is presumed to be ripe for diversion by virtue of his
social position. Shoplifting, of course, can hardly be equated
with dangerous criminal behavior, but the offense is generally
regarded as highly repetitive behavior, furnishing, at least in
theory, a compelling basis for criminal processing.
The fact that many stores today post notification that
"shoplifters will be prosecuted" is implicit evidence of official
B.

revealed that, despite the "hard-nosed" talk, diversion of "appropriate"
cases was nonetheless a reality. In sum, dispositional practices were
roughly similar in all three cities.
17 Stated policy with regard to the handling of white collar crimes exhibits significant disparity, but the relationship between stated policy
and practice is uncertain. While practices vary in the sense that some

jurisdictions pursue a course of active implementation of the diversion
option and others play a role more akin to passive acquiescence to

private preferences, the evidence suggests that these variations do not

result in correspondingly different dispositional patterns in either volume or types of cases diverted. Whatever relationship exists between
stated policy, implementing practice, and dispositional consequence is

difficult to measure given the lack of data on diversionary decisions.
It should not be too readily assumed.

is A point of departure for subsequent investigation may be to focus on

those white collar cases which were routed through the regular criminal

process and not diverted. An examination of these more observable dispositions may well result in a finding that convicted white collar offendders are atypical in terms of social status of the label which describes
the class. Important as such a finding would be in its own right, it
would additionally demonstrate that crucial determinaticns are made at
a less observable level and provide clues as to when and where these
decisions are made, under what circumstances, and how frequently.
Also, such an examination would tend to test the relationship between
stated policy on the exercise of discretion and the concrete practice of
diversionary disposition, and clarify the meaning of dispositions recorded versus those which go unrecorded.
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practices whose aims are the converse of that."' Such notification announces perhaps the merchants' aspirations, but little
more than that. To be sure, some shoplifters are fully prosecuted,2 " but only those who quite clearly fall outside the group
which is normally accorded diversionary treatment.
When criminal justice officials talk about shoplifting, they
seem to be thinking exclusively of women offenders. The image
is one of slightly imbalanced, compulsive, older ladies who take
things not out of economic need, but from mysterious drives
attributed to menopausal

phenomena.2

1

Evidently, this image

contributes heavily to the notion that shoplifting is not worth
concern from the prosecutorial point of view, and that restitution and or fines are adequate and appropriate solutions.
The interesting aspect of the shoplifting situation is not
only that essentially adverse prejudice works in this situation
to the benefit of a class of offenders, but that factual circumstances and perceptions are virtually forced to conform to the
standard image. Apparently. the notion of "worth" in the community and the consequent protection accorded to persons of
that status figure even more strongly with respect to middle
class female offenders than they do in the white collar crime
situation. One almost wonders whether criminal justice officials
confronted with atypical shoplifters (e.g. a male) will venture
to transform the offense or the offender to fit the acceptable
dispositional pattern. This is, of course, an overstatement, but
the question may serve as a starting point for more intensive
inquiry into this area. A profitable focus might be to see how
prosecutorial discretion is exercised with respect -to atypical
shoplifters: how are the less tangible facts such as social or
racial status, occupational status, potential and prior criminal
record. and so forth, manipulated when "diagnostic" expectations and dispositional inclinations are upset by inescapable
physical facts?

'

See W. LAFAVE, supra note 3.

When shoplifters are caught, they are usually apprehended in
the act, which results in immediate recovery of the stolen goods.
Merchants generally are unwilling to prosecute, asserting that
they cannot afford the time away from the store to testify in
court or that they do not want to risk a loss of good will.
Thi. is only a partial explanation for the low volume of prosecutions.
The behavior cf enforcement officials is often determinative of the "unwillingess" to prosecute.
20

See, e.g.,

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-

MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT (especially footnotes).
AN ASSESSMENT 48-49 (1967)
A See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 179-80.
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Family Disputes

The very frequent fact of non-criminal handling of family
quarrels offers an appropriate setting for the recognition of
another rationale behind diversion: in an already overburdened
criminal justice system, a percentage of cases must be disposed
of with a mininal expenditure of resources. It is probably true
that this conservation argument lurks behind the entire spectrum of cases which are commonly diverted 2 2 but in the context of family disputes this rationale seems particularly compelling and conspicuous.
The observation that the diversion of intrafamily offenses
is firmly predicated on reasons of economies respecting the
utilization of criminal justice resources is not derived from the
statements of criminal justice officials. The conservation argument is rarely articulated probably because officials are reluctant to display the detachment (or cynicism) required for the
admission that it is operative. About the strongest response
obtained from officials queried on this area is that "discretion
must be exercised," otherwise there is "too much to handle."
That conservation of criminal justice resources is a predominant motivation behind the systematic diversion of family disputes is thus largely a matter of inference, negative inference
at that. The following factors point to its predominance: First
and generally, family quarrels are a high volume phenomenon,
constituting a major portion of police calls. This in itself implies that economies must be made and leads to the inference
that they are made. Secondly, diversion of a high proportion
of domestic incidents is an empirical fact, but the rationales
which support diversionary practices in other offense categories
do not apply. Family disputes are not nondangerous forms of
behavior, confined to socially preferred classes whose prior or
future behavior is or can be assumed to be non-repetitive or
non-regressive. To the contrary, as any police officer will
testify, domestic quarrels constitute high risk situations for
both the participants and enforcers. Intrafamily offenses cut
across social classes, and officials apparently perceive that fact.
Moreover, the offenses are commonly associated with prior and
future similar misbehavior. In fact, minimal intervention by
the criminal system is particularly notable in high-danger
areas of the cities, 23 a phenomenon which runs directly counter
22
23

Id. at 102-24.
In connection with this point on family disputes, it is appropriate to
refer to the problem of neighborhood assaultive behavior, since the

criminal justice system's response of minimal intervention in that area
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to the typical pattern that only offenders with social status
from worthy neighborhoods are selected for non-criminal handling. The notion that criminal processing of family disputes
is "not worth it" thus operates independently from assumptions
as to the non-seriousness of the offense or the positive characteristics of the offender. "Not worth it" in the context of
domestic offenses means primarily a reluctance to commit already over-taxed criminal justice resources to an unmanageable situation. The official response is usually temporary intervention at most. The decision to avoid criminal processing is
generally made at the earliest stage - by the police - and in
full recognition that this solution is inadequate, that it represents only "a temporary cooling-off." The typical attitude is:
you can't
"Tomorrow they'll probably be at it again -but
bring them all in."
There are other motivations at play in the diversion of domestic offenses. Already alluded to is the situation in parts of the
large inner-city areas - the ghettos in particular - where violence, including bloodshed, is an unfortunately common phenomenon. Law enforcement response in these areas is generally less
than adequate. 24 It is apparently the system's judgment that
more frequent and more incisive action is not worth the risk
and effort in neighborhoods where violent behavior is common
and thereby assumed to be condoned (and perhaps felt to be

24

of offenses reveals that some alternative motivations are at stake. "Neighhc.od assaults" are commonly understood to refer to acts of violence
committed among people who live in close physical and social proximity
to one another -specifically, in the city ghettos. Intrafamily offenses
can be said to be part of the neighborhood assault phenomenon. In our
field study, however, questions and responses were formulated along
the former category, hence the focus in the body of the article. The
point to be made is that, though the motivations of conservation and
difficulty of proof play a role in the handling (non-handling) of neighborhood assaults, additional reasons exist which reinforce these motivations and which render the policy of minimal involvement compelling
and operational. The need to conserve criminal justice resources operates along lines which are inverze to the usual diversionary process.
Diversion (if one can call it such) is the rule because violence is commonplace, not because it is isolated or aberrational; intervention is
avoided or minimized because it is dangerous to intervene, not because
the behavior is deemed innocuous. Some uneasy assumptions are involved: violence is tolerated which would be intolerable in more affluent communities. Disputants are left to their own devices "to work out
problems." But the evidence must be overwhelming, and overwhelmingly ignored, that the behavior tolerated by the system is not at all
tolerated in the disadvantaged communities, and that those left to work
out their own disputes are least capable of doing so.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 22, where the point is made
that this situation may be improving:
Not long ago there was a tendency to dismiss reports of all but
the most serious offenses in slum areas and segregated minority
group districts ....

[But c]rimes that were once unknown to the

police, or ignored when complaints were received, are now much
more likely to be reported and recorded as part of the regular
statistical procedure.
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"deserved"). A related factor motivating non-intervention is the
common experience (or assumption) that the adversaries to these
disputes are reluctant to take part in the prosecution of one another. This is an evidentiary problem, and it extends beyond the
city ghettos, providing a motivation for diversion of domestic disputes generally. The short of it is that the system will not be
burdened with cases where victims refuse to testify on the date
of trial. Finally, another motivation which is operative involves
the notion that a family should not be deprived of its bread2
winner and thus forced onto the welfare rolls.. ;,
These alternative motivations serve to reinforce the propriety
of diversionary dispositions already dictated by the need to conserve the system's resources. They do not undercut the basic
thesis that unmanageable quantity determines the quality (the
admitted inefficacy of minimal intervention) and frequency of
official response. They demonstrate the complex and sometimes
cumulative nature of motivations behind diversionary decision,
but fall short of being broadly applicable or self-sufficient rationales. Rather, they take the form of somewhat overworked excuses
often applied to less than appropriate situations in which it is
evident that decisions are actually based on economic considerations.
The police diversion practices range from no response, to
temporary "holding actions" until "things calm down,1126 to forcing the aggressor to sleep off his drunk in the park, and to providing transportation to a hospital for the injured. Sometimes
these are eminently appropriate actions. Moreover, the desire
to hold families together through nonintervention or through
paradoxically - temporary disruption may be both explainable and commendable, while the methods may at least be temporarily effective. A greater paradox, however, and one which
is in need of a better justification, is why action must always
stop that short, regardless of the circumstances that prompted
the dispute or those which might result in its persistence or
aggravation.
First Offense
First offenses, of course, include the categories of offenses
already discussed as commonly diverted. In addition to the rationales already discussed for diversion of white collar offenses,
shoplifting, or family quarrels, the decision to handle in a noncriminal manner may depend in part on the absence of a crimiD.

25
26

See F. MILLER, supra note 2, at 260-66.
Id. at 266-71.
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nal record, though a totally unblemished record is ordinarily
not required. Second or third offenders in the areas of business
frauds or shoplifting may still be given a "break." Persons involved in domestic misbehavior are likely to be diverted at a
stage too early for, or under circumstances which preclude,
even an inquiry into the question of prior record.
The categorization or recognition of an offense as a first
offense serves to assure diversion in classes of offenses where
there already exists a predisposition to divert. This re-emphasizes the point that the exercise of the discretion to handle in
non-criminal fashion is often based on a combination of circumstances and motivations. There is an element of the first
offense situation which, however, has a more independent character, constituting a more or less separate and distinct motivation accounting for the decision to handle in non-criminal
fashion.
First offenders are usually youthful offenders due to the
established fact that people who run afoul of the law at a later
age have often run afoul of the law before; stated conversely,
individuals without a criminal record developed in their more
youthful days are not so likely to develop one later in life.
In the folklore of criminal justice officials, as a result, the term
first offender is essentially equated with youthful offender,
and the standard enforcement response is influenced accordingly. First offenders (read youthful offenders) constitute a
preferred class who are given a "break" because to subject
them to the rigors of the criminal justice system at an impressionable age is felt to have adverse consequences. For first
offenders, criminalization is thought to result in a hardening
of anti-social tendencies, whereas for other offenders the theory
(or myth) is maintained that exposure to the criminal system
has a deterrent effect. A distinctive rationale is operative here:
prosecution of a first offense is deemed inappropriate not only
because the offense is deemed non-serious by virtue of the
nature of the act or assumptions about the offender, but because the consequences of full prosecution for the offender are
viewed differently. The selective adherence to or elimination
of the fictions which permeate criminal justice thinking, and
the substitution of new fictions, as exemplified in the handling
of first offenders, present an intriguing and intractable process.
Most probably it reflects an awareness, if a somewhat subconscious one, that more serious and systematic reevaluation
of the prevailing notions of deterrence, rehabilitation, retribu-
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tion, and morality in terms of their impact on the criminal
process at large, or diversion specifically, constitutes an alternative which crosses the boundary of political and social feasibility (if not personal imagination).
The decision to handle first offenses in non-criminal fashion
is also influenced by the existence of what are thought to be
clear and worthwhile non-criminal dispositional alternatives,
presumably more effective than such hopeful non-criminal sanctions as enforced restitution, official detection and so forth, the
inefficacy of which is often conceded by criminal justice officials themselves. For many young first offenders a very real
and at least temporarily effective dispositional alternative is the
military service. Criminal justice officials have an inordinate but for short-term purposes, perhaps a justifiable -faith in the
correctional value of military service. They will go to great
length to utilize this alternative. One prosecutor stated that he
would "wipe everything off the record" just to get the offender
in the Army, thus providing the pre-condition as well as the
incentive for the offender to "choose" this alternative. This
more extreme version of the non-criminal response again reveals
that circumstances can be made to fit the preconceived category
which would render the diversionary response indisputably appropriate. That is to say, the first offense category is quite an
elastic one, including offenders who are technically not first
offenders. The designation of an offense as a first offense is
often little more than a function of prosecutorial interpretation,
since in many instances something can be found in the record
of a non-youthful offender which disqualifies him from first
offender treatment, while for the youthful offender there is
usually something that can conveniently be ignored. This phenomenon may be both an outgrowth of, and an explanation for,
the equation made between first offenders and youthful offenders; in that sense, the first offender situation is analogous to
other diversion categories and reminiscent of the point made
semi-facetiously earlier that a shoplifter is a menopausal old
lady or else is not a shoplifter.
Another typical non-criminal response to first offenses is
the "deferred sentence. '27 The peculiarity of this diversionary
27

As distinguished from "deferred prosecution," which is also a common
diversionary practice, deferred sentence implies a hearing and convict'on prior to the diversionary determination. In practice, however,

the concepts are less distinct. In the cities visited during the course of
the field work, most officials appeared to be talking
sentence, though at times the term deferred prosecution
changeably with deferred sentence, and the concepts
Even judges within a single jurisdiction labeled this

about deferred
was used interwere confused.
exercise of dis-
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disposition is that it is at least technically a function of judicial,
rather than prosecutorial or police, discretion and occurs at a
late stage of the criminal process. The fact that relatively significant criminal justice resources have been expended prior to
the decision to divert would emphasize the fact that, as compared to other offense categories discussed, the conservation
argument plays a smaller part in the handling of the first
(youthful) offenders class of cases.
The judicial decision to defer the sentence of a first offender
has been said to amount to a disposition in the nature of
"informal probation." The judge hears the evidence surrounding
the act and the background of the offender, upon which he
predicates the decision to delay judgment for a period of 6
months or a year. During this time the offender has a chance
to prove himself worthy of the special consideration accorded
to him. Good behavior during this period results in the sentence
being dropped. Since there is practically no supervision over
the offender during the time of his conditional status, it has
been argued that the deferred sentence is an inadequate dispositional alternative, in effect a minimal response like most
other diversionary dispositions. This argument, however, ignores
the fact that the deferred sentence poses a threat to the offender
which in appearances - if not in actuality - is quite immediate,
serious and predictable. The consequence of misbehavior, including minor infractions, during the conditional period is imposition of the original sentence with no further consideration
given.
IV.

FORMALIZING DIVERSIONARY PRACTICES

Having sketched the character of these several categories
of offenses, the reasons behind diversion in each category, and
the specific non-criminal dispositions commonly applied to each,
the discussion which follows focuses on attempts, and their impact, to formalize these processes. The diversionary practices
treated in this article are, as stated earlier, characteristically
lacking in formality, low in observability, and devoid of such
institutional elements as specialization of personnel and thorough
data gathering and reporting. If one of the aims of formalization
is to remedy this situation, it has not been achieved. Legislative
cretion variously, and the procedural technicalities differed at some
points. One judge said that he in essence convicted before deferring
the ultimate judgment; another judge claimed there was no conviction.
Regardless of labels applied, the process is characterized by perfunctory
hearings on the merits (the evidence) held prior to the decision to
divert. The distinctions center on where or in what manner of formality
the decisions and findings which will subsequently be "re-entered" or
-'expunged," depending on the offender's interim behavior, are recorded.
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or administrative schemes designed to formalize one or several
of the diversionary practices described exist today in many of
our larger cities, but the experiences have generally been limited,
tools of implementation have been wanting, and little reliable
data on impact has been collected. As a consequence, responses
in the course of the field survey were largely confined to
vague descriptions by criminal justice officials who were neither
very knowledgeable nor enthusiastic about the formal programs.
Alternatively, enthusiastic program directors would hand out
what were in effect self-serving and inflated reports indicating
the unmitigated successes of their diversion schemes. Despite
these limitations, sufficient impressionistic data was obtained
to justify an attempt in this article to describe and speculate
about the operations, goals, and rationales of existing and proposed formalized diversion programs.
The formalization of diversion poses serious dilemmas. The
enactment into law of discretionary diversion practices aims to
impart a measure of uniformity, predictability, and evenhandedness to an area of the criminal process where there is perceived to be an excess of unchecked discretion and unequal
application.2 8 Formalization also seeks to legitimize and extend
more widely what are viewed as extra-legal and sporadic practices. The problem, however, is whether these goals can be
achieved, or even whether they should be. The questions to be
posed are whether the ends of equality of application, standardization, legitimation, and extension can be accomplished without sacrificing the ends of diversion itself, and whether criminal
justice officials can be persuaded that formality is workable
and desirable: in short, whether the elimination (or better, the
reduction) of discretion which accompanies formalization is not
accompanied by both results and means which are shortsighted
and counter-productive. The answers to these questions will be
explored by again turning to the specific offense categories
and legislative or administrative schemes which have sought to
codify or programmatize the non-criminal processing commonly
reserved for these offenses.

28

See, e.g.,

K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 225 (1969): "Prosecutors
should be required to make and to announce rules that will guide their
choices, stating . . . what will and what will not be prosecuted, and they

should be required otherwise to structure their discretion." The quote
above reveals an oversimplification of the problem. Can we expect
prosecutcrs and police to announce as rules diversionary practices motivated by complex, sometimes prejudicial, and often subconscious perceptions?
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Statutory Grace Periods and White Collar Crimes
Formalization of diversionary responses to white collar of29
Prosecufenses has focused primarily on the bad check'area.
tion of bad check offenses in most of the several large cities
visited during our field work is technically controlled by state
statutes which provide that the offender shall have 5 or 10 days
in which to atone for his offense-i.e. make restitution to the
payee. ° The response of criminal justice officials to these
statutes is variable, which serves to point up various weaknesses of attempts to formalize diversionary decisions. One feature of the statutes is that they commonly frame the restitution
concept in terms of intent- failure to make restitution after
feature
notification constitutes proof of intent to defraud -a
which serves to obscure the diversionary purpose of the provisions, and thereby facilitates a blunting of the diversionary
mandate on the operational level.
One observed response was to ignore the statutory mandate. The statute typically eliminates discretion by making the
grace period applicable to all writers of bad checks. Implementation of the provision contemplates the circulation of "restitution demand forms" to potential victims (i.e., merchants) and
the availability of such forms to actual victims who have
brought complaints. Ignoring the statute was accomplished by
simply not making such forms available and not publicizing the
possibility of this form of redress. The decision to divert or not
thus remained entirely within the discretion of the criminal
justice officials, who stated that they continued to prosecute
"only criminals." Restitution was considered by these officials
as morally and practically irrelevant. The decision to handle a
bad check offense in non-criminal fashion rested, as it had prior
to the statute, on whether the offender was typical of the class
of white collar offenders: the decisions to prosecute would
ensue if the offender of offense was atypical, involving a repeater, one with a record of other criminal behavior, or an
amount of money which was exceptionally large. Criminal
justice officials summed up their position as follows: "If it's
a crime, it's a crime- the statute only complicates the question
of when you can say that the crime has been committed." In
their view, the relationship drawn by the statute between restitution and intent was too tenuous, and the equation between
intent and criminality (subject to prosecution) unacceptable.
A.

29

See F.

30

E.g.,

MILLER,

supra note 2, at 272-73.
§ 609.535 (1963)

MINN. STAT. ANN.

and "Comments" thereto.
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Restitution, they felt, did not necessarily disprove intent, nor
did it turn a "criminal" into a harmless offender. Failure to
make restitution did not automatically prove intent, let alone
indicate criminality and the impropriety of diversion. The
essence of their response was that dispositional decisions were
too complex to be left to hard and fast statutory rules which
ignored both the subtle and obvious realities of law enforcement experience and eliminated the practical tool-discretion
-for dealing with these realities. It may be an obvious and
trivial point to assert that formalization attempts do not work
when they are ignored. What may not be so trivial, however, is
the fact that the formalization was ignored because officials
felt that it could not work.
The response of at least partial compliance with the statute
in another jurisdiction is indicative of the problems created by
formalization and perhaps envisioned by the non-complying
officials. The situation in another of the cities visited involved
a typical but "brand new" restitution statute which provided
that the writer of a bad check would be given 10 days to satisfy
the complainant and thus avoid prosecution. The newness of
the statute might have accounted for the fact that at least
partial compliance prevailed: criminal justice officials were
only beginning to perceive the effects of the statute and such
adjustments as might be made had not yet been made. Officials
complained that their discretionary power, which they believed
they had exercised on the basis of valid experience and intuition, had been subverted. The statute's universal applicability
meant that bad check cases involving small amounts which
were formerly ignored might now necessitate official action,
despite the fact that the nature of the offense and attendant
suppositions about the offender made informal resolution more
appropriate. Alternatively, habitual or significant bad check
offenses were now precluded from prosecution if the offender
complied with the restitution demand. The quantitative impact
of the statute was stated to be a "slight increase" in the number
of formal charges filed. More important, however, were the
non-quantifiable effects; what the figures did not reflect was
that the application of the statute produced offsetting improprieties of result; nor did the figures measure the level of frustration of officials responsible for the enforcement of the statute.
In sum, the legislation which sought to codify and regularize
existing diversionary practices, instead changed practices, which
in turn exerted pressure upon officials to revert to their informal
approach by ignoring the statute or by way of a search for and

DIVERSION

application of newly contrived criteria upon which diversionary decisions would be based.
The tension between formalized and discretionary diversion
is extreme in this area of the law. The empirical evidence suggests that formalization will either be ineffectual or detrimental
to rational processing. It would appear that statutes in this
area should be limited to the role of legitimation and avoid
circumscription of informal practices; but a statute which only
legitimizes is virtually a non-statute.
B.

Restitution, Fines, and Shoplifting

Formalization attempts in the area of shoplifting were met
with a form of adjustment by criminal justice officials which
did not materialize in the bad check area. The reaction to the
shoplifting statutes was to ease the impact of formalization by
restructuring the grounds upon which informal discretion could
be exercised and old inclinations could be pursued. As in the
bad check area, therefore, legislative efforts to make uniform
and predictable the diversionary response seem to be failing.
The underlying reasons are similiar as well: criminal justice
officials believe that the dispositional pattern of diversion
established by informal discretion is sufficiently evenhanded
and predictable, while maintaining the advantage of regular
processing of cases which because of special circumstances surrounding the offense or the offender fail to qualify for noncriminal handling. Formalization, they feel, takes away the
option to make appropriate exceptions to the common response,
or worse, it turns exceptions into rules.
Discussions of shoplifting statutes and their impact, 3' while
acknowledging that the incidence of prosecution of shoplifters
has been negligible, have failed to relate this fact to the diversionary practices of law enforcement officials. Instead, the low
volume of prosecutions has been attributed to the merchants'
unwillingness to take the time and expense to prosecute, 32 and
to their fear of countersuit for unwarranted apprehension and
prosecution by suspected shoplifters. Analysis of the statutes
and proposals for reform have thus focused on factors dealing
with the procedural facilitation and the rights of merchants
to be free from liability in the detection and pursuit of shoplifting offenses. While such an emphasis is not entirely misplaced, it does ignore the significant role played by diversion.
' See,

e.g., Note, The Merchant, the Shoplifter and the Law, 55

REV. 825 (1971).

32

See note 19, supra.

MINN. L.
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Diversionary practices with regard to shoplifting have been
formalized and circumscribed in the following manner: Offenses
involving goods of small value (the cut-off point varying between $20 and $100) are implicitly or explicitly categorized as
misdemeanors by the statutes; goods valued over the specifically
stated dollar amounts are felonies.3 3 Such categorization greatly
reduces, if not eliminates, discretion in that the exercise of discretion often turns on the ability to label an offense according
to the disposition desired. Law enforcement officials put it this
way: "Discretion applies mainly to misdemeanors, we have very
little of it in felonies." What they mean, in the context of
shoplifting, is that when the statute takes away the discretion
to label the degree of the offense, they are less free to exercise,
if not totally inhibited from exercising, dispositional discretion.
In concrete terms it means that the diversionary response such as restitution and fine or the handling as a municipal
violation -is no longer an open option when an "irrelevancy"
such as a statutorily defined sum being exceeded is present.
The hard facts of the offense rather than the manipulable
nature of the offender have become the focus of decisionmaking.
The statutes approximate the informal pattern which prevailed
before their enactment, but by the shift in focus have the potential effect of rigidifying and transforming the informal pattern
which prevailed previously.
Resistance on the part of criminal justice officials to this
formalization takes the shape of differentially interpreting the
dollar amount of the goods in question. In one of the jurisdictions studied, where the statutory division between misdemeanor and felony was placed at $20, the following process
occurred: if a "typical" shoplifter - one who merits diversion
because she meets the preconceptions of officials regarding such
offenders -took something worth $40 from a shop, the officials
would argue that the wholesale value (say only $19) was the
relevant value, and hence that restitution and/or fine were the
appropriate responses. Conversely, less favored offenders were
sometimes prosecuted for goods priced $21 in the store.
To evaluate formalization attempts against the background
of the reactions to them is problematic. Beyond question, the
desire to eliminate discrimination or favoritism is laudable in
the abstract. But the costs may be too great. The disadvantages
of eliminating properly exercised discretion which accompanies
:3 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.20 (Supp. 1970). See also Note, supra note
31, at 835 n. 63 for a listing of shoplifting statutes.
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formalization may outweigh the prevention of improperly exercised discretion. Unbalancing the criminal system's dispositional
patterns and motivations produces undesirable consequences.
At its worst, it could result in disruption and chaos through the
overloading of the system's resources. Or it could lead to blatantly inappropriate dispositions.: Ultimately, however, it is
unlikely that these consequences would be permanent because
the tendency of the system is towards internal accommodation
and adjustment. Consequently. the result will probably be in
the nature of a subversion of statutory mandates through contrived interpretations which shift the surface features of decisionmaking, but in essence maintain the discretion and dispositional pattern as before. Alternatively, the response will be
to wholly ignore the statutes. One might argue that compliance
with the statutes should be forced upon the criminal justice
officials who are professionally and legally bound to operate
within their context. But it is more difficult to argue that this
can be done.
Peace Bonds and Family Disputes
The discretionary handling of family quarrels is an area
where legislatures have on the whole not intervened. Perhaps
this restraint is attributable to the recognition that the power
to divert is exercised largely on the police level and, hence, is
not to be tampered with, absent knowledge of the range of
situations and motivations which influence police practices.
Legislative intervention is more commonly directed towards
later, more conspicious stages of the criminal process. Legislators, rightly or wrongly, appear to feel that the field of prosecutorial or judicial powers is more within their range of understanding or expertise, whereas police practices remain a sacrosanct mystery, not to be defiled by the meddlings of the ignorant. Perhaps legislators are also aware of the exceptional
delicacy of domestic disputes, their potential or actual seriousness, and the ambivalence of the participants, and have therefore refrained from the imposition of absolutes in this area.
C.

About the only "diversionary" legislation pertaining to
domestic offenses derives from the practice of issuing peace
bonds to intrafamily disputants. In most cities the peace bond
::4
'Inappropriate" refers here to the view (shared by many criminal jus-

tice officialS as well as commentators) that the law is a blunt instrument,
the full force or harshness of which should be used sparingly. The criminal law is perceived to be designed to deal only with "hard cases," to be
applied tnot equally but in essence unequallyi.e., with discretion to
divert cr mitigate if the circumstances surrounding the offense or the
offender so warrant, or if pressures on the system compel it.
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is today regarded as an ineffective deterrant to future misbehavior and has fallen into disuse..3 5 Similarly, the statutes
which speak to this practice have ceased to be of practical
relevance. The peace bond was a peculiar method for handling
family quarrels in non-criminal fashion. It was also of dubious
legality. The bond, which was usually not even paid by the
offender, served ostensibly as an alternative to criminal processing, imposing a threat that liberty or money would be summarily forfeited in case of a recurrence of misbehavior. That
this dubious practice was ever legislatively sanctioned reveals,
more than anything else, that police work is regarded as beyond interference.3
Discretion in the domestic dispute area
thus remains unchecked. This may well be sound in an area of
such complexity and unpredictability, where one the primary
motivations for diversion is the conservation of criminal justice
resources-a motivation which does not lend itself easily to
legislative expression without embarrassment.
Assuming formalization be deemed desirable in this area,
on the other hand, the thrust of it should be directed toward
facilitating and improving the selection process. That is, rather
than rigorously defining those cases which may or may not be
diverted, formalization attempts might best be framed in terms
of providing for special departmental units on both police and
prosecutorial levels trained to handle family crisis situations."7
The aim would be to place qualified and numerically adequate
personnel in charge where the need for intervention is greatest,
as determined by soundly exercised discretion.
D.

Deferred Sentences, Court Employment Programs,
and First Offenses
Those who have sought to formalize diversion in the first
offense category adopt the equation made by criminal justice
officials between first offenders and youthful offenders: the
formalization proponents use these designations interchangeably
when speaking of their programs or proposals. The equation
provides the justification for and explains the motivation behind
formalized diversion in this area.
35

36

See F. MILLER, supra note 2, at 266-71.
For a different view of peace bond procedures, see AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS Ch. 3, "Charging"
(D. McIntyre ed. 1967).

37 A big step in that direction is the New York City Police Department's

"Family Crisis Intervention Unit" (FCIU). For a description and evaluation of the FCIU, see M. BARD, TRAINING POLICE AS SPECIALISTS IN FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTIONS (Final Report to LEAA, G.P.O. 70-1 (1970);
Parnas, The Response of Some Relevant Community Resources to IntraFamily Violence, 44 IND. L.J. 159 (1969).
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The armed services disposition has not been subjected to
the process of formalization and it remains within the discretion of criminal justice officials to apply this bi;and of diversion
to "appropriate" individuals. Deferred sentences, however, have
become formalized processes in several cities, and proposals or
38
pressures to formalize exist in several other urban centers.
Deferred sentences as a formal process are associated in
several cities with administratively established "court employment programs."'3" Of interest is the fact that these programs
appear to provide the impetus and motivation for the judicial
decision to defer sentence,- rather than the other way around.
This is the case despite the fact that formalization schemes
generally are conceived as responses to informal situations and
that court-employment programs are designed specifically to
provide follow-up services subsequent to the decision to defer.
The formalization or programmatization of the practice to defer
sentence does not involve the elimination or structuring of discretion which characterizes the other formalizing attempts discussed. Judicial discretion remains essentially untouched, and
it is only the conspicious availability of follow-up services
which may serve to change the informal pattern of whom, or
how many, shall be selected. It is on this matter of selection
that attention will be focused here.
Court employment programs provide services in the nature
of job-training, education, job-seeking, and so forth, during the
informal probationary period which ensues upon deferral of
sentence. The services are thus designed to help the offender
prove that he merits having the sentence ultimately dismissed.
38 A judge in one city where the deferred sentence was still a matter of

informal discretion exercised exclusively by that particular judge stated
that he was lobbying to "have this practice written into the law." What
made his efforts peculiarly noteworthy was that this judge on the whole
expressed strong opposition to attempts to formalize informal diversionary practices. His reason for expecting the deferred sentence matter
frcm his more general viewpoint appeared to derive from the fact that he
was unable to persuade his judicial colleagues to adopt this practice as
an informal scheme, and thus forced to resort to the admittedly risky
formalization approach so as to extend what he felt was a desirable dispositional option.
The function of the formalization proposed by the judge was clearly
one of publication and legitimation of existing informal practices. The
problem is whether written legislation can be so limited. Perhaps the
absence of formal authority to divert is especially inhibiting on the
judicial level. If so, legislation which seeks to legitimize may be worth
the risks inherent in formalization. It would appear, however, that discretion on the police and prosecutorial level is exercised with less inhibition. A recognition of this fact should have a bearing on whether,
to what ends, and cn what level, informal diversionary practices should
be formalized.
.Some of the major U.S. cities having such programs are New York,
Washington, D.C., Boston, Cleveland, and Minneapolis.
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They also turn his informal conditional status into - at least
theoretically- a more formal, more closely supervised arrangement, thus providing a better basis for the eventual (second)
exercise of judicial discretion of whether the sentence against
the offender shall be enforced or avoided.
Court employment programs have been criticized as doing
formally and at great expense the same that used to be done
informally at no expense. This assessment may be somewhat
overly cynical. The services provided are often real and
worthwhile, and less likely to be accorded to an offender absent
the formal program. It must be deemed common knowledge
by now that existing service agencies, because of lack of coordination and contact with the criminal system, often fail to
reach those they are designed to service-i.e., individuals
diverted or released from the criminal system. This is a strong
argument in favor of the court employment programs.
The negative assessment of court employment programs
may be seen, more appropriately, as a reaction to inflated
claims of success by the programs themselves. "Failure rates"
in the programs tend to be minimized by the self-serving
nature of the selection which extracts only those who are most
likely to succeed and who may be least in need of the services
offered. Moreover, it is conceivable that judges exhibit a partiality to participants in the program and are influenced to
decide upon dismissal of sentence largely on the mere fact of
participation. These would be serious shortcomings of the court
employment programs. It is suggested here that if such programs are to be adopted, that special efforts be made to include
those offenders who by virtue of family, social or racial background are not so likely to succeed. It would be better to maintain the incompleteness of the informal deferred sentence system than to waste scarce resources in order to divert a few
favored first offenders into programs which concentrate exces4
sively on achieving high success rates. 1'
CONCLUSION

Non-criminal handling of less-serious criminal offenses is a
fact - an inescapable, if not very observable, fact, of the operation of the criminal justice process in both urban and rural
40

For a description and evaluation of a deferred sentencing system, see
S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 446-51 (1963) on New
York's Youthful Offender Procedure. Rubin feels that the New York
experience was "successful" and deplores what he describes as the
politically motivated repeal of the procedure. "Politically," here is used
in contradistinction to a repeal on the merits.
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areas. The frequency and efficacy of this type of response is
not readily measurable, in part because it is mostly an informal
response, as well as a conceptually complex one. In most instances, quantifications are not made, records are not kept, and
categorizations are avoided. The decision to divert, moreover,
depends upon subtle and not-so-subtle pressures upon criminal
justice philosophies and resources; the motivations behind discretionary decisions accordingly vary in kind and in perceptibility; and rare is the criminal justice official who intellectually
recognizes and ably articulates the diversion he practices. Even
rough statements as to frequency and efficacy are difficult to
come by. Finally, the formalization of diversion is selective and
sporadic. Such attempts are often nonconducive to general inferences because newly established, misleading because disruptive of earlier motivational and dispositional patterns, or inconsequential because ignored. While these formalization attempts
provide an indirect indication of the merits of at least a measure of informality and discretion, they fail to yield more than
the indefinite data which emerge from the informal practices.
A comprehensive evaluation of the practice of non-criminal
disposition of criminal cases would constitute a monumental,
if not impossible, task. The lack of quantification and articulation is only a small part of the problem. An evaluative statement would have to deal with a weighing of complex, interrelated, often subjective, values; it would have to confront serious methodological problems of access and time in the effort to
gauge the effects of diversion on those diverted; it would seek
to measure what is essentially immeasurable in an objective
sense; it would inevitably limit itself to isolated assertions
detached from a larger and inseparable context. This is not to
say that the concept of diversion is not worthy of further
study, but only that the subject be approached with a sense of
caution and modesty. What is now needed in the area of diversion are studies with more specific and intensive foci on particular issues and problems. "Diversion" is a complex and
varied topic: inquiries in the nature of all-inclusive fishing
expeditions are unmanageable and unfruitful for other than
exploratory purposes, and the need for exploratory information
is diminishing. One of the values of the survey upon which
this article is based is the recognition of these facts. The article
itself is a small impressionistic step, a description of selected
diversionary practices and their rationales coupled with some
thoughts on the propriety of these practices and some caveats
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regarding the attempts to formalize them. Its purpose is to lend
a measure of understanding to, and provoke interest in, this
area of criminal justice, and by its suggestions and omissions
41
prompt further inquiry.

41

Presently, the American Bar Foundation, as a second phase of its project
cn Non-criminal Dispositions of Criminal Cases, is making an intensive
study of court, prosecution, and police records in several cities so as to
shed light - both quantitative and qualitative - on some of the issues.
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INTRODUCTION

HE Special Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws1 which drafted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code proceeded on the basic assumption
that the pricing of credit should be determined by free and
vigorous competition in the marketplace and not by governmental fiat.- In structuring the Code to comply with this
philosophy, the draftsmen provided for relatively free entry
into the consumer credit market and rate ceilings sufficiently
Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; A.B. 1963, Princeton University; J.D. 1970, Cornell University.
1The full title of the Special Committee is the "Special Committee on
Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury."
*

2 Prefatory Note to UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE (1969 Revised Final

Draft) [hereinafter cited and referred to as UCCC].
239
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high so as to permit the forces of the marketplace to work their
will.3 At the same time, however, the draftsmen recognized
the need for certain minimal controls in order to effect a balance between the relative bargaining positions of consumer
and creditor. Thus, they provided for firm but not crippling
restrictions on creditors' rights and remedies, enhancement of
debtors' rights and remedies and a wide variety of administrative powers to enable effective enforcement of the Code
4
provisions.
Taken together, the provisions designed to foster competition and those designed to effect an adjustment of bargaining
power between consumer and creditor represent, according to
the draftsmen, a delicate "balance" which, if upset, could prevent the price of money from reaching its optimum level. ' ,
The purpose of this article is to examine whether or not this
balance has been preserved by the legislatures of each of the six
states in which the Code has been adopted to date."
I.

FREE ENTRY

Traditionally, the consumer credit market has been segmented by the existence of many separate statutes, each regulating supposedly distinct types of credit grantors, as well as
kinds and amounts of credit.- Pursuant to the underlying philosophy of the Code, the draftsmen concluded that the price of
credit would be more apt to reach its optimum level if this
traditional segmentation of each creditor type into a special
legal-business pigeonhole were eliminated, thus permitting all
types of creditors to compete freely in the consumer credit
market.8 Thus, the Code as promulgated provides no entry
3 Id.

at 20.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 21.
6 Colorado (1971), Idaho (1971), Indiana (1971), Oklahoma (1969), Utah
(1969), and Wyoming (1971).
7 Johnson, Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, HARV. Bus. REV., JulyAug. 1968, at 122. Prior to the enactment of the UCCC in Colorado, for
example, the following separate statutes imposed varying requirements
upon asscrted lenders and sellers depending upon the article sold or
the type and amount of the loan or lender: 1913 Loan Law (secured
loans over $1500 at more than 12 percent), Consumer Finance Act
(secured or unsecured loans under $1500 at 12 percent or more), Retail
Installment Sales Act (installment sales of automobiles where purchasemoney security interest is retained by the seller or third party financer),
Personal Property Installment Sales Act (retail installment sales of personal property other than motor vehicles), Industrial Bank Act (licensing of industrial banks), and Colorado Insurance as Security for Loans
statute (sales of credit life insurance). Clark, The Revolution in Consumer Credit Legislation, 45 DENVER L.J. 679, 680-86 (1968).
8 Prefatory Note, supra note 2, at xix. It is hoped by those working to
eccnomically develop the ghetto that the Code's free entry provisions
will prove useful for this specialized purpose. See, e.g., PosrNoN STATE-
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restrictions to tile retail credit market and only minimal entry
restrictions to the lending market. Specifically, sections 3.201
and 3.501 of the Code permit lenders to make consumer loans
at a rate not exceeding 18 percent per year without obtaining a
license. Lenders who extend loan credit at a rate in excess
of 18 percent are required by section 3.502 to obtain licensesunless they are "supervised financial organizations" already
subject to supervision by a state or federal agency.' However,
licensing requirements are much less stringent than under most
existing laws. Thus, a licensee, under section 3.502, need obtain
only one license to operate one- or more offices,"0 whereas
separate licenses for multiple locations are often required under
existing law. The Administrator, under section 3.503, in ruling
on a license application, is to apply a standard of the "financial
responsibility, character and fitness" of the individual applicant
rather than the more restrictive, subjective test of promoting
the "convenience and advantage" of the community currently
used in the majority of states." The latter test is at best difficult to meet since it usually requires the applicant to substantiate, at a public hearing, the need for more credit facilities
in the area, and other lenders customarily appear to rebut the
2
applicant's evidence.1'
Opposition to the Code's free entry
primarily from most commercial banks
companies. Commercial banks in many
with respect to physical location, by state

philosophy has come
and some small loan
states are restricted,
branch banking laws,

and otherwise by state and federal banking codes intended to
protect depositors. Many bankers feel that as a result it is impossible for banks to compete in the consumer credit market
with less stringently regulated creditors.'" The small loan companies have been concerned that their present position as the
dominant lender of small amounts to consumers will be eroded.
These concerns have resulted, in the six states in which the
MENT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION AND OFFICE
OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY/LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR TASK FORCE,

adopted by resolution at the NLADA Convention on November 1, 1968.
'This class of lender typically includes persons authorized to make loans
and receive deposits or their equivalent, such as commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. UCCC
§ 1.301(17), Comment.
UCCC § 3.502, Comment 3.
1 See Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code:
An Economist's View,
54 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 512 (1969).
12 Felsenfeld, Consumer Interest Rates: A
Public Learning Process, 23
Bus. LAW. 931, 940-41 (1968).
13 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION,
AN

ANALYSIS OF

CREDIT CODE

THE ECONOMIC

1-3 (Nov. 1968).
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been enacted, in two general types of limitations upon
entry principle: (1) so-called "brick walls" between
and credit selling operations; (2) more stringent
14
requirements.

A.

Brick Walls
"Brick wall" amendments have been adopted in Oklahoma,
Colorado, and Idaho. 15 The term "brick wall" comes from the
fact that these amendments are designed to keep sellers out
of the loan business by permitting sales creditors, even though
licensed, to make direct small loans only if a "brick wall" is
maintained between selling and lending operations such that
the customer must enter separate doors to obtain a loan or
buy goods. To the extent that these amendments keep certain
credit grantors out of one segment or another of the consumer credit market, they represent a substantial restriction
16
upon the Code's free entry principle.
Only Utah has adopted the Code's free entry provisions as promulgated
by the National Conference. Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates,
Profits and Competition, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 313, 326 (1970). However, a
last minute Senate floor effort to amend § 3.503 (2) to limit free entry
by requiring lenders to show assets of $25,000 nearly succeeded. Bennett,
The Political History of the UCCC in Utah, 23 PEas. FIN. L.Q. 75, 78
(1969).
15 The Oklahoma provision is as follows:
A licensee who is authorized to make supervised loans under
this Part shall not engage in the business of making sales of
goods at any location where supervised loans are made, except
the sale of insurance in connection with the making of loans.
The word "location" as used in this section means the entire
space in which supervised loans are made and said location must
be separated from any location in which merchandise is sold or
displayed by walls which may be broken only by a passageway
to which the public is not admitted.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A § 3.512 (Supp. 1971). This and similar amendments to the Colorado and Idaho Codes have been incorporated in
§ 3.512, which in the UCCC as promulgated merely provides that a
licensee may carry on other business at a location where he makes
supervised loans unless he does so for the purpose of evading or violating the Code.
16 The justification often heard for these amendments is that without the
"brick wall" prohibition against dual business arrangements, there
is nothing to prevent credit sellers from altering the form of sales
transactions to resemble loan transactions for the purpose of escaping
the operation of those consumer protection provisions applicable only
to sales (e.g., §§ 2.403 and 2.404 restricting the operation of the doctrine
of holder in due course and waiver of defense clauses; § 5.103, imposing
restrictions upon deficiency judgments). However, this is a spurious
argument inasmuch as evasive conduct of the type described is prohibited by UCCC § 3.512 ("A licensee may carry on other business at a
location where he makes supervised loans unless he carries on other
business for the purpose of evasion or violation of the Act.").
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, accompanying the "brick
wall" amendment in each of the states where it has been adopted is an
exemption for lender (bank) credit cards. Thus, bank credit cards,
which are specifically designated to compete with retail sales credit
cards, may be used to obtain both sales credit and loans, while retail
sales credit cards may be used only to obtain sal~s credit.
14
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B.

Licensing
Although no state in which the Code has been enacted has
inserted the old convenience and advantage requirement for
lenders, the Code's relatively simple licensing prerequisites have
been made more difficult to comply with in several states. In
Oklahoma, for example, a lender desiring to make loans at a
rate in excess of 10 percent per year (rather than the 18 percent per year set by the draftsmen) must obtain a license. 17
Moreover, if he maintains multiple locations, a separate license
is required for each.' s The test to be applied by the Administrator in issuing or denying a lender's license has been tightened by addition of the requirements that an applicant must
demonstrate that he has "experience" and "general fitness such
as to command the confidence of the public and warrant the
belief the business will be operated lawfully and fairly," that
he has available for operation of each licensed office net assets
of at least $25,000, that he has posted a bond in an amount up
to $5,000 for the first license and up to $1,000 for each additional license and that he has submitted with the application
for a license $200 for an investigation fee and $100 for each
license as his annual fee for the current calendar year.''
In the Idaho version of the Code other licensing requirements were added. Existing licensees in the community must
be notified of a pending license application, and they have the
right to file objections. 2" A licensee may not change his location unless he has given the Administrator 15 days prior notice,
and a change of location of more than 5 miles outside the original municipality is prohibited, as are loans by licensees at any
other place or under any other name than that stated in the
2
license. '
The National Conference has concluded that the practical
effect and intent of these amendments is to restrict the making
7

tit. 14A §3.501(1) (Supp. 1971). In Wyoming and
Indiana, the licensing level was lowered to 10 percent, and in Colorado
to 12 percent. However, all loans over 10 percent are not "supervised
loans" under the Indiana amendments. Loans over 18 percent remain in
the separate category of "supervised loans" for purposes of certain provisions designed to be applicable only to high-rate loans-e.g., § 3.514
governing the terms of over 18 percent loan agreements with respect
to attorney's fees.
I8Id. § 3.504. A separate license for each location is also required in Colorado and Idaho. See Colo. Sess. Laws 1971, ch. 207, § 73-3-503 and
IDAHO CODE § 28-33-503 (Supp. 1971). The potential problems in requiring a separate license for each location are manifold. For example, must
a travel card issuer which makes loans on its card obtain a license for
each place of business where the card is honored?
1"' OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A §§ 3.503, 3.504. (Supp. 1971).
20 IDAHO CODE § 28-33-503 (Supp. 1971).
"1Id.
1 OKLA. STAT. ANN.
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of consumer loans to established lenders such as banks and
small loan companies by making it more difficult to enter the
lending market..2 2 This of course is an abrogation of the underlying Code philosophy of free competition.
II. RATE CEILINGS
The philosophy of the draftsmen with respect to interest
rates is that there should be rate ceilings but not rate fixing,
and that actual rates will, in response to the forces of competition, establish themselves below the rate ceilings.23 Unfortunately, neither the philosophy nor the ample ceilings recommended by the National Conference 4 have met with widespread
acceptance in the legislatures of tne six states which have
enacted the Code. In fact only Utah has preserved the rate
5
structure recommended by the draftsmen.2
22 NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF

COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM

STATE

LAWS,

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES, CONSUMER CREDIT,
SMALL LOANS AND USURY, PROPOSED "FREEDOM OF ENTRY" AMENDMENTS
TO UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODESPONSORS REPLY 6 (Dec. 1968).

23 Prefatory Note supra note 2, at xx.

"The preponderance of evidence
indicates that rates do not, in fact, move to the ceiling, except in the
small-loan field." Johnson, Rate Competition, 26 Bus. LAW. 777, 781
(1971). In Utah, where the maximum schedule on revolving credit sales
was adopted, competition has apparently kept the rates well below the
permissible ceilings.

REPORT BY THE UTAH STATE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
UTAH ON THE USE OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN UTAH 77-78 (Nov. 1970).

With respect to personal loans, one expert has concluded that there
is relatively little correlation between rate ceilings and the pricing
policies of banks, and that price is in fact competitively determined.
Smith, Pricing Policies on Consumer Loans at Commercial Banks, 25
J. FINANCE 517, 519 (1970).
24 Except for revolving sales credit, the rate ceilings proposed by the
National Conference are the same for both loans (including bank credit
cards) and credit sales; 36 percent per year on amounts of $300 or less,
21 percent on the next $700, and 15 percent on amounts over $1000, or an
alternative flat rate of 18 percent on the entire outstanding balance.
UCCC §§ 2.201, 3.508. For revolving sales credit only, the rates differ;
2 percent per month on an unpaid balance of $500 or less, and 1
percent on that portion of the balance over $500. Id. § 2.207.
25 In Colorado, the National Conference's ceilings on installment loans were
not altered, but the ceiling on revolving loans was dropped to 18 percent
per year. Ch. 207, § 73-3-508, [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 826. The sales rates
were lowered to annual rates of 25 percent, 20 percent and 15 percent on
closed end installment sales, and 1
percent per month, based on the
adjusted balance, on revolving credit sales. Id. §§ 73-2-201, 207. In
Idaho, the rate ceiling on revolving sales credit was lowered to 1
percent per month, and the ceiling on revolving loan credit to 14 percent per month. IDAHO CODE §§ 22-32-207 (3), 28-33-201 (4) (Supp. 1971).
The Indiana Code's ceiling on revolving sales credit was lowered to a flat
1V2 percent per month. BURNS ANN. IND. STAT. § 19-22-207 (Supp.
1971).
The maximum permissible rate in connection with closed
end installment sales and all consumer loans on amounts up to $300 was
reduced in Oklahoma from 36 percent per year to 30 percent per year
and the maximum rate in connection with revolving credit sales was
reduced to a flat 1
percent per month. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A
§§ 2.201(2), 2.207, 3.508 (Supp. 1971). In Wyoming, the maximium rate
on revolving sales credit was lowered to a flat 1/2 percent per month.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-207 (Supp. 1971).
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The attack in the state legislatures on the Code's rate structure has focused primarily on sales rates. 26 There is no really
satisfactory explanation of why this has been the case. It may
be that retailers have traditionally been detached from the
political process, and that the more politically sophisticated
lender groups have simply been more effective in the legislative arena in combating the current tendency to legislate the
price of credit. It has also been suggested that accounting
methods used by retailers are at least partially responsible for
the increasing tendency of the legislatures to restrict the prices
which retailers may charge for providing credit services: the
considerable costs involved in extending credit have traditionally been included in other operating expenses, while credit
revenues have been shown separately as apparently cost-free
income.2 7 Thus, the illusion is given that retailers obtain substantial profits from credit when in fact, retailers generally do
28
no better than break even on their credit operations.
Whatever the reason for the vulnerability of retail rate
ceilings, the effects are unfortunate. Ceilings on credit rates
cannot control the cash prices of goods, nor the fixed costs
involved in extending credit which often exceed credit revenues
even at a monthly rate of 112 percent.1"' Since extension of
credit has become a matter of competitive necessity, retail
sellers appear to have no acceptable alternative but to adjust
the cash prices of goods and services in order to recoup at least
30
Thus, at
a portion of the losses involved in extending credit.

The justification often heard for higher loan than sales rates is that
sellers may adjust the prices of goods to make up the difference. Usually ignored, however, is the fact that issuers of bank credit cards, in
addition to credit revenue, receive substantial income from the "discount" received from participating merchants in the credit card plans.
•_7Johnson. Economic Effects of Price Ceilings on Consumer Credit, 25
1,

PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 81, 82 (1971).
28

A study of consumer credit ccsts in department stores conducted by
Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart for the National Retail Merchants Association concluded that costs involved in extending sales credit exceeded
credit revenues by 3.41 percent of sales. On a per active customer account basis, the co-t for the stores studied was $11.35 and the service
charge revenue $7.40 annually, for a loss of $3.95 per account. NATIONAL
RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION
MENT STORE CREDIT 42 (1969).

ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

OF DEPART-

In 1969, J.C. Penney Co., Inc. credit costs exceeded service charge

revenues by $23 million. Address by Kenneth S. Axelson, Vice President and Director of Finance and Administration of J.C. Penney Co.,
Inc. to the New York Society of Security Analysts. Feb. 4, 1971.
29

Id.

:I0Benfield, Interest Ceilings and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 56
A.B.A.J. 946, 949 (1970); Johnson. supra note 27, at 83.
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least to a certain extent, the cash customer will be subsidizing
31
the extension of credit to others.
In order to reduce the cost of extending credit as much as
possible, retail sellers will be forced to tighten credit-granting
criteria and reject marginal credit risks. 32 This will adversely
affect those consumers least able to buy for cash. 33 Further, by
placing retail credit at a competitive disadvantage with loan
credit, the more necessitous consumers will be compelled to
turn to the higher lending rates."
Thus, while lower rate ceilings would appear to be in the
interest of debtors, the exact opposite seems to be true. This is
31 In November of 1968, the voters of Washington State adopted Initiative

245 lowering the retail credit service charge rate ceiling from 18 percent
per year to 12 percent per year. One of the effects unearthed by a study
conducted by the University of Washington Graduate School of Business Administration was that, in one form or another, prices were raised
as a result of Initiative 245. Where these price increases were across
the board and not just on "credit sensitive" items, the net effect was to
impose some of the costs of credit programs upon cash buyers. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
THE IMPACT OF A CONSUMER CREDIT INTEREST LIMITATION LAW WASHINGTON STATE: INITIATIVE 245 at 65 (1970).

For similar conclusions as to the effects of a 10 percent limitation
on service charges in Arkansas, see G. LYNCH, CONSU-MER CREDIT AT
TEN PER CENT SIMPLE: THE ARKANSAS CASE, (College of Business, University of Arkansas 1969).
32 Benfield, supra note 30, at 948.
33 As noted by Professor Robert Braucher, now a Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts and a member of the Special Committee
which drafted the UCCC, not only will cash buyers subsidize the extension of credit to credit buyers, but also some less credit worthy customers will be ineligible for revolving sales credit and will be forced to
pay higher installment sale or small loan rates:
... But the latest study of costs indicates that most stores, particularly small stores, lose money on revolving charge accounts
at present rates. This means in most cases that cash customers
are paying in cash prices part of the cost of supplying credit
to revolving charge customers. If we squeeze revolving charge
rates too hard, some customers will be shifted to higher installment sale or small loan rates.
Statement by Professor Robert Braucher, Hearings Before the Sub-

comm. on Consumer Affairs of the Hcuse Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. on Consumer Credit Regulation (Proposed
Uniform Consumer Credit Code), Part A. at 191 (1969).
Unresolved is the question whether extensicn of credit to the very
poor is desirable at all. See Felsenfeld, supra note 12, at 944-46, in which
it is suggested that government credit facilities of some type may be the
answer. However, it is clear that those least able to afford credit should
not be compelled to subsidize the extension of credit to more affluent
consumers by having to pay higher prices for goods purchased for cash
or to seek credit at higher rates in the legal small loan market or at
exorbitant rates in the illegal market. See also M. GOUDZWAARD, THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CHARGES ON

RETAIL INSTALLMENT

Graduate School cf Management 1971).

CREDIT

(UCLA

Those who are hurt most by

price ceilings are usually those who can least afford to be hurt- the
poor and financially weak who want credit but cannot obtain it because
no creditor can "afford" to extend credit to them because their costs of
34

investigation and probable loss are simply too great.

Washington Study, supra note 31, at 72.
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but a further illustration of the need to preserve the balance
so carefully struck by the draftsmen.
III.

DEBTOR-CREDITOR RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

Recognizing that stimulation of creditor competition would
not, by itself, assure the debtor a continuous flow of inexpensive
credit on a fair and equitable basis, the draftsmen of the Code
sought to bring about an adjustment of bargaining power between consumer and creditor. Thus, acting on the assumption
that debtors and creditors rarely negotiate the terms of their contracts,35 the draftsmen placed restrictions on permissible contract terms. They also mitigated some of the harsher debt collection practices and remedies, not only to afford relief to the
consumer, but also to insure that creditors extend credit in the
first instance on the basis of the applicant's credit-worthiness,
rather than in reliance upon one-sided collection remedies.
A.

Multiple Agreements

The Code prohibits creditors from utilizing multiple agree36
ments to split transactions with the "intent" to maximize rates
or to avoid disclosure.3 7 It has been argued that these Code
prohibitions are not strong enough to protect consumers from
multiple agreement abuses because it is too difficult to show
that a creditor has intentionally used multiple agreements for
the prohibited purposes. Accordingly, amendments drafted to
remove the element of intent and thus to impose strict liability
for the improper use of multiple agreements have been pro35 Whatever the process of exchange between the consumer and the prospective creditor prior to the consummation of the arrangement, the
terms of the contract itself, other than the principal amount, the method
of repayment, and in some cases the collateral required, are not the
subject of negotiations or discussions by the parties. And there is no
reason to expect that they will become so. The contract is a standard
printed form containing appropriate blank spaces. Neither the consumer
nor the creditor's respresentative is qualified to negotiate about any of
the printed contract terms and, in the latter case, not authorized to do
so. Although disclosure emphasizing rates may affect costs, no amount
of disclosure or stimulation of creditor access to the market is likely
to change the pattern of contract negotiations for most other contract
terms. Curran & Fand, An Analysis of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 49 NEB. L. REV. 727, 739 (1970). See also James, Holder in Due
Course and Other Prohibitions on Agreements, 26 Bus. LAw. 881, 886
(1971).
36 Restrictions on the use of multiple agreements are necessary because of
the graduated rate ceiling structure of the Code. Sellers or lenders might
arbitrarily divide a transaction into two or more agreements for lesser
amounts in order to generate higher rates. UCCC § 2.402, Comment 1.
3T Here the multiple concern is that a seller will employ multiple agreements in order to keep the amounts financed under each agreement low
enough to fall within the minimum charge provisions of § 2.306(2)(k)
which excuse the seller from having to disclose an annual percentage
rate. UCCC § 2.402, Comment 2.
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posed 38 and even adopted in Colorado. As amended, sections
2.402, 3.409 and 3.509 of the Colorado Code provide that any
use of multiple agreements which would "result" in obtaining
a higher rate of finance charge than otherwise permitted, or in
avoiding disclosure, is unlawful. 39 Added to sections 2.402 and
3.409 in Colorado is the presumption that the prohibition against
the use of multiple agreements is violated where a transaction
40
is divided between a husband and wife.
Legislating strict liability in this area could have the unfortunate effects of introducing undesirable rigidity, from the
point of view of both creditors and debtors, into credit transactions and of unnecessarily exposing creditors to liability for
technical violations. In sales transactions, for example, appliances and other "big ticket" items are customarily sold under
installment contracts in order to permit the seller to retain a
security interest in, and otherwise maintain control of, more
expensive goods. A department store customer might well make
larger purchases under such a closed end plan and at the same
time maintain a revolving charge account for less expensive
items. Or, a husband could make an installment purchase
independent of his wife's revolving charge account purchases.
In these situations, there would be no "intent" on the part of
the store to obtain a higher credit service charge, but this could
well be the "result." While a single store might be able to
insure that its customers do not make purchases under multiple
accounts, larger chains would find such control virtually impossible. On the loan side, a similar situation could unintentionally "result" where single borrowers, or a husband and wife
independently, take out separate loans from different branches
of the same consumer finance company. A higher finance
charge would "result," yet the violation would be entirely
unintentional.
In order to avoid technical violation of the multiple agreements provisions in the Colorado Code, creditors will be compelled to institute costly procedures to insure that consumers
are not making purchases on separate accounts or taking out
§ 2.413 (First Final Draft 1970)
(drafted by the National Consumer Law Center at Boston College Law
School).
3. It may be that the "result" amendment is applicable only to obtaining
higher rates and not to avoiding disclosure. § 2.402, provides, and
§§ 3.409 and 3.509 are similar, that a seller may not use multiple agreements which would "result in obtaining a higher credit service charge
. . . or to avoid disclosure .... ." It would seem that the element of
intent is still implicit in the phrase "to avoid dislosure."
40 The amendment was apparently derived from § 2.413 (2) of the NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT, supra note 38.
38See, e.g., NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT
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independent, higher-rate loans. The result will be less flexibility in credit purchases and another increase in credit costs
which will necessarily be reflected in the price of credit. Thus,
while the Colorado amendments appear to tip the "balance"
sought to be achieved by the draftsmen in favor of the consumer, such is clearly not the case.
Holder in Due Course
The doctrine of holder in due course developed as a legitimate means of promoting the free flow of commercial paper by
shielding assignees of such paper from disputes between buyers
and sellers. As applied to consumer credit transactions, however, it has been subject to considerable abuse. 4' In order to
obtain a cash flow to finance his business, a merchant will offer
to sell consumer promissory notes to financing institutions. If
the merchandise turns out to be defective, the buyer will have
no practical means of forcing the merchant to correct the defect
since his payments are now made to the financing institution,
which is not subject to the buyer's personal defenses against
the merchant. 42 The buyer must continue to make his payments
and, if the merchant is unwilling to correct the defect, to seek
time-consuming and often prohibitively expensive legal relief.
B.

On the theory that the assignee financing institution is in a
better position to police sellers of inferior merchandise or service than the presumably unsophisticated consumer buyer, the
Code attacks the doctrine, in the context of consumer credit
sales and consumer leases only,4 on two fronts. Section 2.403
prohibits the use of negotiable instruments in consumer credit
sales or consumer leases and makes it impossible for financers
buying consumer paper to qualify as holders in due course
For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of holder in due course and
its contractual prcgeny, the waiver of defense clause, see Comment,
The Role of Cnt-Off Devices in Consumer
Consumer Protection Financing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 505.
42 Clark, supra note 7, at 698.
43 The UCCC does not restrict the use of negotiable instruments in consumer loans. Since extensicn of credit pursuant to a lender credit card
is a "loan" (M 3.104. 3.106), the doctrine of holder in due course is left
untouched with respect to purchases pursuant to bank credit cards.
Section 2.407 of The National Consumer Act, supra note 38, seeks to
prevent circumvention of the elimination of holder in due course by
making the lender subject to the consumer's claims and defenses in
"connected" sale and loan situations. A similar result may have been
reached in Colorado by an amendment to § 2.104. "Consumer credit
sale" is defined in part in the Colorado Code to be a sale in which
"credit is granted or arranged by a person who regularly engages as a
seller in credit transactions of the same kind." If the underlined amendatory language converts a direct consumer loan "arranged" by a seller
into a consumer credit sale, then the provisions of Article 2, including
§ 2.403, apply to the transaction.
41
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except in the unusual situation where second or third takers
may not know of an instrument's consumer origin. 4 4 To complement this prohibition, section 2.404 offers alternative sections
restricting the efficacy of contractual waivers of claims and
defenses which the buyer may assert against the seller. Alternative A makes such waivers completely ineffective and subjects the financing institution which buys consumer paper to
all claims and defenses which the buyer may assert against the
seller. The assignee's liability, however, is restricted to the
amount owing at the time the claim or defense is asserted, and
the buyer may assert his claim or defense only as a matter of
defense or setoff. Alternative B requires the buyer to inform
the financing institution of any defense arising within 3 months
of the assignment of the paper; 45 in the absence of such notification by the buyer, a contractual waiver of defense is effective to bar the buyer from asserting defenses against the financing institution arising during the 3-month period. 46
These sections have probably generated more debate among
interest groups affected by the Code than any other provision.
Consumer interests have naturally promoted Alternative A of
section 2.404 since Alternative B continues the limited effectiveness of waiver of defense clauses. 47 Financing institutions,
on the other hand, have strongly opposed Alternative A, and
have sought further limitations upon Alternative B, because of
the burdens imposed upon them with respect to policing the
practices of sellers from whom they purchase consumer paper. 4
Of the six states in which the Code has been enacted to
date, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Wyoming have adopted Alternative B of section 2.404 but each has reduced the 90-day time
period within which contract defenses must be raised to 60 days,
44 See

UCCC § 2.403, Comment.

UCCC § 2.404(1) requires the assignee to give the buyer or lessee notice
of the assignment of the contract. The 3-month period runs from the
mailing of this notice.
46 Under UCCC § 2.404(1), a waiver of defense agreement, assuming the
required notice of assignment has been mailed to the buyer, "is enforceable only with respect to claims or defenses which have arisen before
the end of the 3-month period after notice was mailed." UCCC § 2.404,
Comment. Claims or defenses arising after the 3-month period are
apparently not barred by the waiver of defense agreement.
47 See Hogan, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus. LAW. 159,
160-61 (1969). Alternative B is considered unacceptable by the Joint
Public Defenders and Legal Aid National Task Force. NLADA and
OEO/LSP Position Statement, supra note 8.
48 As a practical matter, the financing institution may avoid "policing" by
taking the paper on a recourse basis or pursuant to a repurchase agreement, and by requiring reserves of the seller. However, reserves would
presumably be based upon contingent liabilities and could restrict the
amount of capital which the financing institution would be willing to
make available to the seller.
45
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30 days, and 45 days respectively. Colorado attempted to adopt
a form of Alternative B, with questionable success. 49 Utah
adopted Alternative A. Idaho adopted significantly expanded
versions of both section 2.403 and section 2.404, effectively
abolishing the doctrine of holder in due course in the context of
consumer credit sales and consumer leases.5' 1
The National Conference obviously anticipated significant
4) In the Colorado Code, §§ 2.403 and 2.404 as promulgated by The National

Conference have been deleted entirely. The Colorado version of 2.403
(1) requires the seller or lessor in a consumer credit sale or consumer
lease to print the words "consumer paper" on the instrument and provides that the instrument as thus labeled is a negotiable instrument
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Colorado Uniform Commercial
Code 90 days after the date of the instrument. Section 2.403(2) of
the Colorado Code provides that the assignee cf paper arising out of a
consumer credit sale or lease is subject to all claims and defenses of the
buyer, up to and including the amount owing to the assignee at the time
the claim or defense is asserted, regardless ef whether or not the agreement contains a waiver of defense clause and regardless of whether or
not the seller or lessor has properly labeled the instrument as "consumer
paper."
The 90-day period at the end of subsection 2.403(1) was evidently
an attempt to limit suspension of the holder in due course doctrine to
a 90-day period following the transaction, similar to the limitation in
Alternative B, but to permit free operation of the doctrine thereafter.
However, subsections (1) and (2) are in apparent conflict: Subsection
2.403(2) provides that an assignee of the rights of the seller is subject
to all claims and defenses of the buyer without any express time limitation- regardless of whether or not subsection 2.403 (1) has been complied with and notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary. Subsection
2.403(1), however, says only that an instrument shall be "negotiable"
within the meaning of Article 3 of the UCC 90 days after the date of
the instrument. A possible way to reconcile subsections (1) and (2)
is to read subsection (1) to be restricted to the suspension only of the
several attributes of UCC Article 3 except that attribute of negotiability
covered by subsection (2) which cuts off claims and defenses. However,
this reading ignores the intent of the Colorado Legislature, which was to
separately treat in subsections (1) and (2) two separate and distinct,
albeit closely related, problems. In subsection (1), the Legislature intended to restrict for 90 days the negotiability of consumer paper under
Article 3 of the UCC in order to suspend for that period the operation
of the doctrine of holder in due course in the context of consumer credit
sales or consumer leases. In subsection (2), the Legislature intended to
prohibit as a matter of public policy contractual waivers of defense
which have been widely used to circumvent whatever beneficial aspects
there are in the holder in due course doctrine - e.g., the liability of the
assignee who does not qualify as a holder in due course because he does
not take the instrument for value, in good faith and without notice of
a defense against or a claim to it. It would seem therefore, that subsections (1) and (2) should be read independently: Under subsection
(1), an assignee is not shielded from claims or defenses of the buyer
for 90 days. After 90 days the assignee is protected, but only if he
qualifies as a holder in due course under Article 3 of the UCC; under
subsection (2), contractual waivers of defense which would circumvent
the operation of subsection (1) are prohibited altogether.
.,u In the Idaho Code, the provision in § 2.403 giving holder in due course
status to the assignee in the unusual situation where the assignee does
not know of an instrument's consumer origin has been deleted. Section
2.404 has been extensively amended to make completely ineffective
waiver of defense clauses, to remove the restriction that the buyer may
assert his rights only as a matter of defense or by way of setoff and to
increase the assignee's potential liability from the amount owing at the
time the buyer's claim or defense is formally asserted to the amount
owing at the time the assignee has uotice of tle buyer's claim or defense.
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opposition to its attempt to eliminate, or at least restrict, the
use of contractual waivers of defense in consumer credit sales
and consumer leases, and therefore provided Alternative B of
section 2.404 as a compromise in those states where total elimination was politically unacceptable. Further dilution of this
compromise provision in Indiana, Oklahoma and Wyoming is
extremely unfortunate and is not in keeping with the Code's
philosophy of balancing consumer protections and creditor
default remedies. Substantial elimination of the holder in due
course doctrine in consumer credit sales and consumer leases
under section 2.403 is a futile gesture if creditors can avoid this
section merely by including waiver of defense clauses in their
contracts. Such clauses are a harsh legacy from the past and
should have no place in consumer transactions today.
C.

Cross-Collateral
Section 2.409 of the Code provides, both with respect to
consolidated debts secured by the goods sold in the underlying
sales and with respect to separate debts secured by cross-collateral, that payments are deemed "to have been first applied
to the payment of the debts arising from the sale first made,"
and that the security interests in the goods terminate automatically as the debts originally incurred with respect to each
item are paid. The section is designed to prevent the seller
from retaining a security interest in all of the goods until the
buyer's entire debt is paid. 5'
In Colorado, arguments advanced by various creditor
groups 52 resulted in substantial dilution of this allocation requirement. As amended, section 2.409 (1) of the Colorado Code
provides that, beginning with the first transaction, payments are
to be allocated to each item of collateral according to its original retirement schedule. After an item is paid for, and the security interest in it released at the request of the buyer, subsequent
payments are proportionately allocated to the retirement of the
debts arising from subsequent purchases in the same way. 53
51 If the seller consolidates debts of $100, $200, and $300 arising from sales
made in that order, the security interest in the goods purchased pursuant
to the $100 sale terminates when $100 of the consolidated debt is paid.
If the seller does not consclidate these debts but secures them by crosscollateral, he must allocate all of the buyer's payments to the $100 until
it is paid off, and so forth. UCCC § 2.409, Comment 1.
52 Primarily automobile dealers.
These groups argued that the Code's
crcss-collateral provisions would ultimately restrict credit to consumers
since creditors would be unwilling to extend substantial credit where it
could not be adequately secured, particularly where the security was of
a rapidly depreciating nature, such as automobiles.
53 Ch. 207, § 73-2-409(1), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 799.
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This revised allocation is not inconsistent with the "firstpayments-against-first-debts" rule5 4 since it does apply payments against debts first incurred, although only up to the
amount of the original payments scheduled, and therefore
should not under most circumstances permit a seller to retain a
security interest in all the goods until the entire debt is paid. '
However, the security interest in goods which have been paid
for in full does not automatically terminate; it is released only
at the request of the buyer. Imposing affirmative duties of this
sort upon the buyer appears to be contrary to the Code's basic
philosophy of achieving a new balance in debtor-creditor relationships based upon the recognition that consumers are for the
most part relatively unsophisticated vis-A-vis creditors.
D.

Referral Sales

The Code prohibits referral sales schemes wherein the
seller induces the buyer to purchase the goods, usually at an
inflated price, by offering to credit against the purchase price
a certain amount for the name of every business-generating
reference supplied by the buyer. 6 The abuse sought to be cor57
rected by the Code's drafters is one of the most pervasive.
In Indiana, this prohibition was substantially weakened by
the addition of a provision to the effect that section 2.411 is not
applicable where the seller agrees to pay or credit the buyer
for the name of each prospective purchaser furnished by the
buyer who actually submits to an interview or demonstration
the seller honors the agreements by making the appropri-if
ate payments or credits when earned. Presumably, however,
the section is still applicable where price reductions or other
.54 UCCC

§ 2.409, Comment 1.

55 The seller will, however, be able to retain a security interest for a longer

period of time. If the seller consolidates debts of $100, $200 and $300
arising from Sales made in that order, the security interest in the goods
purchased pursuant to the $100 sale will terminate, not when a total of
$100 has been paid, but when $100 has been paid toward the $100 debt
according to the original retirement schedule. Similarly, if the seller does
not consclidate the debts but secures them by cross-collateral, he is not
required to allocate all of the buyer's payments to the $100 debt until it
is paid off, but only amounts equivalent to the original payment
scheduled.
It has been suggested that this approach will assist consumers in
obtaining higher credit limits. See Hcgan, Integrating the UCCC and
the UCC- Limitations on Creditors' Agreements and Practices, 33 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 686, 698 (1968).
56 UCCC § 2.411. Agreements in violation of § 2.411 are unenforceable.
In addition, the buyer may keep the goods without paying for them or,
in the alternative, rescind the agreement, return the gcods and receive
back any payment made.
57 UCCC § 2.411, Comment 3.
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inducements are conditioned upon subsequent sales.5s
Although the Indiana amendment is an aberration which
has not yet appeared elsewhere, states considering the Code for
adoption in the future should be wary of amendments to this
provision which reduce its effectiveness in eliminating a widespread abuse.
Attorney's Fees
With respect to consumer credit sales or consumer leases
and consumer loans, sections 2.413 and 3.404 furnish alternative
provisions placing limitations on the imposition of attorney's
fees on the defaulting buyer or borrower. Alternative A of each
section prohibits altogether agreements providing for payment
of attorney's fees by the buyer or borrower on the theory that
the Code's generous rate ceilings will enable creditors to treat
attorney's fees as part of the cost of doing business. 59 Alternative B of each section, on the other hand, permits agreements
providing for the payment by the debtor of reasonable attorney's fees, but limits such fees to 15 percent of the unpaid debt
after default. This alternative rests on the theory that attorney's fees should be paid directly by the defaulting buyer or
borrower who generates the expense rather than by the creditor's non-defaulting customers who indirectly pay the cost of
doing business.60 With respect to supervised loans,6 ' the Code
prohibits agreements for the payment of attorney's fees where
62
the principal amount of the loan is $1,000 or less.
E.

In each of the six states in which the UCCC has been
enacted, stiff creditor resistance to any limitation upon attorney's fees has resulted in significant alteration of the Code provisions. In Idaho, Indiana, Utah, and Wyoming, Alternative B
has been adopted, but with the 15 percent limitation on attorney's fees removed. The same result has probably been reached
in Colorado where Alternative B was adopted with the 15 percent limitation intact, but with discretion vested in the court
to "direct" additional fees. In Oklahoma, Alternative B has
been adopted, but with an amendment to section 2.413 prohibiting attorney's fees if the "amount financed" is $1,000 or less and
the credit service charge exceeds 10 percent per year.
The section prohibits price reductions contingent upon the occurrence of
subsequent "events," which would seem to include interviews, demonstrations and sales.
59 UCCC § 2.413, Comment, Alternative A.
60 UCCC § 2.413, Comment, Alternative B.
61 "Supervised Loan" is essentially a consumer loan in which the loan
finance charge exceeds 18 percent per year. UCCC § 3.501 (3).
58

62

UCCC §3.514.

STATE VARIATIONS OF THE UCCC

Under previously discussed amendments to the Oklahoma
Code, all loans in which the finance charge is in excess of 10
percent are supervised loans and, when less- than $1,000, are
therefore governed by section 3.514 prohibiting attorney's fees
in connection with supervised loans of less than $1,000. Thus,
despite the tacit authorization in section 3.404 for attorney's
fees of up to 15 percent, such are prohibited by section 3.514 in
connection with supervised loans of under $1,000. 6 3 The same is
true in the Wyoming Code; all loans in which the finance
charge exceeds 10 percent are supervised loans subject to sec64
tion 3.514, which was not amended.
Section 3.514 of the Colorado Code, however, was amended
to allow attorney's fees up to 15 percent irrespective of the
principal amount of the supervised loan. Thus, even though
loans in which the finance charge exceeds 12 percent are supervised loans in Colorado, and therefore governed by section
3.514, section 3.514 is consistent with section 3.404 as adopted in
that state insofar as it permits reasonable attorney's fees up
to 15 percent of the unpaid debt after default. However, as
previously noted, section 3.404 of the Colorado Code also permits "such additional fee as may be directed by the court." This
additional fee is therefore permissible only with respect to
consumer loans in which the finance charge does not exceed
12 percent.
No amendments were made to the Idaho, Indiana, and Utah
Codes with respect to the loan finance charge of supervised
loans. Thus, section 3.514 in these states governs only those
loans in which the finance charge exceeds 18 percent. In Utah,
the $1,000 limitation in section 3.514 was, in any case, removed,
thereby permitting reasonable attorney's fees on all loans.
There is, perhaps, some justification for permitting attorney's fees in excess of 15 percent in those states where the
Code's sale or loan rates ceilings have been lowered, since these
collection fees represent a significant cost of extending credit
which cannot be recovered through credit revenues. However,
there is no justification for permitting attorney's fees in excess
of 15 percent for loans or sales with respect to which Code rates
have been preserved. To the extent that attorney's fees without
limitation are now permitted on top of ample credit revenues,
the Code's debtor-creditor "balance" has been upset.
63
64

Section 3.404, Alternative B would appear to permit attorney's fees of
up to 15 percent on all consumer loans over $1,000.
UCCC § 3.514 appears in the Wyoming version as § 3.513.
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Home Solicitation Sales

An important UCCC consumer protection is the right of a
buyer to cancel a home solicitation sale until midnight of the
third business day after the buyer has signed at his residence
an agreement or offer to purchase which complies with part
5 of article 2 . 5 To comply with the Code, the seller must furnish the buyer with a cancellation disclosure statement in the
form prescribed by section 2.503. If the buyer does exercise his
right of cancellation, the seller may retain as a cancellation fee
6
the cash down payment up to 5 percent of the cash price.
Section 2.503(2)(b) of the Oklahoma Code has been
amended to require that the notice of the buyer's right to cancel
must state that the seller, upon cancellation, may only retain
any cash down payment "not to exceed five percent (5%) of
the cash price." Similarly, the same section of the Colorado
Code has been amended to require the statement that the
seller, upon cancellation, may only retain "five percent of the
cash price but not exceeding the amount of the cash down
payment." The Code as promulgated does not make it clear in
the required cancellation disclosure statement that the seller's
right to retain the down payment is limited by the 5 percent
ceiling.6 7 These clarifying amendments are therefore desirable
since buyers ignorant of the ceiling would be understandably
reluctant to exercise their right of rescission.
Section 2.502 of the Code as promulgated provides that cancellation of a home solicitation sale occurs when the buyer gives
written notice of cancellation to the seller at the address stated
in the agreement or offer of purchase. An amendment to the
The right of cancellation under part 5 of article 2
is not to be confused with the limited right of rescission with respect to
transactions in which a security interest is taken in the debtor's home
under § 5.204. If a transaction falls within both § 2.402 and § 5.204, the
debtor may elect to proceed under either section, UCCC § 2.502,
Comment 4.
The high expenses of ghetto retailing, which are in turn reflected
in higher prices for goods and services in the ghetto, are attributable
in large part to the high personnel expenses incurred by low-income
market retailers in using door-to-door selling techniques. FTC, Eco-

65 UCCC § 2.502 (1).

NOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS 13, 19 (1968). It has been suggested that breaking the "door-to-door syndrome" would be conducive to ghetto selling at
reasonable prices, and that the Code provisions may be helpful in this

regard. See White, Consumer Credit in the Ghetto: UCCC Free Entry
Provisions and the Federal Trade Commission Study, 25 Bus. LAW. 143,
150-51 (1969).
66 UCCC § 2.503 (3).
67 The language of the Code as promulgated implies that the seller may
retain all of the cash down payment without limit: "If you cancel, the
seller may keep all or part of your cash down payment." UCCC § 2.503
(2) (b).
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Colorado Code makes the additional requirement that the written notice be mailed in a post office or in an official mailbox
from within 50 miles of the place of sale or, in the alternative,
that a wire notifying the seller of intent to rescind with a
letter following be sent within the required time period. 8 The
purpose of the amendment was to finalize home solicitation
sales within 3 days in the unlikely event that the buyer, immediately after executing an agreement of offer to purchase in
connection with a home solicitation sale, left the immediate geographical area and ultimately mailed his notice of cancellation
from some remote place. The amendment seems unfortunate in
that the situation it contemplates will be extremely rare, and
in most instances will only provide disreputable door-to-door
sellers with the argument that the buyer mailed the cancellation notice more than 50 miles from the place of sale and therefore did not comply with section 2.502.
G.

Garnishment

Garnishment of wages is a significant cause of the increasing number of consumer bankruptcies."" The reason is that
garnishment often results in the debtor's discharge from employment, thereby removing the source of income with which
the debtor might eventually pay his debts. Equally important,
of course, is the fact that wage garnishment leaves very little
with which a debtor can sustain himself and his family. The
Code attempts to remedy this situation by prohibiting garnishment before judgment, 7' placing limitations on post-judgment
garnishment, and prohibiting employers from discharging their
employees because of wage garnishments. Unfortunately,
amendments in some states have reduced the impact of the
latter two provisions.
(s Ch. 207, § 73-2-502(2), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 802.
69 Hogan, supra note 47, at 161.
7) Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) casts serious doubt
upon the validity of any ex-parte prejudgment garnishment procedure.
While noting that such procedures might be valid in "extraordinary
situations," the Ccurt. per Douglas J., held that a Wisconsin summary
prejudgment garnishment procedure violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment in failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of wages.
Section 5.104, prohibiting prejudgment garnishment, has been
adopted without change in Idaho, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming. In
Colorado, an amendment prohibits, in addition to prejudgment garnishment, ex-parte forceful replevin of the debtor's gocds, except motor
vehicles, from a dwelling. In Indiana, the application of all garnishment
restrictions, including the prohibition against prejudgment garnishments, has been expanded to cover all debts of an individual and not
just those arising out of a consumer credit sale, consumer lease or consumer loan.
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Section 5.105 of the Code restricts the use of garnishment
after judgment by limiting the maximum amount of disposable
earnings which a creditor can collect in connection with a consumer debt. A creditor may not garnish more than the lesser of
25 percent of a debtor's disposable earnings for 1 week or the
amount by which the debtor's earnings exceed 40 times the federal minimum hourly wage. In Wyoming, Colorado, Oklahoma,
and Indiana, section 5.105 (2) (b) has been amended to reduce
the garnishment exemption from 40 times the minimum hourly
wage to 30 times, which is the figure used in section 303 of the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act from which section
5.105 is derived. This amendment is contrary to the conclusion
of the draftsmen of the Code that 30 times the minimum hourly
wage is an insufficient exemption.71 The National Conference
apparently found that the federal exemption scarcely leaves
enough for a family to subsist on, much less any disposable
income which might encourage a debtor to accommodate his
creditors without resorting to bankruptcy.
Section 5.106 of the Code as promulgated prohibits the discharge of an employee because of the garnishment or attempted
garnishment of his wages by a creditor. Utah, however, has
adopted the more conservative approach of section 304 of the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act which prohibits an
employee's discharge by reason of garnishment of his wages
for any one indebtedness.7 2 Thus, if the employee's wages are
garnished in connection with more than one indebtedness, discharge is permitted in Utah where it would not be under the
Uniform Code. Similarly, section 5.106 of the Oklahoma Code
has been amended to provide that a debtor can be discharged
for garnishment if the employer is served with garnishment
process issued to collect one or more judgments against the
employee on more than two occasions within 1 year.
Garnishment not only creates hardships for debtors, but is
counterproductive for creditors and society as a whole. Bankruptcy and welfare are often the only avenues open to a debtor
whose wages have been garnished and who as a result has been
discharged from employment. The Code restrictions on garnishment are designed to keep the debtor functioning in the economy, which is clearly in the best interests of both debtor and
creditor.
UCCC § 5.105, Comment 1. Assuming a minimum wage of $1.60, the
exemption amounts to only $48.00, as oppcsed to $64.00 if increased to 40
times the minimum wage.
72UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-5-106 (Supp. ]971).
71

STATE VARIATIONS

H.

OF THE UCCC

Deficiency Judgments

Section 5.103 places restrictions upon deficiency judgments
in consumer credit sales. The intent of the section is to prevent a seller from repossessing or voluntarily accepting surrender of the goods, selling the goods for a ridiculously low
price or buying in at the sale for a low price, and then obtaining an additional deficiency judgment for the difference between that price and the unpaid debt - with the result that the
debtor loses the merchandise and yet remains liable for the
unpaid debt. The section provides that, where the seller repossesses or voluntarily accepts surrender of goods in which he
has a security interest, and the cash price of the goods repossessed or surrended is $1,000 or less, the buyer is not personally
liable to the seller for any deficiency. In effect, in cases of
sales of $1,000 or less, the section permits the seller either to
sue for the unpaid balance or to repossess the goods, but not
both.

73

Section 5.103 in both the Wyoming and Colorado Codes has
been amended to prohibit deficiency judgments only where the
cash price of the goods is $500 or less, instead of $1,000 as in
the Uniform Code. As thus amended, the section will still
protect defaulting buyers of most appliances from deficiency
judgments, but it will not abolish deficiency judgments in connection with the sale of most automobiles wherein the abuse
is thought to be most prevalent.74 Indeed, it has been argued
that the $1,000 figure in the Uniform Code as promulgated
affords insufficient protection; 7 ' any lesser figure would therefore be undesirable.
On the other hand, it is arguable that the Code's approach
of requiring an election sweeps too broadly, and that the real
problem lies in the fact that the sale of the repossessed collateral has been subject to widespread abuse and that such
abuse can be corrected by better enforcement of the "commercially reasonable" standard of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
UCCC § 5.103, Comment 3.
74See generally Schuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of
Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20 (1969).
75 Id. at 46-47. Of the 123 case studies forming the basis of this article
in which the original price of the automobile was revealed, only 13
vehicles had cash prices of less than $1,000, and two of those had cash
prices of $995. Thus, the author concludes that the UCCC deficiency
judgment restrictions would affect less than 9 percent of all automobile
credit sales.
Section 5.211 of the National Consumer Act, supra note 38, permits
deficiency judgments only where the unpaid balance of the obligation
is $2,000 or more at the time of default.
73
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Preservation of Collateral

Section 2.208 as promulgated permits the seller, if the agreement between the buyer and seller so provides, to add to the
buyer's debt amounts paid on behalf of the buyer for insurance
for preservation of the collateral. The section also provides that
the seller must disclose to the buyer the details of any such
disbursements on the buyer's behalf.
An amendment to the Colorado Code requires that any expenditures made by the seller be reasonable to protect the risk
of loss or damage to the property and that all expenditures
made by the seller be in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. 76 These additional provisions would seem to
be implicit in the Code section as promulgated. In addition to
post-transaction disclosure by the seller, amendments to the
Colorado and Oklahoma Codes require pretransaction notice
to the buyer of his nonperformance and a reasonable opportunity for the buyer to perform.7 7 This would seem to be a
desirable amendment since it does not alter the substance of
the section but merely places a stricter burden of compliance on
the seller. On the other hand, it could be said that the requirement of such notice and opportunity unduly restricts creditors
in emergency situations where immediate action is required to
preserve the collateral. However, under these circumstances, it
would seem that the buyer's "reasonable opportunity" to perform should not leave the seller with no time to act himself i.e., what is a "reasonable opportunity" will vary with the
circumstances.
CONCLUSION

A review of the variations reflected in the six versions of
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code adopted to date reveals a
tendency among state legislatures to reject wholesale acceptance of the National Conference's recommendations and to restructure certain of the Code's key provisions. The Conference
sought to establish a balance of interests with respect to each
substantive topic in the Code, as well as an overall balance.
While this balance has not been altogether abandoned by the
state legislatures, neither has it survived unscathed the pressures incident to the legislative process.
76

77

Ch. 207, § 73-2-208(1), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 786.
reasonable" standard, in transactions governed by the
to resale by a seller follcwing rejection of goods
§ 2.706) and to disposition of collateral by a secured
(UCC §§ 9.504, 9.507).
Ch. 207, § 73-2-208(1), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 786.

The "commercially
UCCC, is applicable
by a buyer (UCC
party after default
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The incursions on the rate philosophy and competitive
themes, and the shortsighted resistance to the Code's consumer
protection provisions, reflect a trend which, if followed by
other state legislatures, could undermine basic UCCC principles.
Without competition, credit oligopolies will reappear and rates
will be fixed by tacit understandings at the expense of competive efficiencies favoring lower credit prices for the consumer.
This will in turn encourage Congress to follow its Federal Truth
in Lending Act-based squarely on the same principles as the
UCCC-with a comprehensive credit package which will remove the subject of consumer credit regulation entirely from
the control of the states.
To avoid this possibility state legislatures should look long
and hard at any proposed amendments to the UCCC. Above all
they should avoid the temptation to yield to interest group
demands with respect to specific provisions without first considering the effect of the proposed changes on the other provisions of the Code. Only in this way can the balance so carefully struck by the Code's draftsmen be preserved.
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INTRODUCTION

T

HOUGH internal conflict is not a new phenomenon in the
international legal order -brothers have been fighting each
other since Cain slew Abel - it has swollen into epidemic
proportions in the last two and a half decades. One observer
culled from the pages of the New York Times, well over 1,200
unequivocal examples of internal war between 1946 and 1959.1
Even the casual newspaper reader can recall how many among
the numerous recurrent "crises" of the last 10 years grew out of
internal conflicts: Nigeria, the Congo, Cyprus; and in the past
few months alone one thinks of Ceylon, Pakistan, and Northern
Ireland. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara confirms this impression by pointing out that while there were
throughout the world 23 prolonged insurgent movements in 1958,
there were 40 by 1966.2 As the present decade opened, one
Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University Law School;
1

A.B., Wabash College, 1964; LL.B., Harvard, 1967; LL.M., Virginia, 1971.
Eckstein, Introduction: Toward the Theoretical Study of War, INTERNAL

WAR 3 (Eckstein ed. 1964).
2 R. MCNAMARA, THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY 145 (1968).
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observer estimated that one quarter of all the sovereign states
in the world were engaged in some kind of armed conflict,
largely internal .3 Even the two current conflicts most accurately characterized as "international," Vietnam and the Middle
East, are rooted in internal struggles for power.
Given, first, the pervasiveness of internal conflict and, second, the likelihood that its incidence will increase rather than
diminish in the last quarter of this century, it is surprising that
until recently few commentators have analyzed what, if any,
laws of war restrain participants therein.' The traditional laws
of war, which evolved over several hundred years before being
codified in the last century, 5 never governed any internal conflict other than a civil war.' In 1949, however, the Geneva Diplomatic Convention inserted Article 3 into the four Geneva Conventions. The common Article 3 applies to "conflicts not of an
international character." It states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as
a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

3 Kemp, Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts, 577

INT'L CONCILIATION

5 (1970).
4 Although the problem of internal conflict has attracted the interest of
an increasingly large number of international law scholars, they have
focused almost exclusively on the legality of third party intervention.
See Bond, A Survey of the Norms of Intervention, 52 MIL. L. REV. 51
(1971); Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict,
9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205 (1969). The only thorough analysis of Article 3
is J.

SIOTIS, LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE ET LES CONFLICTS ARMIES D'UN CAR-

ACTURE NON-INTERNATIONAL

(1958), which unfortunately has not been

translated into English.
5 The codification mevement began in 1864 with the adoption of the first
Geneva Convention for the Protection of the Sick and Wounded. Today
the law of war is found largely though not exclusively in the four
Geneva Conventions cf 1949: the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wcunded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3114. TIAS No. 3362 [hereinafter cited as
GWS (Sea)]; the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Priconers of War, Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3316, TIAS No. 3364 [hereinafter
cited as POW]; and the Geneva Ccnvention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3516, TIAS
No. 3365 [hereinafter cited as GC]; and the Hague Regulations of 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, TIAS No. 539, II MALLORY TREATIES 2269.
r UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

1HE ARMY, THE LAW

OF LAND WARFARE.

Field Manual 27-10 (1956). "The customary law of war becomes applicable to civil war upon recogniticn of the rebels as belligerents." Id.
para. 11(a). Accord, H. LAUTERPACHT, II OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 209-10 (7th ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as LAUTERPACHT].

INTERNAL CONFLICT AND ARTICLE 3
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a)

violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b)
(c)

taking of hostages;
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d)

the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by civilized peoples.
(2)
The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be collected
and cared for....
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to
the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

While renewed interest in the applicability of the laws of war
to internal conflict has stimulated wide-ranging proposals for
new conventions and the extension of existing ones, 7 Article 3
remains the only part of the presently codified laws of war
applicable to such conflict. Little studied, it is little understood.
Although often characterized as a "convention in miniature," it
has elicited almost no commentary similar to that poured out on
the general Geneva Conventions. Since this dearth of scholarship reflects no dearth of challenging questions about its applicability and substantive content, I ask you to consider with
me the relationship of Article 3 to internal conflict.
7 The International Committee of the Red Cross, which as early as 1912

urged the application of humanitarian law to civil wars and insurrections,
is presently consulting experts on the general topic, "Reaffirmation and
Development of International Law Applicable in Armed Conflict," and
has already published A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE CONSULTATION OF
EXPERTS CONCERNING NON-INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND GUERRILLA WAR-

FARE (1970). It had previously convened three separate study groups
to examine specific internal conflict problems: Commission of Experts
for the Examination of the Question of Assistance to Political Detainees
(1953); Commission of Experts for the Study of the Question of the
Application of Humanitarian Principles in the Event of Internal Dis-

turbances (1955); and Commission of Experts for the Study of the
Question of Aid to Victims of Internal Conflicts (1962).

The United

Nations, whose International Law Commission initially ignored suggestions that it re-examine the law of war, has recently thrown its

weight behind proposals for reform.

Cf. Report of the Secretary-

General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. No.
A/8052 (1970).
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To

WHAT KINDS OF CONFLICTS DOES ARTICLE

3

APPLY?

One frustrated scholar despairs:
One of the most assured things that might be said about the
words "armed conflict not of an internationalcharacter" is that
no one can say with assurance precisely what meaning they were
intended to convey. 8

Consider, for example, the scale of conflicts below, which I have
arranged very roughly from left to right in order of the increasing scope and duration of the conflict, and the intensity
of the threat which the dissident faction poses to the established government.
Watts

Northern Ireland

Angola

Biafra

Vietnam

The scale illustrates how internal conflicts may range from
riots or insurrections through guerrilla movements to civil
wars or even mushroom into international conflicts. The problem of categorizing internal wars is further complicated because, as the fortunes of the competing factions wax or wane,
the conflict may move one way or the other along the scale.
The point is that at any given moment there are different types
of noninternational armed conflicts. In one sense, of course,
people fighting in a pareach conflict is unique -particular
ticular place at a particular time. Beyond that, however, one
would hope to articulate criteria which distinguish one kind
of internal war from another in terms of what laws of war
should regulate the conflict. That is the first challenge. There
are three sources available to aid in the definition of the Article
3's application: legislative history, state practice, and the function or purpose of the article.
A.

Legislative History

Seeking an answer, one plunges into the legislative history
(called the travaux preparatoires in the fancy lingo of the in-

ternational lawyer) only to sink into a quagmire of conflicting
views as to the meaning of noninternational conflict. Some
delegates thought they had merely incorporated the traditional
doctrine that the customary laws of war governed a belligerency but not an insurgency. The U.S. delegation argued, for
example, that the Article ought to apply only in the following
circumstances:
8Farer,Humunitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definitior
of "InternationalArmed Conflict," 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 43 (1971).

INTERNAL CONFLICT AND ARTICLE 3
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

The insurgents must have an organization purporting to have
the characteristics of a state;
The insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory;
The armed forces must act under the direction of an organized civil authority and be prepared to observe the ordinary
laws of war; and
The insurgent civil authority must agree to be bound by the
convention provisions."

The identity between these criteria and those for belligerency
is obvious.'" Delegates wishing to extend convention provisions
to groups who would be colored as insurgents under the traditional litmus paper tests could take little comfort in the American view which in effect said, "Yes, insurgents should be protected, too -so
long as they are belligerents." Though the conference did rebuff the American and other attempts to write
these explicit limitations into Article 3, many left the convention with the sense that it only governed civil strife in which
the rebels had achieved the status of belligerents.
The Committee report on this article states:
It was clear that this [armed conflict not of an international
character] referred to civil war, and not to a mere riot or disturbances caused by bandits."

Even Jean Pictet, who thinks "the Article should be applied as
widely as possible,"12 admits that the criteria embodied in the

various defeated amendments "are useful as a means of distinguishing a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of
banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection."'3
Pictet does contend, however, that Article 3 also governs
conflicts which do not fit any of those criteria. Though he nowhere explicitly says so, Pictet apparently believes that even
one man brandishing a gun in another's face is noninternational conflict within the meaning of Article 3. He, too, mines
the legislative history for nuggets of proof. At the XVIIth In!) II-B

FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA

12.

i,The five requirements for belligerency are:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
11

existence of a responsible government
possession of territory
existence of an army which follows the laws of war
recognition by third states of belligerency
existence of general hostilities
LAUTERPACHT at 249. See also M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 18-19 (1959).
II-B FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA 129.
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DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

ternational Red Cross Conference, which immediately preceded
the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the International Committee
proposed adding a fourth paragraph to draft Article 2:
In all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international
character, especially cases of civil war, colonial ccnflicts, or wars
of religion, which may occur in the territory of one or more of
the High Contracting Parties, the implementing of the principles
of the present Conventicns shall be obligatory on each of the
14
adversaries.

After prolonged discussion, the Conference deleted the phrase
"especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion." Pictet concludes that "[t] he ommission of these words,
far from weakening the text, enlarged its scope."'1 5 Article 3 as
finally approved retains "the armed conflict not of an international character" language, and the Conference's rejection of
the various amendments which would have explicitly and narrowly circumscribed its meaning by enumerating certain specific types, arguably reinforces Pictet's argument that Article 3
applies to a wide range of conflicts.
Pictet finds further support for his view in the Conference
decision to list certain basic principles by which parties fighting
each other ought to abide. Initially, the Conference had weighed
applying all the Conventions to internal conflicts. Concerned
that brigands and bandits, for example, might thus escape punishment by claiming prisoner of war status, representatives of
various governments had tried to limit their applicability to
conflicts which, though internal in character, exhibited the
features of real war.'" The French delegation broke the logjam over the six different proposals with the suggestion that
only certain principles rather than all the provisions of the
Conventions be applicable:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall apply the provisions of the Pre14 The reference to Article 2 may be confusing. What ultimately became
Article 3 was initially included in draft Article 2 as paragraph 4.
15 J.PICTET, supra note 12, at 43. Mr. Pesmazoglon of Greece feared what
Pictet hoped: "I consider that the Stcckholm Conference by suppressing

the explicit references to 'civil war' and 'colonial war' gives too wide a
scope to the text." II-B FINAL RECORD Or THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE

Precisely because the Committee shared the Greek delegate's fears, the chairman had asked a working party "to draw up a
new provision cf a more limited character." Id. at 76.
16 Sir Robert Craigie, the British delegate to the Geneva Diplomatic Conference stated at the outset that he "did not believe it possible to oblige
a State to apply the Conventions to situations which were not war.
declared or not, as this idea was defined by international law." II-B
OF GENEVA 10.
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amble to the Convention for the protection of Civilian Persons
17
in Time of War.

The Soviet Union favored an enumeration of specific Convention provisions rather than a statement of general principles
and, therefore, proposed the following text:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the State Parties to the
present Convention, each Party to the conflict shall apply all
the provisions of the present Convention guaranteeing:
-humane treatment for the wounded sick;
-prohibition
of all discriminatory treatment of wounded and
sick practised on the basis of differences of race, colour, religion, sex, birth, or fortune1s

Although the Conference adopted the French rather than the
Russian approach, the final Article did specify more fundamental principles than those contained in the never-adopted
draft Preamble. Pictet, reflecting on the debate over Article
3, depicts the delegates as choosing between (1) applying all
the Convention provisions to a limited range of conflicts, or
(2) applying a limited number of principles to an unlimited
range of conflicts. If Pictet has fairly juxtaposed the alternatives, the Conference did choose

the latter course.

Pictet also argues the number of applicable principles is
so limited that they must be observed in all conflicts.

He asks

rhetorically:
What government would dare to claim before the world in a
case of civil disturbances which could justly be described as
mere acts of banditry, that, Article 3 not being applicable, it was
entitled to leave the wounded uncared for, to inflict torture and
mutilations and to take hostages?'"
The

regrettable

fact

is

that

some

nations

have

implicitly

claimed as much. Moreover, under traditional and still widelyheld views

about the

nature of international

law, states

are

bound to observe only those rules to which they agree;2 0 and
they have usually resisted even minimal efforts to tie their
hands in dealing with domestic enemies.

All this may suggest

that the delegates considered "an armed conflict not of an inter17 Id. at 78. In addition to the original Stockholm draft and the French
and Russian proposals, the British and Italian delegations had submitted
drafts. There was finally the text of the Working Party, a committee
which had ironed out a compromise provision. Following a discussion of
these proposals at the 24th meeting of the Special Committee of June
15, 1949, the chairman appointed a second working party composed of
representatives from Britain, France, Italy, Monaco, and the U.S.S.R.
On June 24, the Working Party reported to the 28th meeting a text,
which, with mincr revisions, became the present Article 3.
18 J. PIcTET, supra note 12, at 47.
19 Id. at 50.
20 Case of the S.S. "Lotus" [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
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national character" a civil war by any other name and voted
in favor of applying a limited number of principles to a limited
range of conflicts. Mounting evidence suggests that their instincts may have been sound: one of the few effective ways to
21
deal with domestic unrest is to strike swiftly and severely.
There is, however, another and to my mind more persuasive reason for taking Pictet's argument with a few grains of
skepticism. While the number of principles set out in Article
3 is small, they are very general and therefore susceptable, as
we will shortly see, of broad interpretation. Desirable as it
may be to pour increasingly detailed content into the vague
language of Article 3, one must face the dilemma that the more
specific the rules he sees embodied in the Article, the less
likely it is that the draftsmen ever envisioned their application
to riots, insurrections, or even insurgencies. If the humanitarian
must impale himself on one or the other horns of this dilemma,
he may lose less blood by opting for a more definite code which
extends some otherwise inapplicable rules to the most destructive kinds of internal conflicts. The alternative is to affirm
the continued applicability of minimal restraints already enshrined - though admittedly not always worshipped - in the
constitutions of all states. If Article 3 imposes only "a few
essential rules which [the government] in fact respects daily
under its own laws, even when dealing with common criminals, 1 2 - then it hardly justifies the effusive praise or the desper23
ate fears which attended its adoption.
No set of criteria for determining the type of internal conflicts to which Article 3 applies is buried in the Conference
committee reports. Reading through them, one nevertheless
is convinced that the delegates intended Article 3 to apply to
belligerencies or civil wars (Biafra), perhaps to insurgencies
(Angola), but never to bandits or riots (Watts) or even insurrections (Northern Ireland).
B.

State Practice
The practice of states may often dispel the fogs of legisla-

21

See generally Pye, The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of

22

The exhortation is Pictet's. J. PICTET, supra note 12.
But see, Ford, Resistance Movements in International Law, 7 REV.
THE INT'L RED CRoss 579 (1967):
The rules of Article 3 are of considerable importance in the case
of an armed conflict not of an international character because,
the national legislations, which are adapted to normal conditions,
may prove to be inadequate in the event of internal disturbances, so the possibility of excesses must not be ruled out. Id.
at 587.

Rebellions, in
23
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157 (Eckstein ed. 1964).
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tive history (indeed, examination of state practice is to be preferred to examination of legislative history as a method of interpreting an international agreement 24), and state practice
underscores the limited range of conflicts to which authorities
believe Article 3 applicable. Though there has been, as my
introductory comments illustrate, no absence of opportunities
for the application of Article 3 in the 25 years since its adoption, states have generally ignored it. So discouraging has
Jacques Siotis found the record of state practice that he has
concluded that governments do not regard the new rules of
25
conventional law contained in Article 3 as obligatory.
A few examples will illustrate that Siotis has ample justification for his pessimism. From 1946 until 1949 when fighting
ended, the Greek government, though it permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross to perform limited humanitarian functions, denied that it was embroiled in a civil
war and refused to abide by any laws of war.2 6 While Article
3 had not yet come into force, the ICRC did call the Greek
government's attention to the work of the 1946 Pre-Conference
Meeting of the Red Cross Societies which had resolved that in
case of an armed conflict not of an international character,
each of the parties should observe the conventions unless one
of them explicitly refused to do SO. 2' Article 3 had certainly
come into force when Biafra split from Nigeria, precipitating a
bloody civil war. The Nigerian government never admitted
any legal obligation to adhere to its provisions though it permitted the ICRC to perform certain humanitarian functions
and itself vowed to conduct military operations humanely. 28
The widely reported "night of the long knives" suggests that
the military in Indonesia did not take seriously any restraints
contained in Article 3. Within the last year both Pakistan and
Ceylon have had to employ regular military units against rebel
forces. Neither has publicly recognized any obligations under
Article 3; and press reports indicate what would appear to be
24 According to the "treaty on treaties," state practice is a primary means

of interpretation whereas preparatory work is a subsidiary means of
interpretation, resorted to only if primary sources leave "the meaning
ambiguous" or "lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Article 31 and 32, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969, printed in 63 AM. J. INT'L L.
875 (1969).
25

J. SioTis, supra note 4.

26

Ford, supra note 23, at 585.
M. Veuthey, The Red Cross and Non-International Conflicts, 10 INT'L
REV. OF THE RED CROSs 411, 412-13 (1970).
Farer, supra note 8, at 60. The ICRC faced many obstacles in Nigeria.
See Help to War Victims in Nigeria, 9 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSs 353

27

28

(1969).
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widespread violations of its basic provisions. 2" Likewise, Portuguese authorities have never admitted any obligation to apply
the provisions of Article 3 to rebel forces in the African provinces of Mozambique and Angola, even though the General Assembly has demanded that the native guerrillas be treated as
prisoners of war,3 0 a specific requirement quite beyond anything imposed by Article 3 itself.
Algeria was the only contemporary internal conflict in
which both sides agreed to abide by Article 3. 3 1 Though both
sides occasionally violated it (as is perhaps inevitable in any
armed conflict) they publicly and repeatedly urged each
other to respect its humanitarian provisions. Moreover, a number of countries such as Greece and Nigeria, though denying
the applicability of Article 3, did permit the Red Cross to exercise humanitarian functions. In the Yemenese Civil War, the
ICRC operated field medical hospitals.32 Following the brief
1954 revolt in Guatemala, the ICRC inspected prison facilities
and insured proper treatment of political detainees.3 3 While
these examples do not show widespread compliance with Article
3, they do create a less bleak picture than emerges from analyzing foreign office statements.
Two conclusions emerge from a survey of state practice.
First, states which quell riots, insurrections, or even revolts
quickly do not feel bound to respect Article 3. In the absence
of any widely-held expectation of the international community
that they conform to Article 3, they act under emergency or
martial law. The internal conflict is over before the international communtiy can apprise itself of the facts and generate
any pressure on the competing parties to comply with the provisions of Article 3. States do, second and nevertheless, accept
Consider the following press report, which an Associated Press newsman
in Ceylon filed:
Bodies of young men presumably killed by policemen and soldiers have been floating down rivers in groups .oward the sea
near Colombo.... Some of them were decapitated and others
riddled with bullets, their wrists bound behind their backs.
Steiba, Ceylon's Police and Army Fight Rebels with Terror, N.Y. Times,
April 25, 1971 at 1, col. 6. The Times has also reported that the Pakistani Army had orders to kill students, intellectuals, professors, doctors,
and others of leadership caliber in East Pakistan. Schanberg, Bengalis
Form a Cabinet as the Bloodshed Goes On, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1971,
at 7, col. 2.
30G.A. Res. 2395, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18. U.N. Doc. A/OR/23/S/18
(1968).
31 See, The ICRC and the Algerian Conflict, (International Committee of
the Red Cross Pamphlet, 1962).
32 See, The ICRC and the Yemen Conflict (International Committee of the
Red Cross Pamphlet, 1964).
33 Ford, supra note 23, at 586.
29
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some obligation to treat opposing forces humanely if the conflict drags on beyond several weeks or months. While this
recognition seldom takes the form of an explicit acceptance of
Article 3, it often manifests itself in acceptance of some Red
Cross initiative. Curiously enough, this practice antedates the
adoption of Article 3 and formed the basis for the original
34
ICRC proposal to the 1946 Preparatory Conference.
C. Function or Purpose
Reflecting upon the purpose or function of Article 3 may
focus some light on the kinds of internal conflicts to which
it should apply. The general purpose of Article 3 is the same
as that which animates the whole of the laws of war: to ameli-

orate suffering insofar as military necessity permits.

At the

most abstract level, then, the laws of war reflect a tension be-

tween the principles of necessity

(defense justifies resort to

violence) and humanity (fundamental human rights must be
protected)

Professor

.3

Baxter has succinctly

delineated this

tension:
The law of war is itself a compromise between unbridled license
on the one hand and, on the other, the absolute demands of humanity, which, if carried to a logical extreme, would proscribe
war altogether. Stated in other terms, the law seeks to limit the
measures of war to those which are necessary and to curb those
activities which produce suffering out of all proportion to the
military advantage to be gained. 36

While it is difficult to stake out the parameters of military
necessity, that necessity is not, as Professor Baxter suggests,
unlimited.
flicts

The demands of military necessity in

might

conceivably

legitimate

some

terror

internal contactics

not

authorized in international conflicts ,37 but they could not justify
J. PICTET, supra note 12, at 41. Article 3 still authorizes an "impartial
body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross . . . [to]
offer its services to the Parties to the Conflict" and further encourages
them to "endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements,
all or part cf the other provisions of the present Convention." Article
3 thus retains the right of humanitarian initiative while imposing some
minimum obligations. Before the laws of war became substantially
codified, states frequently negotiated ad hoc arrangements, as, for instance, the cartel of March 12, 1780, between France and England establishing the ransom in pounds sterling for captured field-marshalls.
35 For a thorough but brief sketch of the conceptual basis for the laws of
war, see J. PICTET, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW (1966).
3; Baxter, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 9 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 59
(1956).
37 R. TRINQUIER, MODERN WARFARE 8 (1964).
We know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare
is the unconditional support of a population.... Such support
may be spontaneous, although that is quite rare and probably
a temporary condition. If it doesn't exist, it must be secured by
every possible means, the most effective of which is terrorism.
See also Thornton, Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, in INTERNAL WAR 71 (Eckstein ed. 1964).
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wholesale denial of human rights. 38
Many of the same human rights protected by the laws of
war are threatened during internal conflicts. Accurate figures
are difficult to come by, but estimates on loss of life and destruction of property run high. 3 ' Torture, degrading imprisonment, and summary execution are all too commonplace. Children starve and the sick and wounded languish unattended.
The dead rot. Families may be forcibly evicted from their
homes and "relocated."'4 ' When, as is often the case, ethnic
or religious differences permeate the conflict, the savagery
would warm the heart of Ghengis Khan, who cried:
The greatest happiness is to vanquish ycur enemies, to chase
them before you, to rob them of their wealth, to see those dear
to them bathed in tears, to clasp to your bosom their wives and
41
daughters.

Article 3 denies such happiness to would-be Ghengis Khans.
Since the protection of certain human rights is the chief
purpose of Article 3, one might reasonably conclude that it
should come into force in any internal conflict which endangered those rights. Inquiry should focus on the nature of
the human rights being threatened rather than on the nature
of the conflict (i.e., whether it was a riot, insurrection, insurgency, or belligerency). The use of regular combat units in
tactical operations would be the most important criterion justifying application of laws of war. Both because of the weapons
which soldiers are likely to use (artillery, fire and chemical
weapons, for example) and the probable scope of any military
operation (the use of air cover or support, for example), the
threat to human rights normally protected by the laws of war
isgreat.
It was during an internal war- the American Civil War - that a government is-ued the first official document recognizing humanitarian
limitations on military necessity. Para. 14-16 General Order 100, "Instructicns for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field" (April 24, 1863). During the same war, however, General Sherman, who proved a man of his word, explained why an internal war
dictated a strategy of terror and devastation:
[T]his war differs from European wars in this particular; we
are not only fighting hostile enemies, but a hostile people, and
must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of
war, as well as their organized armies.
Quoted in C. Fenwick, INTERNATIONAL LAW 568 (3d ed. 1948). For an
analysis of the continuing relevance of the principles embodied in General Order 100 to the conduct of unconventional warfare, see Garner,
General Order 100 Revisted, 27 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1965).
39 Cf. D. de Huan and J. Tinker, Refugee and Civil War Casualty Problems
in Indcchina (Staff Report of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Refugees).
40
Johnson, Preface to CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1971).
41 Quoted in L. MONTROSS, WAR THROUGH THE AGES 144 (1944).
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Another criterion for the application of the laws of war
is the duration of the conflict. As the fight drags on, the disruption of normal life intensifies. The sick and wounded demand treatment; the hungry, food; the homeless, shelter. The
number of prisoners grows; and difficult questions about their
classification, punishment, detention, and care must be answered. All of these problems are common to international
conflicts, and large portions of the laws of war were designed
to provide humanitarian solutions.
Foreign troop participation in tactical combat operations
is a third criterion for the application of the laws of war. There
is no litmus paper test by which one can distinguish an internal
war from an international war; and while one can imagine an
internal conflict in which foreign troops participate on either
side without thereby internationalizing it, their presence creates
conditions which demand application of the laws of war. Foreign assistance may, for example, augment native firepower
and thereby increase the potential destructiveness of their
operations. Failure to treat captured soldiers from foreign
countries as prisoners of war will exacerbate tensions and may
trigger a spiraling wave of inhumane reprisals.
What may be called the "intensity" of the conflict for want
of a more descriptive term is a fourth criterion for the application of the laws of war. Sporadic raids and firefights do not
greatly endanger large numbers of people, nor are they apt
to provoke government use of combat troops. They may entail
an occasional violation of a human right normally protected
by the laws of war, but the acts will probably also violate
domestic criminal law, as, for example, in the case of a political assassination. When the fighting intensifies, these violations proliferate. It is at that point-when the fighting becomes the bloodiest-that the laws of war should be applied
to prevent wholesale slaughter and destruction. Neither side
wins if it inherits only the wind. A stable government rests
upon a loyal people, and one does not induce loyalty by raping
and pillaging. A viable economy requires productive farms and
industries. The farmer cannot reap from the salted earth;
neither can the factory worker conjure wares from the rubble
of bombed industries. An efficient state needs doctors, enginers, lawyers, and scientists. Whichever side wins will require
their professional skills and can ill afford their loss through
mass executions or indiscriminate bombardment.
A group of distinguished scholars has identified several
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other criteria which would indicate a need to apply the laws
of war to an internal conflict:
It is submitted that even though governments fighting insurgents generally refuse formally to recognize the "belligerency," they acknowledge the seriousness of the insurgency rather
clearly through alterations in their normal domestic laws and
institutions. Some of the signs that internal strife ought not to
be considered as purely domestic are the following:
a. imposition of martial law or state of siege generally or
in certain areas over a long period of time;
b. organization of emergency military or paramilitary security agencies, inter-departmental committees or councils
operating with extraordinary powers similar to those exercised
in wartime;
c. enforcement of laws and institutions commonly associated with wartime such as high draft calls, extraordinary
measures with respect to food and other necessities, transportation and the like;
d. drastic increase in detentions and other deprivations of
civil rights for political or security reasons, detentions over long
periods without trial, increase in trials not characterized by
minimal due process, or at least, due process as it was supposed
42
to exist in the state in normal times.

These criteria are nothing more than contextual factors
which provide a sounder index to those circumstances in which
human rights normally protected by the laws of war are endangered than do the traditional categories of riot, insurrection,
insurgency, and belligerency.

It

is

true that these traditional

categories reflected, roughly, differences in the duration, troop
involvement,

and intensity of

internal

conflicts.

Riots or in-

surrections seldom last long. Military troops usually pour onto
the battlefields only during insurgencies or belligerencies. One
might therefore conclude that the rights protected by the laws
of war are far more likely to be denied during an insurgency
or belligerency than during a riot or insurrection because the

government will, when combating the former, usually conduct
the kind of operations and adopt political measures that often
generate law of war violations. Policies adopted to control riots
and put down insurrections may, of course, also violate certain
human rights; but to the extent that the rights violated are

other than those guaranteed by the laws of war, they should
have no application.

The point remains, however, that the tradi-

tional categories do not invariably reflect accurately the degree
of troop involvement, the duration and intensity of an internal
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conflict, or the significant changes in domestic policies outlined
above.
A moment's reflection upon the factor of jurisdictional competency within the international legal order reinforces the conclusion that Article 3 ought to apply, even under a purpose
test, only to those internal conflicts far along the scale in terms
of scope, duration, and intensity. The sovereign equality of
states remains a fundamental building block of the international
legal order, 43 and states retain a considerable degree of absolute
discretion in regulating events within their territory. The idea
is enshrined in the United Nations Charter, which provides:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .
,",44
The continuing General Assembly consideration of the South African
policy of apartheid has-narrowed the scope of the domestic
jurisdiction reservation ,4 and the growing body of international humanitarian law demonstrates a growing international
concern in the very problems we have been discussing. As I
implied in my survey of state practice, a state will nevertheless still claim absolute discretion to deal with riots and
insurrections.
II.

How

DOES ONE DETERMINE THE SUBSTANTIVE
CONTENT OF ARTICLE 3?

We now turn our attention to the second major challenge
inherent in Article 3. To what situations does it apply? For
example, many metropolitan police forces use dum-dum bullets, 46 which have long been considered illegal per se in international law. 47 Are we then to conclude that their use against
bank robbers is illegal? Most governments regularly use nontoxic tear gases to disperse riots. If, as certain authoritative
43 Friedmann, Intervention, Civil War and the Role of International Law,
1965 PROc. Am.Soc. INT'L L. 67, 67-68.
44 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
45 See generally McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations:
the Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
41;Cf. Police in Memphis are Criticized Over a Rash of Killings on Duty
and Use of Dumdum-Like Bullets, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1970, at 34, col. 1.
47 The Judge Advocate General of the Army has recognized that "there
is an international law restriction . . . on the types of bullets that may
be used in both smooth-bore and rifled small arms." Opinion No. JAG.
W 1960/1305, filed January 4, 1961 in the office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army. The restrictions date back to the St. Petersburg
Declaraticn of 1868, (PHILLMORE, III INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-62 [3d ed.
1885]) and are summarized in ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 5:
Usage has, however, established the illegality of the use of . . .
irregular-shaped bullets . . . and the scoring of the surface or
the filing off of the ends of the hard cases of bullets. Id. at 34.
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sources believe, the Geneva gas ban extends to non-toxic gases, 48
must we also conclude that governments must use other, presumably more humane, methods of riot control? I raise the
questions not to answer them but to re-emphasize the subtle
interplay between the decision to ascribe a particular substantive content to the Article, and the decision to apply it to particular types of internal conflicts.
I think that the best way to get a handle on Article 3's substantive content is to analyze a series of hypotheticals. I assure
you that my examples are realistic if not real. Their realism is
a healthy antidote to academic theorizing, for these hypotheticals require us to fit our textual analysis to battlefield realities.
There are three techniques of interpretation which may be
used in applying the substantive content of Article 3 to these
hypothetical situations. One is to analyze the language of the
Article alone. Another approach is to analyze analogous but
more detailed provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Finally,
one might analyze Article 3 in light of a subjective, humanitarian standard.
A.

Analyzing the Language of Article 3
The first question one asks himself is who is entitled to the
humane treatment guaranteed in Article 3. Consider the following hypothetical case. Government troops engage a rebel band
entrenched in a mountain redoubt. The commander of the government forces decides to gas the rebels with an asphyxiating
gas. The Geneva Gas Protocol of 192541 forbids the use of such
gas. Most scholars now argue that the prohibition on the use
of gas is customary international law and therefore binds
equally those who did not sign the Geneva Protocol.50 For our
present purposes let us assume that customary international
law does prohibit the use of asphyxiating gas or that the government is a signatory. Does Article 3 prohibit the commander
from employing it against the rebels in their mountain stronghold?
Article 3 does not explicitly forbid the use of gas or, for
that matter, any other weapon. It does, however, in addition
to imposing the general requirement of humane treatment, forCf. G.A. Res. 2603 (A), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 30, p. 16 (Dec. 16, 1969)
reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 393 .(1970).
49 L.N.T.S. 65. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare.
50 See generally Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should
the United States Agree?, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 375 (1969).
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bid cruel treatment. One could plausibly equate "cruel treatment" with the infliction of "unnecessary suffering," the standard found in Article 23 of the Hague Rules5' and the basis for
outlawing almost all illegal weapons of war.
Whom does Article 3 protect? It protects only non-combatants, i.e., persons taking no active part in the hostilities. Article
3 would therefore not prohibit the commander from gassing
rebels in their mountain stronghold, not because gas does not
constitute cruel treatment (that is, as I have indicated an open
question), but because combatants fall outside the protective
ambit of the Article. Article 3 simply does not require that
government forces treat resisting rebels humanely.
The implication of this conclusion is disheartening. The
laws of war may be broadly divided into two branches: the
rules protecting non-combatants, often called the law of Geneva;
and the rules regulating conduct of hostilities, often called the
law of The Hague.52 While, as we shall see, Article 3 does incorporate much of the law of Geneva, it incorporates almost
none of the law of The Hague. Consequently, government forces
need not play by the "game rules" - particularly the provisions and principles of the Annex to the 4th Hague Regulation of 1907 on weapons, targets, ruses, and strategems - unless
their actions would unjustifiably subject non-combatants to
inhumane treatment.
A second hypothetical case will illustrate this possibility.
Government forces receive sniper fire from a small village.
The village is suspected of rebel sympathies, and reliable intelligence sources report that a rebel unit has set up headquarters
for its local operations in the village. The commander of the
government forces calls in artillery fire on the village. A Red
Cross medical unit is hit and several patients killed. Has the

51 It is almost impossible to determine what constitutes "unnecessary suffering," and some have therefore argued that it imposes no effective
restraints on the use of new weapons. Cf. J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 550-51 (1959).
52 The distinction is misleading for two reasons. The first is that documents signed at either The Hague or Geneva often contain provisions
with respect to both the protection of non-combatants and the conduct of
hostilities. Much of the early law on treatment of ncn-combatants for
example, was embodied in the 1907 Hague Regulations (e.g., Articles
4-20 dealt with prisoners of war). And the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol,
to take another example, would fall within the law of The Hague. Secondly, the distincticn is misleading to the extent that it implies that different purposes underlie the two categories. The purpose of the law of
The Hague is not simply to regulate or govern the conduct of tactical
operations but rather to reduce human suffering and protect fundamental human rights by limiting operational excesses. Its purpose is
thus the same as that of the law of Geneva.
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commander violated Article 3? Article 25 of the Hague Regulation states: "The attack or bombardment, by whatever means,
of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended
is prohibited.15 3 Article 27 says that in any attack non-military
targets such as schools, hospitals, churches, and museums should
be spared.5 4 Damage to such institutions and loss of innocent
lives does not violate the laws of war, however, so long as it is
incident to a lawful attack upon a legitimate military target. 55
While, as our first hypothetical showed, the rebel soldiers are
not protected persons, the medical staff and patients are. They
are entitled to humane treatment; and if one assumes, as I do,
that protection of non-combatants is the underlying purpose for
restricting bombardment, then the answer becomes first one of
interpretation, and second of fact. The interpretative question
is one we have already analyzed and shall analyze again: what
constitutes "humane treatment"? The general requirement of
humane treatment may be too slender a basis upon which to
incorporate all the rules whose purpose is protection of noncombatants, but we also find in Article 3 the injunction that
the "wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for." Like
all the provisions in Article 3, this, too, is very general. At a
minimum, however, one could surely imply that medical establishments cannot be attacked and that hospital staff must be respected. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how "the wounded and
sick" can be "collected and cared for." One may then conclude
that the general requirements of humane treatment and care for
the sick and wounded preclude indiscriminate bombardment
in the circumstances outlined above.
The second question is the factual one: did the attack violate the rules of bombardment? Was the artillery strike an excessive use of firepower? Was the Red Cross unit clearly
marked? Was it located dangerously near a legitimate military
553
Customary practice has modified this rule. Attacks upon military targets in undefended cities are legal. K. RABY, BOMBARDMENT OF LAND
TARGETS -

MILITARY NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY INTERPELLATED

(an

unpublished thesis presented to the Judge Advocate General's School
1968). See also, ICRC draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers
Incurred by the Civilian Population in Times of War. Article 6
specifies:
[S]hould members of the civilian population . . . be within or in
close proximity to a military cbjective they must accept the risks
resulting from an attack directed against that objective.
54 The immunity is not absolute, however. If enemy forces are using the
institution for a military purpose (e.g., using a church steeple as a lookout) opposing forces may attack it.
55 Cf. Article 6, ICRC I DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MILITARY
LAWYERS 61, 63 (1969).
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target? One cannot determine whether the commander violated
5
Article 3 by shelling the village unless he knows "the facts."
Analyzing Analogous Geneva Conventions
The importance of the facts does not make the rule unimportant, however, and we must know what it means. A third
hypothetical case will illustrate an interpretive means by which
we can flesh out the skeletal provisions of Article 3 by analogy
to provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Regular government
forces capture a guerrilla leader. He is wounded, though not
seriously, and is in some pain. He has not eaten in three days
and is hungry. The commander of the regular army forces tells
the captured man that he will get him medical attention and
food as soon as he answers some questions. The commander
then asks the prisoner several questions about the location and
strength of guerrilla units. Although the prisoner initially refuses to answer, he finally gives his interrogator the information, after which he gets the promised food and treatment.
The prisoner is clearly a protected person. True, he is a
rebel. But he is no longer fighting; he is in the "power" or
"hands of" government forces. He is hors de combat and therefore must be treated as a non-combatant. Does questioning
a man when he is hungry and wounded, and conditioning feeding and treatment on his answering, violate the obligation to
treat humanely? Is it torture? Cruel treatment? Humiliating
and degrading? Does such treatment violate the command to
attend the wounded? Where does one look for some standards
by which he can judge what constitutes torture or cruel
treatment?
One alternative is to look to the more detailed provisions
of the Geneva Conventions. For example, one could look at
Article 17 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention which
establishes guidelines for interrogating prisoners. Article 17
states:
B.

No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion
may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to
to any unanswer may not be threatened. insulted, or exposed
5
pleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. 7
56 An example of the growing literature which demonstrates little interest
in "the facts" of U.S. Army operations in Vietnam is Sheehan, Should
We Have War Crimes Trials?, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1971, § 7, at 1, col. 1.
57 The Article is a direct lineal descendant of Article 9 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations:
Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if he is questioned
on the subject, his name and true rank, and if he infringes
this rule, he is liable to have a curtailment of the advantages accorded to prisoners of his class.
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The Article does not bar all questioning. 58 It does prohibit all
coercive tactics. The Article is not without ambiguity, however, for what constitutes "disadvantageous treatment" remains
a question of interpretation. One could nevertheless argue that
the denial of food and medicine falls within the scope of any
reasonable definition of "disadvantageous treatment." This view
is reinforced by the frequent charge to treat the sick and
wounded "without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race,
nationality, religion, political, or other similar criteria."59' Refusal to answer questions should not preclude care, since "only
urgent medical reasons" determine priority of treatment.60
Other Convention articles point to the same conclusion.
Captors must evacuate the prisoner from "the combat zone" as
quickly as possible." One could imply then that beyond ascertaining identity, any questioning must be delayed until the
prisoner is interned in "camps situated in an area far enough
from the combat zone to be out of danger.' 12 Moreover, the
captor must "supply prisoners with sufficient food and potable
water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention. ' 3 The various articles just surveyed suggest one answer:
the commander violated the law by denying the prisoner food
and medical attention.
As a method of interpretation, this approach has much to
commend it. It refers us to a pre-existing detailed body of law.
Many Convention articles, for example, establish procedures
for implementing the humanitarian dictates of the law; and
since procedural safeguards are almost entirely unspecified in
Article 3, reference to the Geneva Conventions as a whole
would provide an authoritative solution to many problems of
insuring humane treatment. Where better to look for the
meaning of the general principles contained in Article 3 than
in the detailed provisions of the Geneva Conventions from
which they were deduced?
One objection to this approach is that it in effect incorporates the whole of the Geneva Conventions into Article 3 and
thereby makes applicable to internal conflicts a whole body of
techniques under the
Geneva Conventions, see Glcd & Smith, Interrogation under the 1949
Prisonersof War Convention, 21 MIL. L. REV. 145 (1963).
59 E.g., common Article 3; GWS Article 12; GWS (Sea) Article 12; POW
Article 16; GC Article 13.
60 GWS and GWS (Sea) Article 12.
61 POW Article 19.
62 Id.
63 Id. Article 20.
58 For a "handbook" on permissible interrogation
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law whose applicability the Geneva Diplomatic Conference explicitly rejected. The present hypothetical illustrates the point
nicely. Article 3 does not grant prisoner of war status to anyone. As noted earlier, delegates to the Geneva Diplomatic Conference rejected the notion that their governments should
treat traitors--and that is what a rebel is from the government's point of view -- as prisoners of war because among other
things they could then claim immunity from prosecution under
domestic criminal law.14 Established governments have a vested
interest in making the cost of unsuccessful revolution high; and
even the international community, whose concern must be as
much with stability as self-determination in a nuclear age, has
a considerable interest in shoring up the price levels. Immunizing captured rebels from ordinary or even extraordinary criminal processes may dangerously lower the cost of revolution.
An answer to this objection may be that one need not incorporate all of the Geneva Conventions' provisions; rather,
he need only look to certain provisions for authoritative standards for humane treatment. In the context of the present hypothetical, for example, the question is not whether the prisoner
may be prosecuted under domestic criminal law but whether
his captor may deny him food and medicine until he answers
intelligence questions. One can conclude after interweaving
various relevant articles in the POW and Sick and Wounded
Conventions that denial constitutes inhumane or cruel treatment without also concluding that the rebel cannot be tried as
a traitor. Assimilating a rebel to a prisoner of war for one
purpose does not dictate assimilating him to a prisoner of war
for all purposes. Some provisions of the POW Convention might
prove unworkable in the peculiar context of internal war. It
is far more difficult, for example, to determine "the combat
zone" in a guerrilla conflict than in a World War II-type war,
which was the paradigm in the draftsmen's minds. Others may
be incompatible with Article 3 provisions relevant to the present hypothetical; for instance, there is the clause in Article 3
permitting trial and execution. This clause would seem to permit prosecution of rebels even though prisoners of war could
not be.
not without advantage to the established
government; for while they may not be prosecuted under the ordinary
criminal law, they may be held for the duration of the conflict. Were
the rebel prosecuted, convicted, and jailed for committing a crime, he
could upon completion of his sentence return to the jungle to continue
the revolution - a prospect unlikely to delight the incumbent authorities.

64Treating rebels as POW's is
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C.

Analyzing Article 3 in Light of a HumanitarianStandard
Somewhat similar to the look-to-the-Geneva-Convention
-approach is the I-know-it-when-I-see-it approach to interpretation. This latter approach would eschew reliance on the Geneva
Conventions in favor of an admittedly subjective case-by-case
judgment. While subjective, the determination need not be
irrational. One would strike some balance between the right
of an established government to protect itself against domestic
enemies and the human rights of the individual. In the context
of the present problem, the observer would weigh the importance of intelligence information to government forces combating guerrillas. Professor Farer, whose enthusiasm for the
revolutionaries of the world is undisguised, admits that "in
guerrilla war the most serious problem facing the incumbents is
a lack of intelligence.... .'5
Recognizing the importance of
combat intelligence, the observer would keep in mind the
mounting evidence that coercion yields unreliable information. 6
If pragmatic reasons also underscore prohibitions on coercion,
the observer would be especially sympathetic to humanitarian
claims. In assessing the scope of such claims, he could examine
not only the Geneva Conventions but other documents such as
state constitutions and comparative criminal practice, human
rights covenants, reports of the International Committee of
the Red Cross, and General Assembly resolutions.
Conceivably, the I-know-it-when-I-see-it approach might
yield more humane results. The previously mentioned growth
in humanitarian law has occurred since the Geneva Conventions
were opened for ratification. The cutting edge of the law has
now advanced well beyond their provisions, even those such
as Article 3 which struck some as dangerously avant-garde at
the time. Looking to recent developments in humanitarian
law, as well as to the Conventions themselves, for standards by
which to measure "humane treatment" would incorporate into
Article 3 more stringent safeguards than are found in the
Geneva Conventions alone.
CONCLUSION

The notion that the laws of war should apply to internal
conflicts may well be an idea whose time has come. Many of
the present rules of war were initially advocated by scholars
and later included in draft agreements which never came into
05
06

Farer, supra note 8, at 64.
The Army Military Intelligence School teaches that one cannot get information from a dead man.

INTERNAL
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force before finally finding general expression in formal international conventions. The general principles were then elaborated in increasing detail in subsequent conventions. The idea
that parties to an internal conflict should respect the laws of
war has a similar lineage. Long advocated by scholars and included in draft agreements, it finally emerged in limited form
in Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. We must thus
all hope that the ongoing discussions at the United Nations
and in Geneva will produce at an early date tangible results:
a new and detailed international covenant for the protection
of victims of internal conflict.
In the meantime we must persuade with wit and imagination, a straight face and a reasonable voice, governments to
7
accept broad obligations under Article 3 to treat all humanely.'
Though states have too often ignored Article 3, their actions
nevertheless demonstrate a surprising sensitivity to humanitarian claims, particularly when those claims are based on explicit Convention provisions. The language of Article 3 is unfortunately general, but selective incorporation of the more
detailed rules of the Geneva Conventions can flesh out its general language. While it is true that the legislative history of
Article 3 shows no intent to incorporate all the Convention
provisions, their purpose was identical: to ameliorate the sufferings of war. And it is the nature of the suffering to be
alleviated, not the nature of the conflict, that should define the
application of the laws of war to situations of internal strife.
Otherwise, we shall have kept the humanitarian promise to the
ear of the innocent but broken it to their hope.

4;7 This

obligation might be best implemented in directives to military personnel. The soldier inevitably makes law on the battlefield. If he has
received sound instruction in his responsibilities, and if he has been
issued directives which embody sound principles, he will usually make
good law. The quality of the directives is all important because every
army runs on directives. I would therefore suggest that we draw up
model directives cn subjects such as detention and interrogation. These
directives would "concretize" the general principles in the penumbra
of Article 3.
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The format of Professor Merson's brief article is distinct in
its combination of case analysis with literary review. The
object of combining traditionally separate law review units is
to roughly juxtapose elements which together form an analysis
of interdisciplinary ,flavor. The central value of the combined
format is its capacity for bridging traditionally exclusive research systems: the law library and the social science library.
The upshot is, we feel, a fresh and healthy direction which
offers a new perspective of the proper role of law in dealing
with contemporary social problems.
N January of 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit decided the case of Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw.' If permitted to stand, Hawkins may well augur a new
round of litigation every bit as significant as the desegregation
cases of the fifties and the reapportionment cases of the sixties.
Hawkins may, if broadly interpreted, presage the wholesale
entry of the judiciary into the labyrinth of municipal services,
at least to the extent that there are perceived inequities in
the rendering thereof. Indeed, the overriding issue raised by
Hawkins is the nature and degree of involvement of the judiciary in municipal decisionmaking of the most particularistic sort,
i.e., who receives what, when and how. It is the efficacy and
propriety of judicial action of this sort that is the subject of
this comment and review.
The circuit court decision in Hawkins is the result of
litigation commenced by a group of Shaw's Negro citizens to
challenge inequities in Shaw's rendering of municipal services,
such as street paving, street lighting, sanitary sewers, drainage,
and water, as being based on race and economic class. 2 The
degree of discrimination in Shaw is dramatically illustrated by
the undisputed evidence that nearly 98 percent of all homes
1 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
2

Discrimination based on wealth was not alleged on appeal.
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fronting on unpaved streets in Shaw were occupied by blacks,
and that while 99 percent of white residents were served by a
sanitary sewer system, nearly 20 percent of the black population
was not so served. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under
title 42 United States Code section 1983, 3 but were denied it by
the trial court on the following rationale:
If actions of public officials are shown to have rested upon
rational considerations, irrespective of race or poverty, they are
not within the condemnation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
may not be properly condemned upon judical review. Persons
or groups who are treated differently must be shown to be similarly situated and their unequal treatment demonstrated to be
without any rational basis or based upon an invidious factor such
4
as race.
The circuit court reversed on the ground that the trial court
erred in applying the "traditional" equal protection standard

when, in the face of the plaintiffs' prima facie case of racial
discrimination, "a more stringent standard" of review was required.5 Invoking the test of Loving v. Virginia,", the circuit
court held that a prima facie case of racial discrimination may
be overcome only by proof of a compelling state interest. After
examining the uncontroverted evidence of gross disparities in
the provision of municipal services between the black and white
areas of Shaw, the circuit court determined "that no such compelling interests could possibly justify the gross disparities in
services between black and white areas of town that this record
reveals. '"7
By limiting its consideration to statistical evidence of significant disparities, the court found it unnecessary to determine

whether or not they resulted from the discriminatory intent of
those who govern Shaw. The focus was upon results, not
motives. In thus resting its decision upon data demonstrating
racial inequities in the quantity and quality of municipal services, the circuit court appears to have shed the protective cloak
of judicial restraint heretofore characterizing court scrutiny of
municipal action. In other words, the data alone are permitted
•42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
4 Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162, 1168 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
5 437 F.2d at 1288.
6388 U.S. 1 (1967).
7 437 F.2d at 1288.
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to overcome the usual presumption of validity attaching to the
exercise of a municipality's "police power" -data in many ways
comparable to that previously used to establish inequities
between the educational opportunities of black and white chil9
dren8 and inequities in population among congressional and
state legislative districts."'
The remedy of the circuit court also borrows from desegregation and reapportionment cases. The court fashioned its
remedy not by deciding in the first instance upon a courtordained distribution of services, but by requiring the municipality to "submit a plan for the court's approval detailing how
it proposes to cure the results of the long history of discrimination which the record reveals."" In its concluding sentence,
the court, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, asserts its confidence "that
the municipal authorities can, particularly because they so
staunchly deny any racial motivation, propose a program of improvements that will, within a reasonable time, remove the dis2
parities that bear so heavily on the black citizens of Shaw.'
It would not be surprising if the stringent equal protection
standard applied in Hawkins were to precipitate a probing judicial review of the multitude of disputes which rage daily
within county boards and city councils about appropriate apportionment of municipal services. Judicial intervention of this
sort, however, may be no more likely to produce an equitable
redistribution of municipal services than to elevate the quality
of education for black children or to generate more responsive
state legislators. In short, the courts appear to be embarking
upon the same storm-tossed sea which they have encountered
before and from which they have received a very considerable
battering.
The practical impact of Hawkins may also be limited by its
facts--the grossness of the discrimination found in the town of
Shaw. Consider the possibility of applying Hawkins to the more
sophisticated context of a large urban area. The court would
then be confronting more than one minority group and a governmental bureaucracy whose decisionmaking apparatus is significantly more complicated than that in a rural town of 2,500.
Even if a court should successfully sift through the far greater
mass of data before it, and conclude, as in Hawkins that inde8Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11 437 F.2d at 1293.
12

Id.
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fensible inequities exist, the fashioning of a remedy would pose
far more serious problems.
The problems of understanding discrimination within a complex urban society and of designing an effective remedy for it
are carefully explored by William L. Taylor in his recent book
Hanging Together.1 3 The author exposes the critical linkages
which bind the kind of ineouities confronted in Hawkins to the
social, cultural, and political phenomena which are their inevitable concomitants. He states his thesis quite simply:
All of our efforts against racial injustice will fail unless we are
willing to restructure our urban system and its institutions to
provide freedom and mobility and to allocate to all citizens a
share of the responsibility for overcoming deprivation and discrimination....
[I]t is possible to establish racial and social justice and to create
livable cities, but only if both challenges are faced together
14

Thus, the urban crisis and the racial crisis are seen by Taylor
as one Gordian knot whose strands are to be untangled concurrently or not at all.
In addition to identifying the inadequacies of our prior civil
rights efforts and of the economic and social programs currently
pursued to erase glaring discrepencies between black and white,
Taylor injects the new element of suburban/inner-city conflict.
He correctly demonstrates that "Affluent suburban areas are
still left free to accept large government subsidies for highways,
sewer lines, and other community facilities without accepting
any responsibility for alleviating any portion of the poverty and
discrimination that afflict the area as a whole."' ;,
After painting a bleak picture of what the future holds
should the trends of today go unchecked, Taylor gives us his
own prescription for channeling existing discontent among both
whites and blacks into a fcrce for positive change. Finding significant disaffection of white city dwellers together with a
growing alienation of middle-income suburban whites, Taylor
argues that "[F] rom these feelings there may evolve new definitions of community, new forms of political organization of cities
in which suburban citizens would accept some of the costs of
dealing with poverty and racial discrimination in return for a
share of control over a larger environment."'" In effect, Taylor
13 W.

TAYLOR, HANGING TOGETHER

14 Id. at 10.
15 Id. at 154.
16 Id. at 217.

(1971).
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is suggesting that if the shoe pinches both black and white feet
severely enough, the momentum for change may well be sufficient to produce a spirit of compromise in moving toward
equality.
There remains nevertheless a gnawing sense that all this
has been suggested before, and that without a far greater
national commitment to the solution of these problems Taylor's
proposals will remain just that. Perhaps Hanging Together
is most useful as an articulate statement of the liberal dilemma:
wanting to believe the best of the future, but finding little
evidence to support such a belief. In particular Taylor finds
little reason to hope that the judicial system will be able to
effect significant change:
It is clear, however, at least in retrospect, that the court
decisions alone could not bring out the fundamental changes
needed to create equality of opportunity for the mass of the
Negro poor. Measured against this goal, they were subject to
a number of important limitations, some inevitable, others not.
The rulings had little direct application in the North....
The rulings could not by themselves redress economic and
social injustice....
The rulings were widely ignored and violated .... 17

Thus, it appears that Taylor would view the remedy prescribed
by the circuit court in Hawkins as wholly inappropriate to an
urban setting.
What then, is the appropriate role, if any, of the courts in
righting racial inequities, especially in the realm of municipal
services? Has the Fifth Circuit evolved a role which may make
more effective the administrative and legislative tools Taylor
and others committed to racial justice seek? Or will the court
merely be sinking deeper into a quagmire of bitter controversy
and political hostility? The answer, I think, lies in the kind
of case the courts will be called upon to decide.
If the court, as in Hawkins, must intervene, unaided by any
prior legislative pronouncements or administrative policies, it
risks the fate we have earlier suggested of stormy public reaction. That fate is manifest in desegregation rulings which have
produced an arousal of community feeling hardly matched in
the past decade by any other issue of local interest. In Denver,
for example, U.S. District Judge William E. Doyle, 8 confronted
Id. at 86-87 (italics omitted).
18 Judge Doyle was subsequently appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals on April 26, 1971.
17
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with overwhelming statistical evidence demonstrating a gross
inequality of educational opportunity for black children in Denver's inner-city schools, found an incontrovertible violation of
equal protection and thus required the development of a much
more agressive desegregation plan by the Denver School Board.19
School board elections before and after Judge Doyle's decision
had demonstrated a dominant public sentiment against any
further desegregation of the Denver public schools. Although
Judge Doyle may have had no choice but to rule as he did, his
decision resulted in a direct confrontation between the judiciary
and a hostile school board. 2 ' In this instance, the court had
virtually no allies, administrative or legislative. Both the mayor
and city council had clearly demonstrated their antipathy
toward the desegretation effort. The court's decision, in fact,
became a rallying cry for those who vowed most fiercely to
resist mandatory desegregation. 1 The school board which had
previously contained one representative of the black community
now has none. This vilification, not only of Judge Doyle, but impliedly of the entire judicial system, bodes ill for the progeny of
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw.
If, however, the court intervenes as handmaiden to an
administration which is acting to carry out a clear legislative
mandate to promote racial equality, it is far more likely to meet
with success. The court's proper role is to adjudiciate, and it
can do that best if the issues are narrowed from a broad constitutional question to one of statutory interpretation. But how
will this be accomplished if we apprehend no national commitment to racial justice? The answer is suggested somewhat
obliquely by Taylor when in the closing pages of his book he
suggests that the easiest way of dealing with racial issues is
to merge them with the general issue of economic deprivation,
both black and white. He thus appears to retreat from the
implications of his original thesis that one cannot attempt to
remedy the problems of urban poverty without dealing directly
with the accompanying problem of racial discrimination, asserting that, "What is needed is a set of national ground rules

19 Keyes v. School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 990

(10th Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972)

(No. 507).

"" See Denver Post, May 13, 1971, at 44, col. 1; Denver Post, May 14, 1971,
at 1, col. 1.
21 Lewis, Parent Group Concerned Over Busing Effects, Denver Post, June

5, 1971, at 12, col. 1.
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establishing the basic conditions of justice and equality under
22
which local government can be made to work for everyone.
What Taylor appears to be suggesting is a concept quite
familiar to constitutional lawyers, namely, the doctrine of procedural due process. Without requiring an explicit commitment
to racial equality, one might find considerable popular support
for processes at the local level which afforded citizens generally
the right to participate fully in the conduct of their government. While cases of the posture of Hawkins inevitably place
courts in political jeopardy, a case calling for the court to
enforce national guidelines guaranteeing the right of a town's
1,500 black and 1,000 white citizens to participate more fully
in the apportionment of municipal services would not only
better insulate the court from political tempests but enable it
to perform a function for which it has more familiar and far
more widely accepted standards.
Courts are traditionally called upon to enforce standards
which relate to the procedural attributes of public proceedings.
Thus, at all levels of government, we have tried to insure that
the decisionmaking process incorporates notice to all interested
parties and an opportunity for them to be heard prior to the
rendering of a decision. These procedural safeguards are often
overlooked at the local level, however, so that only a pitifully
small proportion of the citizenry is given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to participate in the decisionmaking
process. By requiring adequate notice and the undertaking of
affirmative efforts to inform the citizenry of forthcoming decisions, and by securing participation in the decisionmaking process by all affected members of the community, federal guidelines could restore to the political arms of government the
primary responsibility for insuring equality in the rendering of
public services. Local government officials would then have an
affirmative duty to seek out the opinions of all interest groups
within a community before a decision could be accorded judicial recognition. Instead of confronting a municipal decision
within the broader framework of public policy, the court would
decide the simpler, and largely factual, issues of compliance
with the procedural guidelines relating to public participation.
Thus the complex decision of how to distribute municipal
services would be made by legislators-not judges.
Without legislative direction, however, there is little doubt
that when a case assumes the stance of Hawkins the court
22

W.

TAYLOR,

supra note

13,

at 289 (italics omitted).
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must in good conscience decide as fairly as it can in accord
with its constitutional mandate. But as this analysis has indicated, in a typical urban setting discrimination may simply be
too subtle to document, an effective remedy virtually impossible
to fashion, and any aggressive judicial solution thwarted by
public hostility. Ironically, it is the irresponsibility of the
political branches of government which makes necessary the
court's entry into these dangerous uncharted waters. The very
least that can be done, both for the cause of racial justice and
for the court, is a legislative declaration which assures procedural due process in local governmental decisionmaking to
all citizens. To advocate procedural fairness as a solution to
racial imbalance necessarily runs counter to the thesis that
racial problems must be confronted as a separate issue, but the
frustrations of the past decade must convince us that judicial
enforcement of procedural safeguards rather than a wide-ranging vindication of substantive rights is more likely to produce
an effective and permanent response.
Alan Merson*

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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Briola v. Roy, 459
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N June 30, 1966, Elizabeth A. Briola, a domiciliary of Colorado, was involved in an accident while driving her car
some 3 miles from Turlock, California. Mabel T. Roy, also
a resident of Colorado and a passenger in Mrs. Briola's car,
suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident. Mrs. Roy
brought suit in Colorado claiming damages under the California
Guest Statute.1 Both attorneys pleaded and argued California
law,2 and the jury was instructed on the proper application
of the California statute.- The verdict was in favor of Mrs. Roy
and Mrs. Briola appealed.
Counsel for both parties submitted briefs on California law
to the Colorado Supreme Court but were informed by the court
at oral argument that the Colorado Guest Statute would con5
trol.4 Although the decision of the trial court was affirmed,
the "willful misconduct" language argued by the appellant in
I Roy v. Briola, Civil No. B99587 (2d Dist. Ct. Colo., June 14, 1968).
2 In the plaintiff's Pre-Trial Data Certificate she pleaded that "[T]he plaintiff will rely upon the following Statutes of the State of California...."
(The first statute cited was CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1960), as
amended, (Supp. 1971)). In Defendant's Answer it was argued that
"[P]laintiff's Complaint and cause of action are barred by the State of
California Vehicle Code, Section 17158."
3 Instruction #6 stated: "[Slince the accident of June 30, 1966 ...

occurred

in the State of California, the statutes cf that state regulating vehicular
traffic on its highways are applicable." Judge Pinchick also cited the
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 to the jury, which reads as follows:
No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle
upon a highway without giving compensation for such a
ride.., has a right of action for civil damages against the
driver of the vehicle.., on account of personal injuries...
unless that injury resulted from the willful misconduct of
the driver.
§ 17158 (West 1960), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
4 According to Reed L. Winbourn, attorney for the appellant, Justice
Pringle informed the attorneys during oral argument that the court
would use the significant contacts doctrine instead of the old lex loci
delicti doctrine. The Colorado Guest Statute, cited by the supreme court
at 459 P.2d at 289 (Colo. 1969), provides that:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle as his guest ...

shall have a cause of action for

damages against such owner cr operator for injury ...

unless

such accident shall have been intentional . . . or caused by . . .

intoxication, or by negligence consisting of a willful and
wanton disregard of the rights of others.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963).
5 Briola v. Roy, 459 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1969).

COMMENT

the second assignment of error," referring to the California
Guest Statute, appeared in the supreme court's opinion as
"intentional disregard ' 7 and "willful and wanton misconduct, '"
the language of the Colorado Guest Statute.
Of central importance to the analysis of Briola is the fact
that the Colorado Supreme Court applied Colorado law to a
California tort. The court's action in this regard appears to be
in direct conflict with the doctrine of lex loci delicti which has
been the undisputed law in Colorado since 1887. 9 The lex loci
rule provides that the substantive law of the state in which
the tort occurred controls the litigation.' ' In the instant case
there is no doubt that the tort occurred in California. By applying the Colorado Guest Statute in Briola, the court apparently
disregarded the doctrine of lex loci; yet, at no point in Justice
Day's opinion is the choice of law issue raised or discussed.
Prior to the instant case, the Colorado Supreme Court had
manifested no inclination to alter the established precedent in
this area of conflict of laws. In the earlier case of Pando v.
Jasper," a passenger sued the driver for injuries suffered in an
accident in Kansas. Both parties were domiciliaries of Colorado,
and no other cars were involved. The case was tried in Colorado, and the court reaffirmed longstanding precedent by stating that, in such a situation, "[P]laintiff's claim is governed
by the lex loci delicti ....'" Although the Kansas Guest Statute
was not applied because of the defendant's failure to include
the statute in his pleadings, this case has been repeatedly cited
3
as the controlling statement on Colorado choice of law in torts.'
Nine months before Briola, the Colorado Federal District
Court cited Pando as controlling in Bannowsky v. Krauser.14 The
acts alleged in that wrongful death action occurred in Colorado
" Id. at 289.
7 Id. at 291.
8 Id. at 290.

9'Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 15 P. 821 (1887).
"'See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-83 (1934); R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 317 (rev. ed. 1968); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 200 (1971).
11133 Colo. 321, 295 P.2d 229 (1956).
12 Id. at 323, 295 P.2d at 230.
'3 Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 12, 19 (1964); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the
Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under
"Foreseeable and Insurable Laws: 1," 69 YALE L.J. 595, 601 (1960);
Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 21, 37 (1959); Smith, Choice
of the Applicable Law in Colorado, 35 DICTA 162, 173 (1958); Storke,
Another Decade of Colorado Conflicts, 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 139, 148
(1960); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48
CORNELL L.Q. 215, 234 (1963).
14 294 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (D. Colo. 1969).
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while the plaintiff was a domiciliary of New Mexico. In response
to arguments made by the plaintiff for the application of
New Mexico law, the court stated that "[W] e are not presented with any evidence which would indicate that the Colorado Supreme Court is likely to embrace the new conflict of
law principle."' 15
The new principle alluded to in Bannowsky is the significant contacts doctrine.10 This rule, a relatively new approach in
conflict of laws, was first introduced in the New York case of
Babcock v. Jackson17 and has since been adopted by 21 states.18
It allows the court to give "controlling effect to the law of the
jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with
the occurrence or parties, has the greatest concern with the
'
specific issue raised in the litigation."19
Under such analysis, Briola v. Roy could have been tried
under Colorado law, as California had little contact with the
parties or the occurrence. However, before it can be said that
the court has actually adopted the significant contacts doctrine,
it remains to be determined whether, under these circumstances,
the court could have applied Colorado law to a California tort
without resorting to a significant contacts analysis.
Two possible alternatives come to mind and should be con15 Id. The court footnoted in its entirety the balancing of interests test
found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1964) which was argued by plaintiff:
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant
relationship with the cccurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in
determining the state of the most significant relationship
include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where
the conduct occurred, (c) the domicile, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts,
the forum will consider the issues, the character of the tort,
and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the interested
states.

16 The specific label "significant contacts" is relatively unimportant. Other
variations on this theme include "center of gravity," "significant interests," and, most recently, "interest analysis." The import of these doctrines is that they all negate the lex loci delicti doctrine. For a brief
summary in this area see 23 ME. L. REV. 242-47 (1971). For a more
detailed analysis see D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS (1965);
Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on
Reading Cavers, The Choice of Law Process, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 141
(1967); 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 551-654 (1968).
17 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
18 R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 10, at 234-35 lists the following states and their
leading cases on significant contacts:

Alas., Ariz., Cal., D.C., Ill., Ind.,

Iowa, Ky., Me., Minn., Miss., Mo., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore., Pa.,
R.I., Tex., Wis.

19 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963).
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sidered. If California law had not been pleaded, the court could
have applied Colorado law by following Pando's holding with
respect to the Kansas Guest Statute. However, as has been discussed, the attorneys did plead the California Guest Statute,
and the court accepted their arguments. Since the trial judge
also instructed the jury as to the specific California law, there
is no possibility that the Colorado Guest Statute was applied
under a Pando rationale.
Had the court felt that the provisions of the guest statute
were procedural, as opposed to substantive, the Colorado Guest
Statute could have been applied without resorting to the significant contacts doctrine.2 0 A standard definition to follow in analyzing the problem is, "If .. . the foreign rule in issue is not
especially difficult to find and apply and if there is any probability that the rule may affect the outcome, the rule should be
considered 'substantive' . . . .,,21The California Guest Statute
was obviously easy to find. Moreover, its requirements for negligence demanded the lesser evidentiary showing of "willful
misconduct" as compared to the Colorado Statute's "intentional"
and "willful and wanton." This suggests that the choice of guest
statute might have affected the outcome, thereby making the
law substantive, not procedural.
Based on the foregoing it seems reasonable to conclude that
the Colorado Supreme Court did apply the significant contacts
rule to an out-of-state tort without mentioning the issue in its
opinion. Because of the similarity of the statutes involved and
the simplicity of the fact pattern, the court was able to embrace
the significant contacts analysis without a detailed discussion.
The absence of such discussion, however, has resulted in considerable confusion as to what the law really is.
Significant contacts is not an easy doctrine to apply, as
other states have discovered. 22 A more complex fact pattern
21See Parker v. Plympton, 85 Colo. 87, 102, 273 P. 1030, 1035

(1929):
"[M]atters of practice and procedure are almost universally governed by
the law of the forum. This is so even when the substantive laws of different states are involved .... "
21 R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 10, at 46. See also Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260,
268, 14 P.2d 1087, 1091 (1932): "[W]e mean by substantive law the positive law of duties and rights which gives rise to a cause of action, as
distinguished from adjective law, which pertains to practice and procedure, or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is made
effective."
22 See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970); Reich v. Purcell 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Clark v. Clark,
107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966). See also the cases which followed
Babcock: Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380,
274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394,
301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
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plus a detailed set of criteria for balancing the interests 23 could
combine to complicate application and cause confusion. The
Colorado Supreme Court has not circumvented the difficulties
involved in changing the law by simply refusing to analyze or
discuss the issue. Because of this omission, it is probable that
the legal community remains unaware of the application of
significant contacts in Colorado. Moreover, the few attorneys
cognizant of the court's action in Briola have no local guidelines
for arguing the significant contacts doctrine in the future.
In 1887, the Colorado Supreme Court felt that any departure
from lex loci delicti "would be more likely to lead to confusion
and oppression than to any beneficial results. '24 The current
court has made that prediction come true for no necessary reason. Hopefully, the court will take steps to clarify the ambiguous import of Briola, and continue to perform its duty of providing the Colorado legal profession with a clear statement
of the law.
Roger W. Arrington

23

See note 15 supra for an example.

24 Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 438, 15 P. 821, 824

(1887)

Citing Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465, 471 (1861).
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THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND
By FRED P. GRAHAM

New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970. Pp. x, 377.
$7.95

M

OST of the voluminous writings about the work of the
United States Supreme Court are directed at legal specialists: lawyers, judges, and scholars. This survey of the Warren Court's criminal justice decisions in the 1960's by Fred
Graham of the New York Times is one of a very small number
addressed to a larger audience. It presents an accurate, yet
readable, description and analysis of this most important phase
of the Court's work. Inevitably it invites comparison with
two most successful books of this genre: Gideon's Trumpet
by Anthony Lewis (1964), a fascinating account of the various
steps by which the right to counsel in all serious criminal cases
was finally established, and James E. Clayton's, The Making of
Justice (1964), an insightful examination of the work of the
Court during a single term. Graham's study of the Warren
Court's criminal justice decisions in the 1960's is somewhat less
successful, due in part to the far greater complexity of his
undertaking, and his difficulty in resolving his own conflicting
views of the Warren Court's achievements.
Graham's title derives from statements made in 1928 by
former Chief Justice Hughes in a series of lectures, later pub-

lished as The Supreme Court of the United States (1928).
Hughes termed as 'self-inflicted wounds" the Dred Scott case,'
the changed decision on the legal tender issue produced by
Court-packing following the Civil War, 2 and the 1895 invalidation of the federal income tax 3 which made necessary the sixteenth amendment. Each represented judicial resolution of political issues of the highest order, with tremendous stakes turning
on the decision of the Court. Each affected the power of the
I Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2 Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) rev'g Hepburn v. Griswold,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
3 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing, 158
U.S. 601 (1895).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

political branches to govern, and as a consequence, aligned the
Court for and against the interests of a major part of the population. Graham's thesis is that the effort of the Warren Court
in the 1960's to place legal controls on the nation's police, culminating in the 1966 Miranda case, 4 is of the same order of
magnitude.
It is a fascinating and involved story that Graham tells. It
begins in 1923, when for the first time, the United States Supreme Court determined in Moore v. Dempsey' that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment required a federal
district judge to determine whether or not a state defendant
was detained in violation of his constitutional rights, based on
allegations that his trial was influenced by mob threats and acts.
Even earlier in the 1890's, the Court had discovered the potentialities of the due process clause as a weapon for protecting
property rights and invalidating "unreasonable" social legislation. 6 In 1925, just 2 years after Moore, it held that the first
amendment free speech guarantee was protected by the fourteenth amendment against state action.7 From the 19 20's to the
present the story is one of increasing pressure by the Supreme
Court on the states, first, to make them conform to standards
-f basic fairness (the "fair trial" rule) and later, in the 1960's,
to adopt and apply the same procedures which the Bill of Rights
required of the federal government. While the Court has never
accepted the full incorporation theory pressed by Justices Black
and Douglas, the Court has incorporated one by one all of the
specific procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights save grand
jury indictment and jury trial in civil cases.8
What did the Warren Court actually do in the 60's, and
what changes did its decisions produce in police and prosecutional practices? The process began with Mapp v. Ohio,9 where
the Court applied to the states the federal rule excluding from
trial evidence illegally obtained, thus taking a step it had rejected in 1949.'" Second, the Court began incorporating one by
one into the fourteenth amendment due process clause various
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
6 See generally E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST
FLOWERING,

&

GOVERNMENT:

DECLINE OF A FAMvous JUDICIAL CONCEPT

THE

RISE,

(1951).

7Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
s Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), with Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). There has not yet been a Supreme Court
holding that the eighth amendment bail provision is incorporated, but
there is little doubt that the Court would include it.

9367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10 Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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specific procedural guarantees from the Bill of Rights, a policy
the Court had refused to follow during the previous 70 years.
In 1963, Gideon v. Wainwright' imposed the sixth amendment
right to counsel on state trials. Douglas v. California1 2 extended
the right to appeal. In 1964, Malloy v. Hogan" extended to state
proceedings the privilege against self-incrimination, and in
Griffin v. California14 the Court reversed precedents of long
standing in holding invalid comment by a state trial judge on the
failure of a defendant to testify on his own behalf. Perhaps
most devastating to both state and federal officials was the
decision in Miranda v. Arizona" which went beyond any previous decision in laying down specific rules governing the advice
and warning to be given a suspect before his statement would
be admissible in court. Now a suspect has to be told of his right
to remain silent, that his statements could be used against him,
that he has a right to counsel of his own choice or, if indigent,
to receive the assistance of appointed counsel. Ever the realist,
the Court then provided an escape mechanism by recognizing
the suspect's capacity to waive his rights and make a statement
in response to questioning. In a related development, a suspect
was given the right to have his own or appointed counsel at a
line-up,16 but this too could be waived. The double jeopardy
bar was applied to the states in Benton v. Maryland;7 the sixth
amendment right to confront witnesses was incorporated in
Pointer v. Texas;18 compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
was held applicable in Washington v. Texas;19 speedy trial was
incorporated in Klopfer v. North Carolina;20 the right to trial
by jury in Duncan v. Louisiana;"1 the bar against cruel and
22
unusual punishment in Robinson v. California.
In other pro-defendant decisions the Court tightened the
requirements for using arrest and search warrants (Aguilar v.
Texas -3 and Spinelli v. United States24 ), invalidated a New York
11 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
12 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
13 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
14 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
15 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967).
17 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
18 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
19 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
20 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
21 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
22 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
23 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
24 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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law permitting wiretapping (Berger v. New York 25), limited
the scope of a search incident to an arrest (Chimel v. California2 6 ), and required certain minimal safeguards in juvenile
proceedings (In re Gault " 7 and In re Winship28 ).
If this were the whole story, the Warren Court critics would
seemingly have open-and-shut proof that the justices, frequently
by 5-4 and 6-3 votes, had embarked on a crusade in aid of
criminal suspects. However, Graham is too competent a reporter
to present such a one-sided view. He rightly points to a number of significant decisions by which the Warren Court sought
to take account of the public interest in convicting guilty persons. One of those, involving the doctrine of waiver of rights,
has been mentioned above.
Starting in 1965, the Warren Court, in an unprecedented
move intended to keep the prison doors from swinging wide,
made its innovating decisions prospective in their application,
so that, save for the individual defendant who brought the case,
only those who were denied Miranda warnings, Wade lineups
and other rights after the date of the relevant Court decision,
21
could obtain their benefit. '
Second, the Court made several decisions which were extremely favorable to the prosecution. In Chapman v. California,30 it held that many trial errors. even those involving constitional rights, might be deemed "harmless" and that the
error must appear harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In
Harringtonv. California,3"however, the Court seemingly adopted
a less stringent test. In cases where there is a substantial body
of evidence in addition to the tainted element of proof, lower
courts clearly have a way of escaping from the effect of error. In
Katz v. United States,'-' the Court described a warrant procedure that justified wiretapping. Warden v. Hayden 33 threw out
the old "mere evidence" rule and allowed searches for evidence
of crime. Terry v. Ohio:' authorized police stopping and questioning of suspects in situations that would not justify an arrest,
25 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
26 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
27 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
29 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969)
having only prospective application).
30 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
31 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
32 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33
387 U.S.294 (1967).
4
.4 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

(summary of decisions
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and allowed a patting down of the outer garments where there
was reasonable suspicion that a suspect might be armed. The
Court also upheld the use of police informants to obtain evidence, 35 and allowed them to be equipped with electronic de36
vices to record a suspect's conversation.
The incorporation process, imposing more rigid procedures on the states than the previously applied "fair trial" rule,
along with tightening up of federal procedures in some areas,
all of this occurring in a period when the rate of crime showed
dramatic increase, accounts for the hostile public reaction and,
in part, for the anti-Court upsurge of opinion in Congress. It
should be remembered, however, that many legislators and
their constitutents have been anti-Court as the result of decisions outlawing segregated schools and other public facilities,
upholding conscientious objectors' pleas, protecting civil rights
and anti-war protestors, safeguarding rights of welfare recipients, and other pronouncements of an egalitarian, pro-minorities
coloration. In other words, the revolution in criminal justice
which Graham describes is really part of a broader movement
by the post-19 3 7 Supreme Court that had the effect of enlarging constitutional safeguards of individuals and groups who,
because of their "socio-economic or minority status, or their antimajoritarian activities, are usually incapable of exerting influence on the political arms of government. In short, once the
Court looked realistically at the plight of disadvantaged individuals and groups, it found no ready stopping place.
While the seeds of doctrinal change were planted long
before 1961, that year marks a significant change in the Court's
attitude toward state criminal justice. Herbert L. Packer has
described two models of the criminal justice process: 37 one
crime-control oriented, the other directed toward achieving due
process goals, protective of individual rights. The Warren Court
was regarded by its critics and the public as a due process
court. As Graham writes:
The Justices of the Supreme Court had decided [in 1961]
that the time had come to make the major restrictions of the
Bill of Rights that apply to criminal procedure enforceable
against the states.... Prior to 1961 each state had virtually
gone its own way on criminal procedure, administering criminal
justice with the degree of punctiliousness or muscle that suited
35

Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).

36 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) ; Osburn v. United States, 385

U.S. 323 (1966); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
37 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964);

See also H.

PACKER, THE LIMITS 07 THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

(1968).
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the style of its own people, and with little regard for the
38
Constitution and courts of the United States.

The latter statement is perhaps unfair to the states insofar as
the "fair trial" rule laid down by the Supreme Court was a
post hoc standard of such glaring ambiguity that states were
virtually invited to continue loose practices so long as the cold
record, retrospectively examined, revealed a result that appeared not "unfair."
Why did the Court change course in 1961, knowing well
that it was courting public disfavor and severe backlash from
a variety of law enforcement officials, as well as state and
lower federal court judges, and that it could expect support
only from that small minority of the population known as
"civil libertarians"? Obviously, the beneficiaries of the Court's
pro-defendant rulings constitute one of the least effective interest groups in the nation. Why did the Warren Court choose to
take this hard road in the 1960's, a time when the crime rate
appeared to increase substantially in the United States as it
did in most industrial nations of the world?
The fact that the apparent statistical increase in crime was
challenged by knowledgeable observers at least until 1968 had
little effect on the FBI-created popular judgment that crime
was getting out of control and that courts should be blamed
for coddling criminals. As Graham observes, before 1968 there
was serious doubt that the rate of violent crime was dramatically rising. Experts thought that the rate had been higher in
the past: "[T]he crime scare had been generated by crime statistics that were so questionable and by distortions and exaggerations of those statistics that some critics considered them
unworthy of belief. Finally, even those statistics didn't show an
alarming rise in violent crime until 1968 .... .,3:" Graham's observation is accurate, but perhaps irrelevant. The anti-Supreme
Court attitude of the population was clearly manifest before
1968, the year that Chief Justice Warren announced his intention
to retire. Responsible state and federal officials and the communications media had established in the minds of most citizens that a crime wave existed, and this-along with the
terror of big-city riots, the fears resulting from the revolt of
the young, and strong anti-establishment actions of minority
group activities- created a "state of siege" mentality that is
still evident in the early 70's. One reason that many whites
38 F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND Viii
GRAHAM].

39 Id. at 71-72.

(1970) [hereinafter cited as
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found it easy to believe in a "crime wave" was the high Negro
40
arrest rates for violent crime as shown by FBI statistics.
Overlooked was the fact that Negroes were the victims of most
black-committed crimes, and that the NAACP has advocated
a tough policy against crime. Equally ignored have been the
findings and recommendations of the President's Commission,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, that the causes of
crime, including black crime, were extremely complex, and
simplistic solutions were not in sight.
The answer to the question, then, of why the Warren Court
chose an unpropitious time to tighten judicial controls has to be
a combination of its despair that the states would ever take
the many hints of needed changes that the Court had dropped
in pre-1960 decisions and its broader concern with justice fol
individuals who had no effective voice in the political system.
Reform of criminal justice through legislative change or executive initiative, particularly at the state level was simply not
likely to occur; hence, the Court felt it had to assume the unpopular burden of making the necessary changes, on the additional assumption that it alone would take steps to correct an
unjust situation.
This, essentially, is the story Graham has to tell. The "selfinflicted wound" resulted from the Court's attempts to increase
the safeguards of criminal suspects and defendants at a time
when the national mood was particularly unripe for such a
development. Query: When is this likely to be a popular move?
His own conclusion, based on numerous interviews and various
empirical studies, is that the decisions did not substantially
diminish the ability of police to arrest and prosecutors to convict criminals.
It is at this point that Graham's own confusion becomes
evident. Clearly sympathetic to the Court's reaching out to help
the underdog, he nevertheless is struck by the Court's willingness to act in accordance with values that lie outside the popular consensus. This clash between an "unrepresentative Court,"
responsive to the highest ideals of equality and justice, and a
perhaps more representative Congress and President, attuned
4
more closely to popular opinion, is unique in our history .
More typically it has been the Court that preferred ancient
and more conservative ways and tried to defy popular opinion
40
41

See id. ch. V, "Negro Crime and the Supreme Court."

The lack of popular support for civil liberties has been well-documented.
See e.g., S. KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL FREEDOM ch. 1
(1968)

(summarizing this tendency).
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as revealed through presidential-legislative representatives. The
Court fight of the 1930's comes quickly to mind.
In the final analysis, it is doubtful if the "self-inflicted
wound" analogy is correct. The signal characteristic of the
"wound" cases cited by Chief Justice Hughes was that each
decision tended to affect the power of the political branches
to govern. In support of that thesis, Graham's evidence is relevant but not wholly convincing. He cites the fact that in 1965
the Gallup Poll found 48% of the public believing that courts
were too lenient with criminals and, by 1968, found 63% feeling
42
that way.
In 1968 Congress voted overwhelmingly to include in the
Omnibus Crime Control Act a provision that purported to reverse
Miranda in the Federal courts. Abe Fortas was denied confirmation as Chief Justice. ...Richard Nixon won the Presidency after
promising to appoint Justices to retract Miranda and other decisions. Finally, Earl Warren was replaced, upon his retirement,
with Warren E. Burger, a judge who had criticized much that
43
the due process revolution had produced.

Yet, as on earlier occasions in Supreme Court history, the controversy subsided with changes in Court personnel. A few Congressional threats of impeachment directed at Justice William
0. Douglas in 1970-71 marked the withdrawal of Congress from
44
the battlefield. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act,
however, stands as a monument to Congressional displeasure
with the Warren Court, but it is yet to be tested, and it applies
only to federal proceedings. In one proposed revision of Title
II the Congress would have stripped away the Court's review
45
power over certain state decisions, but this failed to pass.
Only time will establish how many of the Warren Court's
criminal procedure holdings will survive. The 1970-71 decisions
show clearly a tendency to cut back, but only Justice Blackmun seems ready to join Chief Justice Burger in wholesale
rejection of Mapp v. Ohio, Miranda, and the other controversial decisions. President Nixon, however, has decided to
move the Court further toward "strict construction," a euphemism for conservatism. Yet, to predict the long-range outcome
is impossible. The idealism of the Warren Court may yet find
reflection in a more youthful public opinion and consequent
greater concern by political leaders who value equality and
justice.
William M. Beaney*
42 GRAHAM

43 Id. at 9.
44 Omnibus

at 8.

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title II, 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3501-02 (Supp. V, 1970).
45 See GRAHAM at 327-29.
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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DEFENDING THE ENVIRtONMENT
A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION
By JOSEPH L. SAX
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971. Pp. xix, 252.
$6.95

T

HIS is a most important book. Also, it is very good reading.
Professor Sax advances far toward that elusive goal-giving coherence to the concept of "environmental law." Asserting
that the public interest in a decent environment should be
treated as a legally protected interest, he observes the recent
trend toward judicial willingness at least to listen to citizens'
environmental claims and suggests a line of substantive legal
doctrine for the courts to employ in protecting the asserted
public interest. The author's theory is woven from a number
of case studies that he also uses convincingly to demonstrate
two additional points: first, the limitations inherent in the traditional administrative agency approach to resource management
and regulation and, second, the democratizing potential of
greater judicial involvement in such issues.
Moreover, Sax's case studies, especially at the beginning of
the book, emerge in the fashion of a Gay Talese - seemingly
effortless storytelling, but, in actuality, a highly skilled marshalling of facts into a fascinating sequence. The reader is compelled to continue and, in so doing, has indelibly impressed
upon him the fact patterns that, later on, lead persuasively to
the author's creative legal theories.
Accordingly, Defending the Environment is both lawyer's
reading and layman's reading, and the more important for its
duality. To the lawyer, judge, or legislator, Professor Sax suggests a viable course of legal development, even to the extent
of supplying a model statute as an appendix to the book. To
the citizen, Sax presents a vivid, indeed, artistic, justification
for the adoption of his suggested course of action by legislators,
judges, and lawyers. In a democratic society struggling to
achieve a quality environment, Sax thus excellently exemplifies the lawyer as political scientist.
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I. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: USURPATION OR
ENHANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC POWER?

Essential to Professor Sax's plan is a substantial enlargement of the citizenry's opportunities to challenge in court both
public and private decisions involving environmental and resource management issues. Partisans in the current controversy
over citizen action and judicial activism, however, will find
something new in this book.
Both traditionalist opponents and activist proponents tend
to see expanded judicial intervention at the behest of "private
attorneys general" as a displacement of administrative agencies'
planning-managing-regulating functions and as an incursion
upon or usurpation of legislative policy-making functions. If
there be any romantic souls-- trial-oriented young lawyers or
others-who really believe such a fantasy either desirable or
possible of accomplishment, this book is not their meat. Perhaps more significantly, this volume demolishes the straw-man
that conventional critics would build out of such notions. Professor Sax repeatedly disclaims any suggestion of judicial displacement of other governmental branches. He seeks to make
the present system more effective.
As already suggested, the foundation thesis of this book
is that the public interest in a decent environment should be
treated as a legally-protected interest. Let us momentarily
forego inquiry into how that substantive legal rule may be
given life and assume that the judiciary will impose it. Would
that amount to a judicial usurpation of power? Not according
to Professor Sax's plan.
The author invokes exclusively infra-constitutional doctrine' and points out that judicial adherence to the values of
environmental quality normally would be effectuated through
equitable relief. That is, the courts would in each such case
suspend, interrupt, or substantially modify someone's promotional scheme or schemes. Any such injunctive relief would
create, vis-A-vis the legislature, what Sax calls a "legislative
remand" and a "judicial moratorium."
It would always be open to the legislature to modify or
overrule the judicial decision or decisions. The legislature would
be able to reconsider applicable public policies and, if it so
chooses, nullify in whole or in part a judicial interference with
any given resource development plan or class of such plans.
1 Sax

would oppose any attempt to develop a constitutional right to a
quality environment or to promulgate an "environmental bill of rights."
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Thus, the court's injunction would amount to a "remand" to the
legislature- the "legislative remand." By the same token, the
injunction would create, in effect, a time delay during which
the proponents of the project would be required to seek a legislative reversal if they wish to carry out their planned resource
use. That delay is the "judicial moratorium."
If the legislature approves the project or class of projects,
the moratorium would be brought to an end by the imposition
of legislative policy. If the legislature declines or omits to overrule the injunction, the judicial moratorium would, in effect,
wash into a restrictive legislative policy. Either way, the judicial remand would lead to the establishment or refinement of
legislative policy, and legislative attention would end the judicial moratorium.
Obviously, the concepts of legislative remand and judicial
moratorium assume that the proponents of enjoined or seriously
modified projects will seek legislative action. To the extent
that they omit doing so, it would appear that they deem the
defeated plan to be either not sufficiently important or unlikely
to attract legislative support. In either case, public policy would
seem to be served by the judicial intervention.
Remembering that we have momentarily assumed a standard of environmental quality to have been incorporated into
applicable law, it can be seen that judicial review of administrative agency behavior amounts only to a monitoring function:
an examination of how well the agency has applied environmental values to the case or class of cases at hand. Where the
courts reverse an administrative decision, they again invite
legislative review of the policy questions at issue -- again a
remand and, again, a moratorium, this time a moratorium on
the applicatioin of administrative policy.
Such judicial interventions, and their mere possibility,
clearly should cause administrative agencies and resource developers, both public and private, to incorporate environmental
standards more consciously into their decision-making and
policy determinations. Thus, both directly and through the ripple effect, Sax suggests, greater judicial involvement will increase the weight given environmental concerns in decisionmaking and will tend to keep administrative agencies honest.
Moreover, such judicial intervention should assist legislatures
in exercising their policy-making functions more effectively.
Sax sees that state of affairs as an enhancement rather
than a detriment to the democratic process. Inter alia, the leg-
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islature must openly and responsibly decide the important resource management questions, and the burden of going to the
legislature is shifted to the proponents of resource development
and environmental change.
While Professor Sax thus seeks to enhance the existing
processes of democracy, his presentation is in a certain way
flawed. That weakness stems from several instances throughout
the book where a liaison between the compositional need for
generality and the author's mostly successful inclination toward
the well-turned phrase produces somewhat extravagant prose.
A single example will suffice: Professor Sax gets off to a
questionable start with the first paragraph of his foreword:
We are a peculiar people. Though committed to the idea of
democracy, as private citizens we have withdrawn from the governmental process and sent in our place a surrogate to implement
the public interest. This substitute - the administrative agency is the
stands between the people and those whose daily business
2
devouring of natural environments for private gain.

To be sure, the second paragraph of the foreword immediately
begins steering toward the author's real goal. Nevertheless,
such heights of rhetoric, invoking images of a New England
town meeting panacea and, possibly, even, a "bad man" theory,
are misleading because they are quite contrary to points Sax
is at great pains to make, and makes so eloquently, elsewhere
in the book. One may expect negative critics to make good use
of such passages.
An occasional misleading gloss, however, cannot take away
from the author's real point which is otherwise persuasively
stated. Clearly, Professor Sax seeks to use the powers and
strengths of the judiciary to stimulate and improve the quality
and responsibility of the other governmental branches' actions
affecting resources and environment.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT: POWER TO THE PROMOTERS

Implicit in this volume is Professor Sax's recognition of the
elementary - but elsewhere frequently ignored - reality that
environmental concern is a function of resource planning, management, development, and use. At the beginning, therefore,
the author states what must be regarded as a truism: that the
existing legal framework for resource planning, management,
development, and use has failed miserably in protecting the
2 J.

SAX,
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quality of our air and water and all other natural resources, and
that the present legal institutions have proven inadequate to the
task. But he goes a step further. Critically, and in great detail,
Sax analyzes the now-traditional "administrative law" approach
to solving such public problems. He argues, broadly, that to
design additional management, regulatory, or advisory agencies,
commissions, or procedures, or to devise coordination or supercoordination of such existing institutions or procedures will not
get to the root of the environmental problem.
Professor Sax sees that root in the basic inequality of power
between those embodying society's interest in developing our
resources and those embodying society's interest in preserving
environmental quality. Without espousing any "bad man"
theory, one may notice that a person or entity seeking to use
or develop a resource necessarily has at least a relatively
specific plan, a set of usually well-defined purposes, financial
backing, and, correlative to the foregoing, regularized lines of
communication to centers of community power, both private
and public. And that applies whether the subject be roadbuilding, timber cutting, electric power production, or real estate
development. On the other hand, those whose interests in
specific cases oppose such resource development or use ordinarily start out unorganized, seeking the more diffuse goal of
"environmental quality," absent financial backing, and without
regularized pipelines to community leadership or public officials. Moreover, in the nature of things, the developmental
interests are the initiators and the opponents are the reactors.
And that situation usually leads to myriad differentials in time
advantage, ability to develop evidence bearing on environmental risks, and capacity to develop alternate proposals.
Given such an imbalance between developmental interests
and their opponents, Sax demonstrates that, even if the administrative agency is not itself the promoter (as in the case of
timber cutting on public lands or roadbuilding), but is, rather,
a regulator (as in various uses of navigable waters or developments affecting fish and wildlife), that agency generally is
early presented with only the proponent's well prepared plans
and arguments. And let us not rely too heavily on independent
agency staff review, says the author. Too frequently, staff is
insufficiently funded to perform its statutory functions. Furthermore, the agency decision-maker, always subject to the
stresses and strains of the legislative-administrative relationship (e.g., through the agency budget process), will be prone,
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too often, to manipulate or disregard staff for reasons other
than the merits of a given case. "Sub-optimizing" is Sax's expression for the later process; seeking "other achievements" was
the euphemism of one of Sax's dramatis personae.
If the foregoing seems a trifle superficial, let the reader be
assured that those tendencies of the bureaucratic system are
amply demonstrated by several of Professor Sax's case studies,
including, most prominently, the first and lengthiest-the
"Fiasco at Hunting Creek." The Hunting Creek case is a fascinating story of an almost successful multi-million dollar real
estate development on the Potomac River at Hunting Creek,
Virginia, near Washington, D.C. The developers' plan called for
the filling in of several acres of "waste" swampland in the
river adjacent to their upland property. Thus, the promoters
were required to obtain a grant from the Commonwealth of
Virginia of its rights to the bed of that navigable stream. They
also needed a permit from the United States Corps of Engineers in order to dredge and fill. The latter agency was, in
turn, required by statute to consult with the Interior Department before acting on the permit application. Interior was
responsible for evaluating the environmental impact of such a
proposal and formulating a recommendation to the Corps reflecting that evaluation.
Professor Sax's account relies primarily upon the public
record but is well supplemented by his own interviewing. He
recounts the Virginia legislature's completely unnoticed authorization for the governor to deed away the Commonwealth's
water rights. The story includes the governor's interminable
"study" of the matter, throughout the years of which the governor's office remained totally noncommittal to environmentalists on the merits. At the federal level, the story depicts an extensive bureaucratic pas de deux, featuring the Corps and Interior, represented by various technical experts (including an
Assistant Secretary), a number of lawyers (including an Under
Secretary), and two Secretaries of the Interior, all of whom
were subject to the (variously stated) "interest" or "neutrality"
of a number of influential senators and representatives.
No brief sketch could do justice either to the facts of the
case or to Professor Sax's fascinating text. It is enough, for
present purposes, to say that the "waste" swamp turned out
to have had considerable ecological and aesthetic value and that
the developers came within a hair's breadth of obtaining, ineluctably, all legal rights and authorities necessary to carry
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out their plan - a plan which would have destroyed those
values. That near victory would have been achieved, moreover,
despite intermittent clamor in the local community by persons
who had been unable to move any federal, state, or local
agency against the project until a congressional committee took
special interest.
The strength of the Hunting Creek story in demonstrating
Professor Sax's criticism of an exclusive "administrative law"
solution to resources and environment problems is two-fold.
First, the "fiasco" proceeded without any suggestion of venality
or even of ideological favoritism. As Sax says, speaking of the
actions in the Interior Department:
[T]he villians of the piece were persons of more than ordinary
competence and integrity and .. both their personal inclinations
and the mission of their agency were in consonance with the
3
values that they betrayed.

Second, to anyone familiar with matters of resource development and use, the story is a familiar one, atypical only in that
it became a matter of public record and, thereby, had to become
undone. The Hunting Creek story illustrates, at both state and
federal levels, the everyday activities of honest government
officials, respectable businessmen, and the lawyers who represent them-lawyers, frequently, of the most impeccable professional (including ethical) credentials.
III.

THE LEGALLY PROTECTED COMMON

LAW INTEREST IN ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY

If Professor Sax finds inadequate an exclusive reliance
upon the traditional institutions of "administrative law," then
how does he propose to employ litigation to redress the imbalance of power now overly favoring society's interests in
the development and use of resources?
Sax, quite literally, perhaps more literally than Professor
Reich, suggests the creation of a variety of "new property":
the substantive right of every person, as a member of the
public, to a quality environment, a right enforceable in court.
In essence, it would be a right to be extrapolated by the courts,
both state and federal, in common law fashion, on a case-bycase basis.
Doctrinally, Sax relies upon the "public trust" concept,
3 Id. at 52.

Another Sax case study, pertaining to the Hudson River Expressway matter, also supports Sax's thesis but goes further. It suggests
the controlling influence that can be exercised by highly placed government officials in their own private interest-in that case, influence at
least of the "keep the highway out of my backyard" variety.
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having its antecedents in Roman Law but recognized, to one
degree or another, in a few American jurisdictions. 4 It is the
idea that the sovereign holds certain common real property in
trust for the benefit of the public (property such as waterways,
seashores, and common parks); that the sovereign will be held
to a trustee's standard of performance in its management and
disposition of such property interests; and, moreover, that the
sovereign will be so held at the suit of any beneficiary- any
member of the public. Sax would expand the subjects of public
trust to include inter alia, air and all publicly-owned resources.
Not only, however, would acts of the sovereign become subject to judicial scrutiny, but a member of the public, both
through the medium of the sovereign (as fiduciary) and directly
as beneficiary, would be enabled to challenge any real property
owner's use of realty in a fashion injurious to the common
property-the environment. Thus would be created an analogue to the law of nuisance wherein the beneficiaries of the
common property would stand equal to the holders of traditional real property interests. It would be a far-reaching precedent for a democratic system increasingly characterized by the
concentration of traditional real property interests of all sorts
in the hands of corporate (developmentally prone) operatives.
Professor Sax, then, is urging that courts adopt and expand
the public trust doctrine and give the beneficiaries in virtually
all cases the standing to seek protection of their interests in
the judicial forum. But how may that be accomplished?
Theoretically, the common law courts of all fifty states
might develop the necessary law and procedure, should they be
so inclined. Similarly, the courts might employ existing federal and state statutes, as some have done already, 5 to hold
specific agencies to a high degree of care in environmental
matters. Any effective reform, however, obviously will require
6
more.
Sax suggests the enactment of a model statute authorizing
members of the public to seek judicial enforcement of the "public trust" in law suits brought against any person or govern4 See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
5 Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.,
Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Parker v. United States,
307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793 (1971).
6 Some might argue that at the federal level the National Environmental
Policy Act cf 1969 [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (Supp., May 1971), amending
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (1970)] may be sufficient if broadly construed as
in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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mental agency. By legislatively establishing the "public trust"
as the standard and by not defining that expression, the statute
would leave the courts to extrapolate the doctrine in a case-bycase fashion. Sax describes the bill thus:
Its purposes are essentially threefold: to recognize the public
right to a decent environment as an enforceable legal right; to
make it enforceable by private citizens suing as members of the
public; and to set the stage for the development of a common law
of environmental quality. As to the last consideration, the bill
purposely refrains from defining pollution, environmental quality, or the public trust. At this early stage in the development
of environmental law it is important to open the way to elucidation and consideration of a wide range of problems, many of
which are still uncertain, rather than to create confining definitions. Use of the courts to evolve a common-law approach to
environmental problems adds to the arsenal of the public interest
a significant weapon: the ability to meet problems as they are
identified and to formulate a solution appropriate to the occa7
sion- flexible, innovative, and responsive.

IV.

OF REMANDS, MORATORIA, AND OTHER ESSENTIAL EXPERIMENTS

Defending the Environment makes a strong case for Professor Sax's theory and his model law. Both theory and statute,

however, raise a number of questions, some of which are answered forcefully in the book, and some not. A few points
deserve notice.
While demonstrating well the democratizing effects of his
theories, Professor Sax does not specifically deal with the fact

that delay in the administrative process is not always benign.
Consider, for example, cases involving electric plant siting,
design, and regulation. One need not adopt any particular position regarding pumped-storage plants, nuclear plants, or the
proceedings of the Federal Power and Atomic Energy Commissions to recognize that litigation-borne delays in plant construction have played a significant part in the development of the
electric energy crisis in the New York metropolitan area. Even

conceding that basic environmental issues in electric plant cases
may center ultimately on reducing the expansion of electric
demand and on substantially revising governmental and corporate behavior patterns, the immediate social cost of crises such
as New York's could be disastrous. Accordingly, the "judicial
moratorium" and "legislative remand" deserve careful scrutiny.
Another point may be illustrated by electric industry cases
as well as those in food and drug, pesticide-herbicide, and a
at 248. The model statute has been in effect in Michigan since
mid-1970 and has been introduced in several other state legislatures and
in Congress.

7SAX
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host of other categories. Professor Sax does not come to grips
with the problem faced by judges when they cannot avoid
deciding complex, scientific, and technical issues, such as in
ecology, hydrology, chemistry, and radiation matters. The question is whether lawyers in black robes are any more capable of
proper decision-making in such instances than are the lawyers
and others who populate administrative agencies.
Also, while Professor Sax has taken great pains to show
that he does not advocate the abolition of administrative agencies, his thesis nevertheless limits the legislature's power to
delegate policy-making functions to executive and administrative agencies. The "legislative remand" requires the legislature
itself to take (or decline or omit to take) action wherever a
court has enjoined the carrying out of an administrative policy.
Patently, such judicial power limits the delegability of policymaking. But is such an undefined limitation wholly a blessing?
To the extent that the elected legislature has had "remanded"
to it the responsibility for deciding the major environmental
issues, democracy is served, and intuition suggests that, under
present circumstances at least, the quality of environment may
be served also. A legislature, however, cannot itself establish
every peppercorn of policy, and thus two questions appear.
First, since it is essential that there be some line-drawing
between the "major" questions of policy that may be subject
to "remand" and the lesser questions that the legislature may
appropriately be empowered to delegate with finality to administrators for policy extrapolation, how is that line-drawing to
be accomplished and by whom? Second, and perhaps more important, how can administrative processes be enhanced so that
delegated policy-making may be better legitimated? Can rulemaking proceedings be opened up further in both a democratic
and a due process sense? Can this be accomplished without
piling on more and greater impediments to the achievement of
finality in decision-making and policy-making? Professor Sax
might not concede these even as appropriate questions, and yet
they seem vital.
Reference again to the example of the electricity issue is
useful. It will be agreed that national electric energy policyperhaps aimed at long-term leveling of demand and production
-must be determined in a fashion consistent with both democracy and due process. It also will probably be agreed that electric energy policy is sufficiently "major" to demand open and
explicit congressional attention. But, surely, every detail of
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plant-siting, system interconnection, and environmental tradeoff cannot be decided by Congress and, viewed realistically,
will not be. How shall we determine, in the open, how to divide
the necessary legislative responsibility from the properly administrative? And what steps can we take to build greater national confidence in the administrative processes for policymaking? Irrespective of one's response to such questions, one
thing is certain: no answer may be allowed to comprehend the
possibility of total electric power failure in a metropolitan area
such as New York City pending action on a "legislative
remand."
Having advanced those several questions, one must point
out an important strength in Professor Sax's thesis, an element
that may provide the setting for the resolution of such issues.
That strength is the author's reliance on judicial experience in
decision-making to sort out the socially important from the
socially unimportant, the frivolous from the significant, as particular cases are presented. Given the crisis proportions of
America's environment and resources problems, it is probably
appropriate to rely on such judicial expertise to resolve issues
of the kind raised above. That same judicial expertise and good
sense probably should be relied on as well to avoid the proliferation of litigation feared generally by many opponents of
greater citizen participation in public decision-making.
In addition it is clearly essential that other approaches to
improving the administrative process be pressed simultaneously
- including experimentation with the ombudsman, with the
''consumers' counsel," with the traditional "reorganization" and
"coordination" of existing structures and the creation and abolition of structures, and with reforms of both rule-making and
adjudicatory procedures. Reforms designed, for example, to increase the portion of environmental decision-making based on a
written public record and written, principled decisions most
likely would complement the sort of reform Professor Sax
wants." Even the efforts to increase effective public access to
agency files could have an important effect.
If closer judicial scrutiny of the sort Professor Sax proposes
will help keep administrative agencies "honest," the Sax reforms should work in synergism with other essential reforms.
s It may be noted that Professor Sax's telling criticisms of the administrative process were directed, for the greatest part, at the more informal
procedures; but this, of course, is not to say that the more formal, quasijudicial proceedings and the agencies employing them are not also a part

of the environmental problem.
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THERAPY FOR DEMOCRACY

However one reacts to the questions raised by its thesis,
Defending the Environment compells us to give Professor Sax's
theory a fair trial.
This book is valuable, however, not only because it presents
a lucid, creative, and well-thought-out plan to help solve
environmental problems. Professor Sax offers a hope to the
individual citizen. It is a hope that could be generally therapeutic in a society presently so distrustful of its own democratic
instrumentalities, and in which large portions of the citizenry
perceive themselves impotent to affect their government's policies and, ultimately, their own lives.
One wonders about the effects of expanded citizen participation in the governmental process should it prove successful
in the sphere of environmental problems. Professor Sax's own
postscript is suggestive. Referring to a number of other social
problems in respect of which existing democratic government
appears to be failing as it has failed in protecting the environment, the book closes with the following:
Environmental problems simply illustrate our failings with
special poignancy . . . ironically, because environmental dis-

ruption affects the rich and powerful just as it does the most
humble citizen. The plunder of our natural heritage at last
brings home to us our equality-we all must breathe the same
foul vapors. The well-to-do are nct accustomed to being so dealt

with; their frustration is now a seed that will bloom in many
gardens.9
Let us hope so.
Charles A. Ehren, Jr.*

9 SAX at 245.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY BIRTH CONTROL. Edgar R. Chasteen.
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971. Pp. 213. $5.95. Edgar Chasteen
dramatically protests the "rape of our country" by those who
define progress in terms of consumer buying power and gross
national product. The book describes man's hopelessly destructive nature and inability to safeguard his environment, predicting that unchecked breeding and increasing numbers of people
will soon lead to environmental crisis. The author's tone is
almost frantic as he warns of the depletion of our natural resources, of the impossibility of feeding our masses, and of the
physical overcrowding which must result unless we stabilize
our population.
Chasteen deals with this current issue by tracing the concept of population control from Confucius to Margaret Sanger.
Concluding that family planning is an anachronism and that the
preventive medicine of birth control is inadequate, the author
dismisses legislation offering tax incentives for small families,
and advocates statutory restrictions on family size as the only
viable means of solving this problem. Although it is recognized
that the acceptance of such a law would not be automatic,
The Case for Compulsory Birth Control does not consider
whether the system is repugnant to our way of life or violative
of provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, it ignores the
problem of policing the system. In spite of these weaknesses,
Chasteen's empirical evidence and historical approach make his
call for an end to the "birthquake" valuable and interesting
reading for socially-concerned people.
Milton R. Friedman. New
York: Practising Law Institute, 1971. Pp. 464 (paperbound).
Milton Friedman, a widely known New York real estate lawyer
and scholar, has selected an extremely practical group of articles which discuss in some detail the intricacies of office, store,
and shopping center leases. Of particular value for quick reference are the sample lease forms and standard lease clauses
which Friedman has included. In short, this well-edited text
provides the practitioner with an excellent introductory source
for dealing with commercial real estate leases.
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LEASES - 3D.

FROM Now TO ZERO. Leslie Aldridge Westoff and Charles F.

Westoff. Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1971. Pp. 358.
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$7.95. In 1965, Charles F. Westoff released the National Fertility
Study, a report based on personal interviews with 5,600 married women located throughout the country. From Now to Zero
is a popularization of the findings of that study, which constitutes an analysis of contraceptive and reproductive habits in
America and their impact on population growth. Included in
the author's coverage is an investigation of the factual aspects
of reproduction and contraception; the attitude of the Roman
Catholic Church and its effect on the reproductive behavior of
Catholics; the fertility of the Black population, viewed against
the history of the Negro family and today's social and economic
environment; governmental population policy in the U.S.; and
previous and present efforts toward family planning. The
authors observe, as have many economists, that population per
se is not the villain that high production and consumption are.
This book provides an excellent background for the understanding of reproduction and contraception and American attitudes toward both. Each chapter concludes with an extensive
bibliography to expedite a more detailed study in the field.
Although it fails to resolve major policy issues in the matter
of population control, From Now to Zero represents an excellent source of basic population data.
HOW TO

Avom

LAWYERS.

Edward Siegel. Greenwich, Connecti-

cut: Fawcett, 1971. Pp. 350 $0.95 (paperbound). How to Avoid
Lawyers identifies several situations in which the layman can
attempt "do-it-yourself" techniques, and a large portion of the
book consequently deals with the "probate racket." Siegel
parades anecdotes of everyday legal dilemmas in the lives of
Mr. and Mrs. Upper Middle Class, and although he disclaims an
attempt to "teach the reader to be a lawyer," each chapter of
his "how-to-do-it" manual ends with copies of appropriate legal
forms intended to be adapted for use in the home.
The trouble with this book is not that it is professionally
deficient or that it presents a distorted picture of the mechanics
of a legal dispute, but that it is offered as a tempting panacea
to the problem of the high cost of legal services while serving
only to fuel the problem by encouraging laymen toward further
blunders and confusion. The legal profession is no doubt susceptible to criticism for failure to reduce the cost of legal services to the middle class. But this book is worthy of equally
strong criticism for deceiving the layman into believing that
he can successfully avoid the costs of a lawyer by drafting his
own will, contract of sale, or partnership agreement. Confusion
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and mistake breed complexity. Complex lawsuits are expensive.
Avoid Edward Siegel.
How TO BE A SURVIVOR. Dr. Paul R. Ehrlich and Richard L.
Harriman. New York: Ballantine Books, 1971. Pp. 207. $5.95.
This readable book is intended as a step toward a comprehensive "survival manual for Spaceship Earth." Ehrlich and
Harriman apparently felt little trepidation in tackling and resolving every conceivable economic, social, ecological, and political problem the world faces. The authors outline and discuss
a four-step conversion from our present situation to a more
idealized existence, including programs for population control,
de-development of overdeveloped countries, semi-development
of underdeveloped countries and, finally, continuous regulation.
Their broad discussion makes for a stimulating and hyphenated
view of the future, and includes a biblography of related works
for those readers who can't stop with one.
Charles S. Rhyne. Washington: CLB Publishers, Inc., 1971. Pp. xxix, 656. $22.50. This book is a comprehensive overview of the present status of international law,
covering its history, sources, and basic concepts. Rapidly developing areas such as human rights, outer space, and disarmament are extensively treated, as are the more traditional areas
of international law such as warfare and arbitration. The
author's careful analysis of the origins, functions, and procedures of international institutions and agencies should be of
particular value to the practicing attorney who might have
occasion to work with or through any of these organizations.
Also included is a section devoted to legal education and its
impact in shaping the growth of international law. Of particular interest is the author's lengthy discussion of the relationship between law and international economic development.
International Law is not confined to consideration of the past
and present, but also includes prospects and specific proposals
by the author and other authorities for the future of the international legal order. Comprehensive references to secondary
sources facilitate any additional research the reader may wish
to do in a particular area of international law.
INTERNATIONAL

REGULATING

LAW.

THE

POOR:

THE

FUNCTION

OF

PUBLIC

WELFARE.

Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971. Pp. xiii, 389. $10.00. Regulating the Poor
rejects the view that governmental social policies are becoming
progressively more responsible and humane, and contends in-
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stead that present welfare policies are politically motivated. The
authors' thesis is that "[E] xpansive relief policies are designed
to mute civil disorder, and restrictive ones to reinforce work
norms." In other words, in times of stress the government increases welfare benefits in order to quiet the public, but once
quiet is achieved the government returns benefits to lower
levels. Welfare policies, therefore, vary cyclically in relation
to the amount of social turmoil. In support of their thesis, the
authors discuss the welfare explosions of the 1930's and 1960's,
arguing that in both instances welfare benefits were increased
to assuage public discontent. During the interim, they point
out, welfare rolls were cut back. The analysis is radical, but
done in a scholarly manner. The commentary on American
government is both interesting and worthwhile reading.
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST.

New York: Arno Press, 1970. Pp. x, 537. $5.95. The book that
evoked the charge of "pabulum for permissiveness" by Vice
President Spiro Agnew in September of 1970 is something far
less radical than might be inferred from that statement. The
report is an enlightened analysis of the definition and causes
of, as well as remedies for, "campus unrest." Recognizing that
''campus unrest" has come to include "not only the intellectual
ferment which should exist in the University, but also all forms
of protest, both peaceful and otherwise," the Commission emphasizes that society should concern itself only with activities
on campus which are in fact both disruptive and violent. The
report cites the changing values of American youth as the ultimate cause of increasing student dissatisfaction. The restoration
of moral leadership in American society, the Commission submits, would go far to alleviate the problems of the American
college campus. In short, the crisis of the campus is a lack
of moral leadership with which a young generation can identify.
The substantive issues which gave rise to previous unrest on
college campuses continue to exist and, although campuses are
presently quiet, tensions lie closely beneath the surface. The
analysis and recommendations of this report definitely deserve
reading.
UNFIT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION. Ruth Mulvey Harmer. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971. Pp. 374.
$6.95. The author of The High Cost of Dying has written a welldocumented book to expose what she characterizes as the neglect of the scientific, industrial, educational, and governmental
establishments in the regulation of pesticides and the subse-
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quent effect of this neglect on human health and welfare.
Demonstrating how ineffective the regulatory agencies have
been in controlling the use of insecticides, she points out the
need for effectively enforced, consistent national standards for
the use of pesticides. Miss Harmer attacks in particular what
she terms the "insect mentality" or "pest hallucinations" that
in a
have been created by insecticide advertising -resulting
"bugs or people" feeling that often clouds the real issue. Identified as one of the problems is the reluctance of many people
in positions of authority to search for new ways of controlling
and eliminating insects.
After documenting the dangers of the DDT and organic
phosphate families of poisons and present policies for their use,
the author recognizes that chemical pesticides are here to stay.
She urges, however, that their nonselective uses be banned and
that their selective uses be carefully regulated. Many workable
alternatives to present methods are offered: new farming
methods, living pesticides (harmless insects that are natural
enemies of the harmful ones), selective poisons (those that kill
only one species), and the use of light and sound to attract
insects.
CONSCIENCE. Erwin Knoll and
Judith Niles McFadden, Eds. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1970. Pp. xiv, 208. $5.95. War Crimes presents selected
portions of testimony and discussion recorded at the 1970 Congressional Conference on War and National Responsibility.
Gathering at the invitation of a number of congressmen, a
group of noted American scholars, jurists, and public figures
discuss U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Among the numerous participants were Senator George McGovern, political scientist Hans Morgenthau, and Richard Falk, noted author in the
field of international law. Falk presented extensive analogies
between those violent acts punished after World War II and
the programs of civilian harassment and extermination which
are apparently an element. of present U.S. policy in Indochina.
Avoiding emotional extremes and focusing on reasonable justification for U.S. withdrawal, War Crimes represents a comprehensive collection of anti-war sentiment in America today.
WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN

ABSTRACTS OF
LEGAL

ANI) EMPIRICAL PUBLICATIONS'

CRIMINAL JUSTICE
A STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF HOT PURSUIT BY THE POLICE.
Edmund F. Fennessy, Thomas Hamilton, Kent B. Joscelyn, and
John S. Merritt. Center for the Environment and Man, Inc.
Pp. 260. The document covers
Hartford, Conn. July, 1970.
police "hot pursuit" of fleeing drivers, an active attempt by a
law enforcement officer in a patrol car to apprehend occupants
of a moving motor vehicle, the driver of which is resisting apprehension. The purpose of the study was to determine the
nature and magnitude of the hot pursuit problem nationally and
to prepare guidelines to assist the police in dealing with it.
Order Number PB-194 202. $3.00.
A CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING PROGRAM AND INSTITUTE FOR SOUTH
CAROLINA. South Carolina State Planning and Grants Division,
Columbia, S.C. February, 1970. Pp. 34. The report summarizes,
in memorandum form, the results of an analysis of the personnel training need of the several public groups involved in the
criminal justice field and outlines the physical facilities necessary to accommodate these training needs. Order Number
PB-197 484. $3.00.
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER ACTIVITIES. Gerald
W. Smith. Ohio State University Research Foundation, Columbus, Ohio. June, 1970. Pp. 168. Using over 27,000 criminal cases
processed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) during 1968, the author investigates the view that the
public defender is less effective for his client than is a private
attorney. The statistical data on the cases was divided into 20
information variables. Three types of questions were addressed
to the data: who is served by the public defender, how do
public defenders dispose of their cases, and what happens to the
cases handled by public defenders. The report includes a chapter on the history of the methods of indigent representation
and opinions on the value of the public defender, a chapter on
* These abstracts are reprinted from GOVERNMENTS REPORTS ANNOUNCEMENTS

and UNITED

STATES GOVERNMENT

RESEARCH

AND

DEVELOPMENT

REPORTS. Unless otherwise indicated, the studies abstracted may be obtained in their entirety by ordering from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. Payment must be enclosed with
the order, and orders must include the "order number" given after each
abstract.

ABSTRACTS

the analytical methodology, a chapter describing the statistical
analysis results by information variable among types of attorneys, a summation of results based on an original weighting
scale for sentences to determine comparison of attorneys' effectiveness, and an appendix of statistical data. Order Number
PB-197 648. $3.00.
A

STUDY

OF

THE NEED

FOR ARREST POWERS

PERFORMING CIVIL DISTURBANCE MISSIONS.

BY FEDERAL

TROOPS

David H. Stem. Army

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1970. Pp. 46. By analyzing missions performed by Federal
troops in civil disturbances and reviewing other techniques
which might accomplish the same purpose, a determination is
made with respect to the need for arrest powers. Order Number AD-713 356. $3.00.
Lubbock Metropolitan Council of Governments, Lubbock, Texas. May, 1969. Pp. 75. The
document presents a plan for the prevention of crime, increased
efficiency of law enforcement, improved administration of justice, and increased effectiveness of correctional systems in
Crosby, Dickens, Garza, Lamb, and Lubbock Counties, Texas.
Order Number PB-191 840. $3.00.
REGIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLAN.

ENVIRONMENT
1970. Bobby L. Dillard.
Regional Operations),
of
Bureau of Radiological Health (Office
Rockville, Md. March, 1971. Pp. 43. This report, which presents a review of state radiation control legislation, has been
divided into three sections: legislation approved during calendar
year 1970; legislation defeated or pending during calendar year
1970; and existing laws or statutes governing ionizing radiation,
non-ionizing radiation and radiologic technology. An index and a
brief description of each bill introduced in 1970 are included.
Order Number PB-198 374. $3.00.
STATE RADIATION

THE IMPACT

LOCAL

LEVU.

CONTROL LEGISLATION

OF FEDERAL WATER

LEGISLATION

AT THE STATE

AND

Kenneth A. Hammond, Daniel P. Beard, and

Keith W. Muckleston. Central Washington State College (Dept.
of Geography), Ellensburg, Washington. October, 1970. Pp. 358.
This study involves the history of land and water resource
legislation and the multitude of problems arising from a decentralized government. It relates directly to intergovernmental
and interorganizational relations, the practice of purchasing
cooperation through grants-in-aid, the evolution of goals for
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society, the means chosen to attain goals for society, and the
institutional reactions to changed public preferences. Special
attention is given to the impact on state and local institutional
arrangements, financial commitment and planning. Some conclusions are reached and suggestions for improvements are
made. Order Number PB-196 309. $6.00.
INSURANCE: AUTOMOBILE
CONSEQUENCES

ECONOMIC
VOLUME

I.

OF

AUTOMOBILE

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

(PART

ACCIDENT

1);

INJURIES.

REFERENCE TABLES

2). Westat Research, Inc. Bethesda, Md. April, 1970.
Pp. 396. The report presents the results of a probability survey
of police-reported injuries and fatalities due to automobile accidents in the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia.
The study represents 500,000 fatalities and seriously injured
persons. Order As: TD1.18:Ac2.V1 from Superintendent of Documents, GPO, Washington, D.C. 20402. $2.75.
(PART

ECONOMIC

CONSEQUENCES

OF

AUTOMOBILE

ACCIDENT

INJURIES.

APPENDICES (PART 3), Westat Research, Inc. BeApril, 1970. Pp. 299. The report presents the
thesda, Md.
results of a nationwide survey which identified and quantified
the economic consequences of automobile accidents and the
sources and amounts of compensation received by seriously injured or killed victims and their families. Order As: TD1.17:
Ac2.V2 from Superintendent of Documents, GPO, Washington,
D.C. 20402. $2.25.
Survey Research
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD AUTO INSURANCE.
Center, University of Michigan. Ann Arbor, Mich. March,
1970. Pp. 297. The report presents the results of a survey of
consumer attitudes toward automobile insurance, including
levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the present system
and preferences for reform. The volume also includes a representative selection of consumer complaint letters and insurance
company comments on the letters. Order As: TD1.17:AU8 from
Superintendent of Documents, GPO, Washington, D.C. 20402.
$1.25.
VOLUME II.

AUTOMOBILE

ACCIDENT

LITIGATION.

Federal

Judicial

Center,

Washington, D.C. April, 1970. Pp. 347. The report analyzes the
automobile accident litigation process and the impact of this
litigation upon the existing compensation system. It contains
national profiles and/or estimates regarding claims processing
time from suit filing to disposition and work load impact and
administrative costs of automobile accident litigation on the
state and federal courts. Estimates and national profiles are

ABSTRACTS

given regarding the degree of concentration of automobile personal injury practice among plaintiff and defense attorneys and
of the relationship between gross settlements, attorney fees,
and legal preparation expenses. Order As: RDI.17:AC2/2 from
Superintendent of Documents, GPO, Washington, D.C. 20402.

$2.75.
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION.

Wex

S. Malone, Fleming James, Cornelius J. Peck, and Dix W.
Noel. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. March,
1970. Pp. 95. The report is a compilation of four papers which
review the origin, development, objectives, and present status
of the negligence action. The papers further discuss the relevancy of these matters to current automobile accident compensation law. Order As: TD1.17: N31 from Superintendent of Documents, GPO, Washington, D.C. 20402. $0.45.
COMPARATIVE

STUDIES

IN

AUTOMOBILE

ACCIDENT

COMPENSATION.

Andre Tune, Werner Pfennigstorf, Donald R. Harris, Jan Hellner, and Allen M. Linden. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. April, 1970. Pp. 186. The report is a collection of
five papers by noted foreign scholars on the automobile accident compensation systems of their respective countries: France,
Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, and Canada. The papers focus
on problems and reform proposals current in these countries
and provide basic descriptions of how each system operates.
Order As: TD1.17: C73 from Superintendent of Documents, GPO,
Washington, D.C. 20402. $0.75.
CONSTITUTIONAL

PROBLEMS

IN

AUTOMOBILE

ACCIDENT

COMPENSA-

REFORM. Lindsen Cowen, Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. and C.
Dallas Sands. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.
April, 1970. Pp. 98. The report is a compilation of three papers
which explore, with respect to the Federal Constitution, the
constitutionality of certain widely proposed reform measures
for automobile accident compensation, whether enacted at the
state or federal level. Particular emphasis is given in the first
two papers to -the validity of these measures under the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The third paper principally discusses sources of constitutional power for federal legislation. Order As: TD1.17:C76 from
Superintendent of Documents, GPO, Washington, D.C. 20402.
$0.45.
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POPULATION
A VIEW FROM THE
LAW. Harold P. Green. George Washington University, Washington, D.C. March, 1969. Pp. 18. The document proposes that
recent scientific discoveries indicate that genetic technology will
come into being in the foreseeable future, and that its practice
will give rise to immense problems of public policy necessitating
social controls through the instrumentality of law. Order Number PB-192 547. $3.00.
PUBLIC POLICY FOR GENETIC

MANIPULATION:

